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Most people think of the world as divided into countries, 
and many people identify with their “own” country. Because 
there’s nothing natural in this, governments and others need 
to continually encourage identification with the nation. This 
serves those with power and wealth.
Ruling Tactics outlines the methods commonly used to foster 
everyday nationalism and how they can be countered. These 
methods are described in a range of areas, including crime, 
sport, language, economics, terrorism and war. Ruling 
Tactics can serve as a practical manual for recognising how 
thinking is oriented towards the state, and how this sort of 
thinking can be changed.
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Many people love their country. They think it’s the 
greatest. It’s the place where they want to live. They 
defend it against criticism. They may even be willing to 
die or kill for it.  
 Some phrases indicate unwavering loyalty. A US 
example is “My country, right or wrong.” Others phrases 
condemn those who are disloyal. In the US, “unAmerican” 
is a term of contempt, and social critics may be told, 
“Love it or leave it.” 
 However, even among critics, feelings of national 
pride or identification are common. When it’s time for the 
World Cup, how many soccer fans cheer for a team from a 
country where they have never lived nor have any family 
or personal connections? How many people care more 
about the economic prosperity of people in Bangladesh or 
Togo than those in the country where they live? 
 Thinking from the viewpoint of a country—including 
its people, its government and its social institutions—can 
generate enormous passions. This commitment could be 
called patriotism or nationalism, but it is broader than 
this—it is a way of understanding the world and one’s 
place in it.  
 There’s no good word to describe this sort of think-
ing. It might be called “countryism,” except there’s more 
involved than the country. A key part of the equation is 
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the link between loyalty to and identification with a 
country and loyalty to and identification with the govern-
ment and its related functions, commonly called the state. 
These are certainly not the same. You might love a 
country and hate its government. But government support-
ers have another agenda: they want to tie country loyalties 
to support for dominant social arrangements, including the 
government itself and, more generally, the distribution of 
wealth and power. This doesn’t come naturally, so a lot of 
effort is devoted to shaping the way people think about the 
world. This includes thinking of the world as naturally 
being divided into countries ruled by governments, not 
questioning the distribution of wealth and power in any 
fundamental way, and not pushing for radical alternatives.  
 
Why tactics are needed 
In human prehistory, people lived in small bands, 
probably no larger than one or two hundred people. In 
these groups, loyalty could be vital for survival, so it is 
plausible that humans are predisposed to form group 
loyalties. In today’s world, though, the groups are much 
larger. Instead of a hundred people, where you know 
everyone else and have many close personal bonds, today 
many countries have millions of residents. Loyalty is now 
to an abstraction, a group of symbols, rather than attached 
to individuals you interact with daily. How did the human 
predisposition towards group loyalty become reoriented to 
country-level emotional commitments? 
 My aim here is to illustrate some of the techniques 
used to build identification with dominant social institu-
tions—including inequalities in wealth and power—as 
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embedded within a country. My assumption is that state-
centred thinking is not natural or automatic, but has to be 
forged and continually reinforced in relation to other 
commitments. By recognising and understanding the tech-
niques involved, it may be easier to question, challenge 
and replace them. 
 In doing this, I do not assume love of country is 
always bad. Sometimes it serves noble purposes, as in 
willingness to support others in need. In many cases it is 
unimportant, as in choosing what clothes to wear. My 
concern is about country-centred thinking when it is 
exploited to serve damaging activities, for example 
constructing weapons of mass destruction or exploiting 
foreigners.  
 Scholars have analysed patriotism and nationalism, 
and in chapter 3 I discuss the work of a few of them. My 
aim here is more practical, namely to highlight some of 
the day-to-day efforts and activities that reinforce country-
centrism and to suggest this is not something inherent in 
humans but rather one possible way loyalties can be 
assigned.  
 The next step is to point to alternative ways of 
assigning loyalties. Again, many have argued for alterna-
tives. For example, rather than the United Nations, which 
is built around states, some globalists have supported a 
world parliament. Then there are individuals who try to 
transcend their formal citizenship and instead think and 
act as global citizens. Out of the multitude of alternatives, 
I focus on those that involve greater freedom, equality and 
justice. 
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 After this, the following step is to look again at 
tactics, this time at tactics to counter ruling tactics and 
instead promote alternatives. The number of possible 
examples is huge, so I proceed by looking at particular 
arenas, for example sport and language, looking at two 
sorts of tactics. Firstly there are counter-tactics, challeng-
ing ruling tactics, and secondly there are tactics to 
promote alternatives.  
 My main aim is to show an approach to analysing 
tactics. After you start noticing the use of everyday 
methods to promote patriotism or to encourage thinking of 
the world as a set of countries, you are in a better position 
to recognise alternatives and to understand strategies for 
resistance and building alternatives. Whether to join these 
efforts of course is a matter of choice. 
 Chapter 2 describes research on “moral foundations” 
that is useful for putting ruling tactics in context. Chapter 
3 discusses ideas from a few key writings about national-
ism. In subsequent chapters, I canvass various areas where 
ruling tactics can be observed in everyday life. These 
chapters can be read independently. As will be seen, the 
patterns are similar, though the arenas involved are quite 
different. My aim is less to provide a comprehensive case 
than to show how an analysis of tactics can proceed. Other 
possible areas for analysis include disability, disease, em-
ployment, environment, gender, history and technology. 
Chapters 4 to 13 each begin with a general discussion 
of the issues, followed by an examination of specific 
tactics, using some of the following categories. 
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System-support tactics 
1. Exposure (of positives); attention 
2. Valuing 








3. Negative interpretation 
4. Discrediting endorsements 
5. Intimidation 
 
Opposing system-support tactics 
1. Exposure (of negatives) 
2. Devaluing 
3. Negative interpretation 
4. Discrediting endorsements 
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My interest is not just in the more ardent forms of national 
chauvinism but more generally in how people think of the 
world in terms of countries and their governments, what 
Michael Billig calls “banal nationalism.”1 I chose the title 
Ruling Tactics because thinking in terms of nations serves 
rulers. However, rulers use a host of other tactics too, 
hence the long descriptive subtitle.  
 
How I got onto this topic 
For many years, I’ve been interested in strategy for social 
movements, for example the environmental and peace 
movements. How can activists be more effective in 
pursuing their goals? My special interest has been in 
nonviolent action, including methods such as rallies, 
strikes, boycotts and sit-ins. Most of the effective social 
movements, including the anti-slavery, labour and 
feminist movements, have relied primarily on nonviolent 
methods.  
 When activists mount a campaign, sometimes the 
government uses force against campaigners, with arrests, 
beatings and shootings. Occasionally, government repres-
sion doesn’t work: it generates huge outrage and triggers 
greater popular resistance. For example, in 1960 in South 
Africa, police shot into a crowd of protesters in the town 
of Sharpeville, killing about a hundred of them. Journalists 
were present and photos were taken. The Sharpeville 
                                                
1 See chapter 3. 
Introduction     7 
 
massacre undermined the South African government’s 
credibility internationally.2 
 However, instances in which government repression 
is counterproductive are rare. I started looking at the 
methods used by governments to reduce outrage, and 
came up with five main methods: cover up the action, 
devalue the target, reinterpret what happened (through 
lying, minimising consequences, blaming others and using 
favourable framing), use official channels to give an 
appearance of justice, and intimidate or reward people 
involved. After the Sharpeville massacre, the South 
African police and government used all these methods.3 
 The next step is to look at counter-methods. These 
are exposing the action, validating the target, interpreting 
the events as an injustice, avoiding official channels and 
instead mobilising support, and resisting intimidation and 
rewards. 
 Before long I was looking at all sorts of issues in 
terms of tactics, including bullying at work, sexual 
harassment, censorship, torture and genocide.4 Tactics are 
just methods, and to refer to tactics doesn’t necessarily 
imply that people are sitting around plotting what they are 
going to do. Most tactics are instinctive in the sense that 
                                                
2 The authoritative source is Philip Frankel, An Ordinary 
Atrocity: Sharpeville and its Massacre (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2001). 
3 Brian Martin, Justice Ignited: The Dynamics of Backfire 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007). Chapter 2 is on the 
Sharpeville massacre. 
4 “Backfire materials,” http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/backfire.html 
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people use them without carefully considering options for 
achieving goals, though subsequently they often think up 
rationalisations for their actions. At Sharpeville, just after 
the police had shot and killed protesters, they removed 
some of the bodies whose injuries revealed the use of 
dum-dum bullets, banned internationally. This served to 
hide evidence but, like the shooting, the removal of bodies 
was unplanned, not the result of a thoughtful consideration 
of alternatives.  
 At some point, I started thinking about tactics in 
relation to patriotism and nationalism. As discussed in 
chapter 2, patriotism and nationalism are not natural. In 
fact, quite a few people are critical of them. What 
maintains thinking in terms of nations and maintains 
loyalties to particular nations? I decided to apply my 
tactics framework to the topic, and this morphed into the 
categories listed above. I then picked some of my favour-
ite topics and looked for examples. I find it fascinating to 
see how easily thinking (including my own) can be 
channelled, and challenging to figure out how to think and 
act differently. This book is part of my journey. I hope you 
can see what’s involved and find your own path, whatever 





What makes a person think it is good to be patriotic? To 
help understand the need to foster identification with a 
country and its institutions, it is useful to study the work 
of Jonathan Haidt on the foundations of morality.1 Haidt is 
a psychologist who wants to understand why people make 
commitments to particular religions and political parties, 
among other things. Here I outline some of Haidt’s ideas, 
noting their relevance to understanding why efforts are 
needed to encourage citizens to identify with their country.  
 
The rider and the elephant 
As a preliminary, Haidt presents the view that each of us 
has two minds.2 One mind is intuitive, automatic and high 
capacity. If you see a rock approaching your head, it is 
                                                
1 Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are 
Divided by Politics and Religion (New York: Pantheon, 2012). 
Haidt and his collaborators have written many detailed technical 
articles. 
2 This view is standard among psychologists. See, for example, 
Jonathan St B. T. Evans, Thinking Twice: Two Minds in One 
Brain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Daniel 
Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus 
and Giroux, 2011); Timothy D. Wilson, Strangers to Ourselves: 
Discovering the Adaptive Unconscious (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2004). 
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valuable to duck without pausing to calculate the trajec-
tory of the rock or indeed determine whether it actually is 
a rock rather than an illusion. In early human evolution, 
such an automatic system improved the odds of surviving. 
Responding quickly and automatically to suspicious 
sounds could enable escape from a predator, and was 
advantageous even if most such sounds were false alarms. 
 In the modern world, the intuitive mind still rules 
much of people’s behaviour. A soldier learns to respond 
quickly to the sound of gunfire and, after returning to 
civilian life, may hit the ground at the sound of a car 
backfiring.  
 The other major component of the mind is slow, 
methodical and low-capacity: it takes more effort. It is the 
part of the mind commonly thought of as rational. It 
weighs up evidence, considers options and draws conclu-
sions, and then may assess them on the basis of new 
evidence. Scientific research, in its ideal form, relies 
entirely on this sort of rational evaluation.  
 Haidt calls the intuitive mind the elephant and the 
rational mind the rider. In Haidt’s metaphor, the rider sits 
on top of the elephant, perhaps trying to steer it but in 
most cases actually being at the mercy of the elephant’s 
whims. The elephant is too strong and independent for the 
rider to control it except in carefully constructed circum-
stances. What often happens is that the elephant goes in a 
direction and the rider simply follows: the intuitive mind 
reaches a conclusion and the rational mind then figures out 
reasons to justify this conclusion.  
 Haidt provides some illuminating examples that are, 
by design, uncomfortable or even repellent for some 
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people asked to consider them. One is a hypothetical 
situation of a brother and sister who are travelling together 
and decide to have sex with each other just to see what it 
is like. They do it just once, each of them using birth 
control. They enjoy it but decide not to do it again. The 
first question: is this right or wrong? The second question: 
why? Many people immediately react by saying it’s 
wrong. That is their elephant speaking. But they find it 
challenging to explain why. Some say it is because of the 
possibility of conceiving a child with genetic defects, 
ignoring the information about birth control. The rider 
casts about for a plausible justification of the elephant’s 
choice, but in this case gets stuck. 
 With other issues, the rider has more options. Con-
sider the issue of drugs such as heroin and cocaine. Many 
people react intuitively to say they should be illegal. In a 
debate with a proponent of harm-minimisation, who 
recommends decriminalisation or legalisation, people 
might say the dangers are too great, that enforcement 
needs to be stronger and any of a host of other reasons. 
But they seldom argue for making alcohol or nicotine 
illegal. The same applies to those on the other side: they 
too can come up with many reasons to justify their views. 
Seldom does someone say, “I don’t really know which 
drugs should be illegal, if any, because I haven’t studied 
the issue in enough detail.” 
 The elephant usually prevails even when the rider is 
more sophisticated. People with greater intelligence may 
simply be better at developing clever arguments to justify 
positions they have taken on intuitive grounds. Intelli-
gence is not a guarantee against bias and prejudice. 
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 An effective counter to misguided views is other 
people who point out shortcomings. This is most apparent 
in scientific research. Many scientists, including leading 
scientists, are strongly committed to their viewpoints, so 
much so that new evidence will not budge them: they 
simply come up with ingenious reasons why the contrary 
evidence is wrong or irrelevant and why their position is 
still viable. This was shown in a classic study of 40 
scientists involved in studying rocks from the moon. 
Following the first voyages to the moon and return of 
moon rocks to earth, there was lots of new evidence that 
could be used to adjudicate between different theories 
about the origin and nature of the moon. However, key 
scientists who were advocates of different theories, and 
who were considered by their peers as especially out-
standing in the field, were highly resistant to changing 
their views. This study showed that commitment plays a 
crucial role in science and that the idea that scientists seek 
to falsify their theories is not the way science operates in 
practice.3 
 So for scientists, the rider sometimes serves to justify 
a gut reaction, especially commitment to a viewpoint on 
which they have built careers and reputations. What make 
a difference, eventually, are other scientists. Those 
without prior commitments or who are more open to 
                                                
3 Ian I. Mitroff, The Subjective Side of Science: A Philosophical 
Inquiry into the Psychology of the Apollo Moon Scientists 
(Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1974). See also Michael J. Mahoney, 
Scientist as Subject: The Psychological Imperative (Cambridge, 
MA: Ballinger, 1976). 
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evidence may adopt different views. More importantly, 
scientists with contrary views will point out flaws in 
evidence and logic. The rider-elephant combination may 
not change direction on its own, but other rider-elephants, 
going in different directions, sometimes can have an 
impact. 
 If this sort of commitment is common in science, 
with all its systems for peer review and emphasis on 
rigour, it is even more likely to prevail in politics. After 
someone develops loyalty to a political party, for example, 
they may stick with it tenaciously. The elephant has 
formed a preference and the rider will try to figure out a 
justification.  
 
The six foundations 
Haidt argues that people’s moral judgements—their 
judgements about right and wrong—are influenced by six 
elements or reference points. He calls them moral founda-
tions. They are care, fairness, liberty, loyalty, authority 
and sanctity.  
 People’s behaviour and thoughts are potentially influ-
enced by each of these foundations. Haidt says they are 
deeply embedded in human evolution and social interac-
tions. However, an individual’s foundations can change 
through various processes.  
 Care means caring for others. The most obvious 
instance is looking after children, something that most 
mothers seem to find instinctive. Small groups of humans 
that did not care for their children would have had a hard 
time surviving. Furthermore, caring for other adults in the 
group was also advantageous, because otherwise individu-
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als might compete with or even attack each other, 
undermining the capacity of the group as a whole to 
survive.  
 In modern-day societies, the care foundation mani-
fests itself in support for those who are disadvantaged, for 
example people with disabilities, those who are ill, people 
in poverty—including people in remote parts of the world. 
The care foundation evolved from concern about vulnera-
ble members of one’s own group, but now can be 
extended to people anywhere in the world, and even more 
broadly to animals and the natural environment. 
 Fairness is another important moral foundation. It 
can be evoked when someone else receives something 
they apparently don’t deserve. A small child may protest 
when a brother or sister receives a bigger portion of ice 
cream. In the workplace, workers at the same level may 
protest if a co-worker receives special privileges, such as 
attractive assignments from the boss, or a higher salary for 
the same work. 
 The sense of fairness doesn’t always give the same 
results. Some people think it is unfair that those who do no 
paid work receive unemployment payments—they may be 
called spongers or welfare parasites—whereas others think 
it is unfair when children inherit money and property from 
parents, especially when they did nothing to deserve this 
windfall. This suggests there are many processes involved 
in assigning the sense of fairness to particular situations.  
 Liberty is the sense or demand to be free and inde-
pendent of oppressive power. It is especially pronounced 
among libertarians, who oppose many or even most 
functions of government, instead supporting private 
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solutions, such as markets or voluntary arrangements such 
as charity. Even those from other parts of the political 
spectrum are influenced by the urge for liberty. This is 
seen especially among people subject to repressive 
governments, some of whom are resentful, even when the 
government functions well. Those with a strong liberty 
orientation would oppose a benevolent dictatorship. 
 Loyalty involves commitment to a group, a move-
ment or even an abstraction. People can feel loyalty to 
family, friends, neighbours, clubs, co-workers, employers, 
sporting teams, commercial brands and countries. In 
warfare, soldiers may feel tremendous loyalty to their 
closest mates, even being willing to die for them.  
 Loyalty to one’s country is central to patriotism. This 
often means supporting one’s own government in any 
contest with others. 
 Loyalty is often expected of others in the same group. 
Those who go against expectations may be called traitors. 
Spies are caught in the crossfire of competing loyalties: 
they are patriots to those on one side and detested by the 
other. Few people think of spies as simply doing a job. 
 In human prehistory, the survival of the group was 
vital, and loyalty to the group was highly advantageous. 
This is the evolutionary basis for loyalty being a moral 
foundation. However, people today are loyal to groups 
quite unlike earlier times—sporting teams, for example, 
have no relevance to survival, except in a metaphorical 
way. Even more divergent from earlier forms of loyalty is 
patriotism, when the commitment is to a “community” 
thousands of times larger than one’s personal interactions. 
This suggests that patriotism is not automatic or natural in 
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any sense, but instead requires active efforts to initiate, 
cultivate and maintain it.  
 Authority is a moral foundation built around ac-
ceptance of systems of formal power, hierarchy and 
credibility. Many people believe that authorities should be 
followed, whether they are government leaders, medical 
experts, employers, sports coaches or heads of families. 
Respect for or obedience to authority helps make societies 
more stable. If no one accepts a boss’s directives, then the 
boss has no power and perhaps a new method of making 
decisions will take over. 
 Much of political life involves a struggle over author-
ity. There are struggles over positions of authority, for 
example military coups, elections and popular uprisings 
against rulers. Within organisations, there are struggles for 
positions of influence. Authority figures of various types, 
from politicians to judges, seek to exert their power, often 
encountering resistance from other authority figures and 
from those lower down. 
 The moral foundation of authority gives an advantage 
to those currently in positions of power. If someone 
believes that formal leaders should be respected and 
obeyed, this makes change more difficult. Yet many 
authorities need to be resisted. Repressive rulers cause 
much suffering. 
 One of the important types of authority is the law, a 
set of rules administered by various agencies, notably 
police and courts. The moral foundation of authority 
means that obeying the law is the default for many people. 
However, some laws are so unjust or harmful that 
breaking them might seem justified—to some people, 
Moral foundations     17 
 
anyway. Those who heed the authority imperative may 
reject any sort of law-breaking. 
 Moral judgements can be selective. Some challenges 
to authority are considered acceptable, others not. For 
example, in the US, questioning the views of the president 
might be okay or not, depending on who the president is. 
Authority becomes more important in some arenas. In the 
military, obedience to authority is a foremost value, 
drummed into recruits, despite lip service to a higher 
loyalty to other values.  
 In Nazi Germany, the authority foundation played a 
crucial role in enabling mass killing and other horrific 
human rights violations. The famous Milgram experiments 
showed that this sort of obedience to authority also was 
widespread in the US. The subjects of the experiment 
believed they were administering electric shocks to 
someone else; following instructions from the experi-
menter, many would continue even to dangerous levels.4  
 Sanctity is a moral foundation built around feelings 
that some things are sacred and should not be treated 
casually or with contempt. In the US, many patriots treat 
the flag as a sacred object that needs to be respected. 
Raising and retiring the flag is supposed to be done 
following specified protocols. The way it is folded is 
specified, and the flag should never touch the ground, 
which would defile it. When protesters or artists treat the 
flag in apparently disrespectful ways—for example 
burning it—this is seen as sacrilegious.  
                                                
4 Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1974). 
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Moral foundations and tactics 
Haidt provides considerable evidence and many argu-
ments in support of his classification of these six moral 
foundations. Most individuals are affected by all six 
foundations, but to different degrees. There are some 
patterns worthy of note. Haidt compares the role of the 
foundations in three political orientations in the US: 
libertarians, liberals and conservatives. Libertarians are 
opposed to most government functions and want society to 
be run through markets. As already noted, for them the 
liberty foundation is dominant.  
 Liberals, in contrast, are primarily influenced by 
three foundations: care, fairness and liberty. For them, 
loyalty, authority and sanctity are less influential. This 
helps explain why liberals are likely to support measures 
such as unemployment benefits, progressive taxation and 
foreign aid. 
 Conservatives, Haidt discovered, are influenced more 
equally by all six foundations. They are more likely than 
libertarians or liberals to be concerned about respecting 
police and the flag, for example. 
 Although there are systematic differences between 
people with different political and religious views, what is 
striking to me is the arbitrariness of people’s moral 
commitments. Haidt says that the six moral foundations 
are the “first draft of the mind”: most people have innate 
tendencies towards caring for children (and hence caring 
for others in need), and so forth through all the founda-
tions. But the way these are played out in practice depends 
on circumstances. 
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 Suppose a person has a strong tendency towards 
being loyal. But loyalty to what? There are many potential 
recipients of the feeling of commitment, support and even 
love: sporting teams, neighbourhoods, family members 
and companies, as well as governments and countries. 
Furthermore, there are many choices involved. Does 
loyalty to country mean not buying foreign goods? Does it 
mean not caring about government crimes? Or does it 
mean being especially concerned about government 
crimes? Does it mean supporting mining companies that 
are extracting and exporting the country’s minerals—even 
if the companies are foreign owned? Or does it mean 
supporting calls to use the minerals within the country, or 
calls by environmentalists to leave the minerals in the 
ground and maintain a pristine environment? Loyalty has 
many potential attachments or recipients. To say that 
loyalty is a moral foundation is only the beginning of 
understanding how loyalty operates in practice. 
 My interest here is loyalty to a country or its govern-
ment or people or ideals. Some people are patriotic, but 
many are not—indeed, there are plenty of people who are 
anti-patriotic. However, closely related to patriotism is 
something more common that can be called country-
centredness, which means thinking about the world from 
the perspective of a particular country, usually the one 
where one lives or where one was born, and thinking of 
the world as made up of countries. News stories tell of a 
disaster affecting a few citizens of your country and ignore 
thousands dying in remote parts of the world. Stories 
about the economy or employment focus on local impli-
20     Ruling tactics 
cations, not implications for elsewhere, whether Albania 
or Zambia.  
 How does patriotism and, more generally, country-
based thinking develop? How is it maintained? In the 
following chapters, I examine some of the processes 
involved, looking at methods, behaviours and assumptions 
that foster identification with a country, then at alternative 
forms of action and identification and finally at strategies 








The term “nationalism” refers to support for a nation. In 
common parlance, a nation is a country like Albania or 
Zambia. However, it is useful to distinguish several 
things: countries, nations, states and governments. 
 Let’s start with “country.” It is easiest to think of a 
country as a geographical area plus everything in it, 
including mountains, plants and people. Argentina as a 
country has plains and rivers, sheep, buildings and a 
population of 43 million.  
 Next consider “government.” This can refer to the 
political rulers within a country. Governments may in-
clude both an executive, with a president and cabinet, and 
a legislature. In dictatorships, there may be no legislature, 
or only a powerless one. In parliamentary systems, the 
executive—including the prime minister and cabinet—is 
drawn from the legislature. “Government” may also 
include various administrative supporters for the executive 
and legislature, for example heads of treasury, defence and 
environment departments.  
 Closely related to government is the state. The state 
includes everything officially run by or owned by the 
government. It includes the various departments or minis-
tries that are headed by government figures. It includes 
government-run institutions such as schools, police, 
military, railways and so forth. People’s private lives are 
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not part of the state; only when they are at work are 
government employees part of the state. Private corpora-
tions are not part of the state. Independent religious bodies 
are not part of the state. (In a few countries, like Iran and 
Israel, there is a state religion.) 
 In simple terms, the government runs the show and 
the state is the government plus everything it runs. 
 Then there is “nation,” a more challenging notion. A 
nation can be said to be a group of people who share a 
common identity. This may involve shared experience, 
blood ties, the same language, a religion, eating habits and 
various traditions. Among Native Americans, tribes like 
the Apache, Sioux and Cherokee are called nations: they 
had (and to some extent still have) shared language and 
culture, distinct from other tribes. In Europe, nations 
include the Armenians, Finns, French, Hungarians and 
Kurds. 
 The complication is that nations do not necessarily 
correspond to countries. Most people living in Japan today 
might be considered members of the Japanese nation, but 
there are some indigenous people, for example the Ainu 
from northern Japan (and eastern Russia), who are a 
distinct cultural group, and there are some immigrants, for 
example from Korea, who would be part of a different 
nation: the Korean nation.  
 Then there are nations that are spread across lots of 
countries. The Jewish people could be considered to be a 
nation; they are concentrated in Israel but millions live in 
other countries. People of Chinese ancestry don’t all live 
in China: many live in Malaysia, Vietnam and other 
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countries. (And within the country of China there are 
numerous other national groups). 
 Immigration is a complication for understanding 
nations. Consider an Egyptian family that immigrates to 
New Zealand. Are they Egyptian or Kiwis? If they remain 
in an Egyptian enclave and maintain Egyptian culture 
(religion, food, language), then they might be considered 
part of the Egyptian nation. But if the children grow up 
speaking English with a New Zealand accent, play or 
follow Kiwi sports, join the Anglican Church (or none at 
all), have they become part of the New Zealand nation? Or 
is New Zealand a nation at all, given its mixture of 
Maoris, descendants of British and other European immi-
grants, and new arrivals from various countries? 
 Reference is often made to a “nation-state.” This 
concept assumes that a nation and a state coincide. In 
some cases it is nearly true, but nearly always there are 
some indigenous people, some immigrants and some 
locals who have emigrated (called expatriates). 
 Benedict Anderson calls nations “imagined commu-
nities,” and this idea has been widely taken up.1 A 
community is a group of people having something in 
common: they live in the same neighbourhood, eat lunch 
together, collect stamps or whatever. An imagined 
community is one in which what people have in common 
is not something they do, but only something in their 
imagination, in their minds. If you live in Brazil, you 
                                                
1 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the 
Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991, revised 
edition). 
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cannot possible interact with 200 million other people, 
including ones with different religions, ethnicities and 
ways of life. “Brazil,” as a community, as a group of 
people, exists primarily in the minds of the people living 
in Brazil, as well as in the minds of people from other 
parts of the world. 
 
Isms 
Let’s go from the nation to nationalism. “Nationalism” 
usually refers to a commitment to or identification with a 
nation. It can involve pride. Many people are excited when 
“their” national team does well in the World Cup, despite 
having no personal connection with any members of the 
team. Nationalism, at the psychological level, might 
involve support for or identification with political leaders, 
policies, climate, habits or any number of other attributes. 
One’s own country usually is contrasted with others. 
Nationalism involves identification with and support for 
my country, not others. For most people, nationalism is on 
behalf of a single country, though it’s possible to identify 
with Africa, the European Union or the world. 
 Nationalism, strangely enough, is only sometimes on 
behalf of a nation, at least in the sense that many scholars 
think of nations. If we think of Canadian nationalism, it is 
usually connected to the whole population, including 
separatists in Quebec and members of First Nations. So 
what should this commitment to a country be called? 
There’s no such word as countryism. So perhaps this is 
where the word patriotism is useful. A patriot is a person 
who supports their own country, and patriotism is the 
commitment itself. 
Nationalism     25 
 
 In many cases, patriotism is harnessed to the goals of 
the state or government. A patriot is prone to support 
policies adopted by the government in relation to other 
governments. This is pronounced in the case of war: 
patriots typically support their compatriots—citizens of 
their own country—against enemies. The opposite of a 
patriot is a traitor, someone who supports the enemy. 
 Patriotism has its positive side, including pride in 
group accomplishments and a willingness to sacrifice for 
the good of the whole. When people in a country are doing 
worthwhile things, it makes sense to support them and 
take pride in their achievements. But there is a darker side 
to patriotism: it can involve supporting crimes and abuses, 
including military aggression, torture and genocide. In the 
US, there is a saying, “My country, right or wrong.” 
Supporting “the US”—usually meaning the government’s 
policy in international relations, when it seems in the 
interests of the US people—for good causes is reasonable, 
but why support policies and actions that are wrong?  
 Patriotism becomes “blind patriotism” when people 
take a position simply because it is identified with their 
country or state, even if it involves lying, unfair dealings, 
theft and other crimes. This sort of patriotism is common 
when agents of the state are involved, including political 
leaders and soldiers. In the US, supporting US troops in 
foreign wars has become unquestionable; it is a touchstone 
of being patriotic. Even US opponents of the govern-
ment’s wars are careful not to criticise the troops, re-
stricting themselves to criticising politicians and policies. 
This remains true even when the troops are involved in 
crimes. 
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 In 1968, during the Vietnam war—in Vietnam called 
the American war—US soldiers in Charlie Company went 
on a rampage of killing in a village named My Lai, 
leaving hundreds of civilians dead, including women and 
children. Commanders informed about the massacre did 
nothing. Ron Ridenhour, hearing about what had hap-
pened, collected information and sent a powerful letter to 
various media and politicians, but none of them would act 
on it. Eventually, through the efforts of investigative 
journalist Seymour Hersh, the story broke, a year after the 
massacre. However, only one soldier, Lieutenant William 
Calley, was convicted of any crime, and he served 
minimal time in prison. Many US citizens sided with 
Calley. On the other hand, Hugh Thompson, who had tried 
to stop some of the killing and who testified about what 
had happened, was ostracised by other troops. In the midst 
of the war, many people in the US did not want to know 
about crimes by “their” troops. It was a classic case of 
“my country, right or wrong”—in this case, wrong. 
 Related to the concept of nationalism is what can be 
called statism: support for the state, sometimes glorifica-
tion of the state. It is often associated with dictatorships, in 
which the ruler is attributed superhuman capacities. One 
example of statism is Nazi Germany, with Hitler the father 
figure who could do no wrong. The massive rallies at 
which Hitler spoke were rituals of worshipping the state. 
 Nazi Germany shows a toxic mixture of nationalism 
and statism. The nation in this case was associated with 
Aryan ethnicity and culture, as distinguished from others 
such as Slavs, Gypsies and Jews. After the invasion of the 
Soviet Union, Hitler initiated the “final solution,” the 
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extermination of Jews and other non-Aryans. This could 
be considered the operation of the state to enforce a 
particular conception of the nation, using the most drastic 
methods. 
 Historically, state elites try to harness nationalism for 
their own purposes. But this is complicated because 
nations don’t map onto states in a one-on-one fashion. So 
what state elites usually try to do might better be said to be 
promoting statism and countryism.  
 
Benedict Anderson and imagined communities 
As mentioned earlier, Benedict Anderson’s idea of 
“imagined communities” is widely cited as a way of 
understanding how nationalism operates. In a population 
of one million, it is impossible to know more than a tiny 
fraction of the people in a country, so the “community” 
exists only in the minds of the people, not in direct 
interactions.  
 Anderson’s book Imagined Communities is a highly 
sophisticated treatment of the origins and spread of 
nationalism. He uses a highbrow writing style and 
assumes the reader can understand short passages in 
French and German. This is not bedtime reading, but it 
does contain many insights relevant to patriotism tactics. 
 Many of today’s patriots refer to long traditions, 
often talking about a homeland that has been defended or 
sought for centuries. Serbians talk about the battle of 
Kosovo in the year 1389. However, Anderson says that 
any such long traditions exist only in the imagination. 
National identity is fairly new, something that developed 
beginning in the late 1700s in the Americas, adopted in 
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Europe in the early 1800s, and then exported to Africa and 
Asia through imperial conquests and by providing a model 
for others to follow. 
 Anderson notes that Europeans in the year 1500 or 
1700 did not think of themselves as part of a nation. Upper 
class Europeans were part of a house of nobility that could 
stretch across several of today’s countries. Peasants 
thought in terms of the area where they lived and worked. 
 Anderson, drawing on the work of other scholars as 
well as his own studies, attributes the origin of nationalism 
to developments in the Americas from roughly 1760 to 
1830 involving a complex interplay of administration, 
printing and capitalism. Spain’s colonies in the Americas 
were divided into administrative units. Spanish-born 
administrators in the Americas could move from unit to 
unit—for example from Chile to Mexico—and climb a 
career ladder with the highest rungs being in Spain, the 
centre of empire. But American-born administrators, 
called creoles, were restricted to a single unit. Nationalism 
provided a means of mobilising the population to throw 
off the restrictions imposed by Spanish rulers. The newly 
independent states were divided along the same bounda-
ries as the divisions in the Spanish colonial bureaucracy.  
 Back in Europe, in contrast, languages and printing in 
the vernacular (rather than Latin, previously used for 
official purposes) enabled the mobilising of support for 
control over populations by emerging states. In Japan, the 
threat of conquest after 1868 triggered a process of 
administrative centralisation, with conscription, promotion 
of universal male literacy, elimination of the privileged 
position of the samurai, the removal of feudal controls 
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over peasants, and subordination of local military units to 
a central command. Nationalism was a tool for 
modernisation. 
 Anderson identifies another type of nationalism, 
sponsored by governments that wanted to prevent chal-
lenges from below. This sort of “official nationalism” was 
important in Europe in the mid 1800s. The Austro-
Hungarian empire, for example, was threatened by popular 
nationalism, so it sponsored its own fake nationalism. This 
involved rewriting of history, official propaganda and 
compulsory state-run education (presenting a mythical 
national past). Nevertheless, there was a tension in official 
nationalism between the myth of a single ancestor nation 
and the reality of an empire containing several possible 
nations.  
 The paradoxes of official nationalism were accentu-
ated in England, where a mythical history of England was 
developed. It was mythical in that there was no historical 
English nation. For example, some of the supposedly 
“English” kings were from continental European dynastic 
houses and could not even speak English, and centuries 
ago residents of what is today called England had no sense 
of being part of a nation. Anderson notes, parenthetically: 
 
The barons who imposed Magna Carta on John 
Plantegenet did not speak “English,” and had no 
conception of themselves as “Englishmen,” but they 
were firmly defined as early patriots in the class-
rooms of the United Kingdom 700 years later.2 
                                                
2 Ibid., p. 118. 
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 There was also a tension between England as a nation 
and the reality of an empire. In the 1800s within the 
empire, aspiring colonials seeking a career in government 
service were blocked in their advancement. A talented, 
educated bureaucrat from India could never attain a 
position in London, nor even in the capitals of colonies in 
Africa such as Kenya. Anderson notes that there was a 
strong dose of racism in British colonial policies, but that 
white colonials, for example from Australia and New 
Zealand, faced the same blockages. The reality was an 
empire ruled by upper class figures at the centre, so the 
idea of a nation, in which all members have some sort of 
common membership and some level of equality, was 
patched on top and never fully convincing, hence the need 
for government sponsored efforts to foster a manufactured 
national myth. 
 After the initial development of nationalism in some 
parts of the world, it became a model for use elsewhere, 
by both insurgent movements against colonial powers in 
Africa and Asia and by governments to forestall chal-
lenges. As a model, nationalism has been extraordinarily 
powerful. Anderson notes the significance of the wars 
between China, Vietnam and Cambodia in the late 1970s. 
These wars were the first between socialist states, states 
that were premised on international solidarity of the 
working classes. In practice, though, rulers found it expe-
dient to encourage citizens to identify with the state rather 
than the working class. Anderson notes that the average 
Chinese peasant had no particular interest in a dispute with 
peoples to the south.  
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 Anderson addresses the connection between national-
ism and racism. It is commonly thought that these are 
related, but Anderson notes a positive side to the emo-
tional dimension of nationalism, namely that it is about 
love for a country, not contempt for supposedly lesser 
ethnicities. He points to a remarkable absence, among 
writers from subjugated populations, of antagonism 
towards their oppressors: they are far more likely to laud 
their own culture than to denigrate others. Though there is 
more to say about the connection between nationalism and 
racism, it is wise not to assume they are automatically 
related. 
 
John Breuilly and nationalism as politics 
John Breuilly presents a useful perspective in his book 
Nationalism and the State.3 Basically, he sees nationalism 
as a form of politics, in other words as a way of exercising 
power, most commonly to take control of the state. To 
appreciate Breuilly’s perspective, it’s helpful to look first 
at conventional views of nationalism that see it as associ-
ated with support for a nation, based on cultural charac-
teristics such as language, ethnicity and customs. The 
usual idea is that members of a nation may feel oppressed 
by a state and seek to create a state of their own. 
 Breuilly says it is more the other way around. Certain 
groups want to increase their power, and can do this by 
challenging the state, seeking the power of a state for 
themselves. They could justify their challenge by claiming 
                                                
3 John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1993, 2nd edition). 
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to be superior administrators or having a better set of 
beliefs, for example defending freedom from tyranny as in 
the American Revolution. However, in many circum-
stances it is more effective for challengers to claim to 
represent the aspirations of a nation. For this purpose, they 
then refer to an illustrious history of the nation and 
emphasise cultural characteristics that distinguish their 
group from others. 
 Consider Yugoslavia, a country prior to 1990 con-
taining many different ethnic groups: Serbians, Croatians, 
Slovenians and so forth. After the collapse of Eastern 
European regimes in 1989, there was a struggle for power 
in Yugoslavia, eventually leading to war. Nationalism was 
invoked as an explanation for the breakup of the country 
but, looking at the process from Breuilly’s perspective, 
actually the struggle for power was the primary driver, and 
national characteristics were used as a justification. This 
was most obvious in Bosnia, where Serbians, Croatians 
and Muslims (not a national group) had long lived 
together without difficulty. In the Bosnian war, the idea of 
nations seeking autonomy was the pretext for a bitter quest 
for power.  
 Breuilly takes “nationalism” to refer to “political 
movements seeking or exercising state power” that use a 
political argument with these three features: (1) there is a 
nation with its own special features; (2) the nation’s 
interests and values are paramount; and (3) the nation 
needs to be independent.4 The key bit of this viewpoint is 
                                                
4 Ibid., 2. 
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that nationalism is all about power, in particular state 
power. 
 Another part of Breuilly’s argument is that the rise of 
nationalism occurred along with the rise of modern states, 
initially in Europe and then worldwide via European 
colonialism. Without the state, there would be no point of 
nationalistic fervour. Like Anderson, Breuilly says that 
people centuries ago, before the rise of modern states, did 
not think of themselves in terms of nations. Their identifi-
cation was more local.  
 Breuilly’s analysis of nationalism is based on a wide-
ranging examination of movements from around the 
world, including for example both unification and separa-
tion nationalism in Europe in the 1800s, anti-colonialism 
nationalism in India, Kenya and elsewhere, reform nation-
alism in China, Japan and Turkey, and nationalism after 
the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union. 
 Breuilly’s perspective can be summed up this way: 
 
Nationalism is not the expression of nationality, if by 
nationality is understood an independently developed 
ideology or group sentiment broadly diffused through 
the “nation.” … Rather, an effective nationalism 
develops where it makes political sense for an oppo-
sition to the government to claim to represent the 
nation against the present state.5 
 
                                                
5 Ibid., 398. 
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My aim in this book is to point out the use of tactics by 
ruling groups to maintain their power. Breuilly’s perspec-
tive meshes quite well with the study of tactics, because 
he’s saying that the mobilisation of support for a political 
movement by reference to national characteristics is use-
fully understood as a political strategy, not as something 
inherent in a nation.6 
 
Michael Billig and banal nationalism 
In his important book Banal Nationalism,7 Michael Billig 
gives a different perspective than Breuilly. “Banal” refers 
to things that are ordinary, routine and everyday. Billig 
argues that nationalism is not just something that is 
emotional, extreme and usually somewhere else, but is 
around us all the time even when it is unnoticed: it is 
banal. He gives the example of the US flag, which is hung 
from people’s homes and printed on T-shirts. Most of 
these flags and flag images are treated as part of the 
background of daily life, yet they foster a consciousness of 
                                                
6 Since writing Nationalism and the State, Breuilly’s ideas have 
evolved. See for example “Nationalism as global history,” in 
Daphne Halikiopoulou and Sofia Vasilopoulou (eds.), National-
ism and Globalisation: Conflicting or Complementary? (London: 
Routledge, 2011), pp. 65–83; John Breuilly (ed.), The Oxford 
Handbook of the History of Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013); John Breuilly, “Nationalism,” in John 
Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (eds.), The Globalization 
of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, sixth edition), pp. 387–
400. 
7 Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism (London: Sage, 1995). 
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the nation as integral to the fabric of life. Similarly, in 
schools around the country, children daily stand, put their 
hands on their hearts and together recite the pledge of 
allegiance: “I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United 
States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, 
one Nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice 
for all.” 
 By referring to nationalism as banal, as ordinary, 
Billig is not saying it has no adverse consequences. As he 
puts it, “banal does not imply benign.”8 Banal nationalism 
can be toxic in its own way, blinding citizens to the 
assumptions underpinning the way they see the world and 
enabling aggression and wars.  
 Billig, like other writers on nationalism, notes that 
just a few hundred years ago very few people had any 
conception of themselves as members of a nation. In 
medieval Europe, peasants saw their world as extending 
only to the groups of people they interacted with and 
encompassing a limited geographical area without fixed 
boundaries. Few people living in what is today called 
France thought of themselves as French. In today’s world, 
in contrast, every bit of land is assigned to one country or 
another and boundaries are clearly demarcated. The idea 
that there could be large numbers of people not attached to 
countries or there could be populated territory not 
included in a country is hard to grasp.  
 The contemporary way of thinking about the world is 
built on assumptions about membership of groups and the 
division of territories, assumptions that are hard to 
                                                
8 Ibid., p. 6. 
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appreciate because they are unspoken and seldom articu-
lated. When a political leader says “We must protect the 
French way of life,” it is not necessary to spell out that 
“France” is being distinguished from other distinct coun-
tries and that it is reasonable to assume the existence of a 
“way of life” for everyone encompassed by the adjective 
“French” despite the vast differences in thought and 
behaviour between different people implicated in the term. 
Billig says that, “nationalism is the ideology by which the 
world of nations has come to seem the natural world—as 
if there could not possibly be a world without nations.”9 
 Billig thus conceives nationalism as something more 
pervasive and unnoticed that the usual usages by scholars 
in the field who, like Breuilly, see it as mainly being 
manifested in challenges to existing states. Much of 
Billig’s book is a critique of scholarship that ignores the 
routine and fails to examine assumptions underlying the 
current way the world is organised and thought about. He 
addresses the claims of postmodernists that national 
consciousness is being superseded by other forms of 
identity, and shows postmodernists’ failure to consider 
banal nationalism. He provides a close critique of the 
work of famous philosopher Richard Rorty, showing 
Rorty’s philosophical pragmatism is built on unacknowl-
edged assumptions about US nationalism. Billig’s many 
examples include several that I address in later chapters, 
including language and sport.10 
                                                
9 Ibid., p. 37. 
10 Billig’s ideas have been the subject of critical attention. See 
for example Michael Skey, “The national in everyday life: a 
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 What Billig calls nationalism I might call statism or 
countryism or country-centredness, but the terms are less 
important than the basic idea, namely that people think of 
the world as divided into countries and of themselves as 
members of a country or a nation.  
 
Conclusion 
There are several common themes in the books by 
Anderson, Breuilly and Billig. One key point is that the 
idea of nations is quite new, no more than two or three 
hundred years old. Earlier than this, and even today in 
many parts of the world, people have not thought of 
themselves as part of a nation or a nation-state. The idea 
that the world is divided up into geographically bounded 
areas, each one administered by a central government, is 
new historically. What seems natural today would have 
seemed unnatural, even incomprehensible, to earlier 
generations. 
 All three authors see the rise of the idea that people 
have national identities as happening in parallel with the 
rise of the state system. States rule over people living 
within territories; national identity helps make this seem 
natural and inevitable rather than arbitrary and open to 
challenge.  
 Another key point is that effort is required to get 
people to think in terms of nations, states, borders, citizen-
                                                                                                                                          
critical engagement with Michael Billig’s thesis of Banal 
Nationalism,” Sociological Review, Vol. 57, No. 2, 2009, pp. 
331–346, and Michael Billig, “Reflecting on a critical engage-
ment with banal nationalism—reply to Skey,” pp. 347–352. 
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ship and all the other facets of the system of states. 
Sometimes the efforts are strenuous and obvious, such as 
during wartime, but more commonly the usual ways of 
thinking about the world are reinforced by education, 
media and everyday rituals. 
 Finally, it is important to recognise that the state 
system is a power system. It is political, in the sense of 
involving the exercise of power. Many individuals and 
groups have a stake in the way the world is organised and 
resist those who promote alternatives. One of the key uses 
of power is to encourage people to think that the system is 
natural and that alternatives are impractical. 
 The body of writing about nationalism and states is 
enormous and there is no possibility of even trying to 
summarise it. My goal in Ruling Tactics is to point to 
ways in which governments and their supporters encour-
age people to think in terms of countries and from the 
point of view of governments. In doing this, I am drawing 
on several sources. One is the body of research about 
nationalism, and Billig’s Banal Nationalism is as close as 
any treatment to my starting point. Another source is the 
analysis of strategy and tactics in the social world; James 
Jasper’s book Getting Your Way is the pioneering treat-
ment, showing how social dynamics can be analysed in 
terms of strategy.11 Finally, I have drawn on my own study 
of tactics against injustice, which offers a framework for 
understanding the methods used by powerful groups to 
reduce outrage over injustice, and which can be used more 
                                                
11 James M. Jasper, Getting Your Way: Strategic Dilemmas in 
the Real World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006). 
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generally to look at tactics adopted by rulers.12 My aim is 
to use a range of topics to illustrate how, by looking at 
familiar things in different ways, it is possible to recognise 
tactics that help maintain systems of rule and to imagine 
ways to take action towards alternatives.   
 
 
                                                
12 Brian Martin, Justice Ignited: The Dynamics of Backfire (Lan-
ham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007). See, more generally, 







Murder, theft, assault, burglary—these are staples of news 
coverage. People hear a lot about crime, and nearly every-
one thinks it’s a bad thing. Yet there are huge differences 
in ways different actions are labelled as crime and in the 
attention they receive. 
 The first distortion is that most attention is given to 
low-level crime, the sort that hurts a few people and is 
carried out by relatively powerless individuals. This 
includes many murders, which attract a lot of attention. 
Indeed, so potent is murder for attracting attention that it 
has become a staple of news coverage as well as crime 
novels and television shows: think of Agatha Christie and 
CSI and many others like them. 
 Murder is usually thought of as something done by an 
evil person, who needs to be tracked down, proven guilty 
and punished. Most despicable of all is the serial killer 
who preys on victims over a period of years.  
 Yet there is another sort of crime that usually escapes 
the spotlight, and those responsible are seldom identified 
or exposed, much less ever prosecuted and convicted. This 
is crime by those with a lot of power. 
 Let’s start with corporate crime. Corporate executives 
may enact policies that predictably kill people, sometimes 
large numbers of people. They may hide evidence show-
ing how many people are dying due to their actions. 
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 A classic example involved the Ford Pinto. As ex-
posed in a classic 1977 article in the magazine Mother 
Jones,1 Ford engineers and executives knew about a fault 
in the fuel system: collisions to the rear end of the vehicle 
could easily rupture the fuel system, leading to fire and 
potentially to death of the occupants. Ford already had a 
patent for a safer gas tank, but to save money—Ford was 
then in competition with Volkswagen for the US small-car 
market—the company retained the dangerous tank, and for 
years lobbied against government standards that would 
have mandated a safer tank. Hundreds of people died from 
burns, and Ford settled numerous damage claims out of 
court. The company’s internal cost-benefit analysis 
showed that paying damage claims was cheaper than 
putting in the safer tank. Was this a crime? Technically 
not, because auto manufacturers had lobbied against any 
provision in the Motor Vehicle Safety Act providing for 
criminal sanctions for selling unsafe cars. However, it is 
not something that any company would want to admit, 
much less advertise. 
 On a vastly greater scale are the actions of tobacco 
companies. Executives know that smoking cigarettes leads 
to the illness and premature death of a great number of 
smokers. Furthermore, the companies carried out research 
of their own that showed the dangers while denying them 
publicly. They fought regulations tooth and nail.2 
                                                
1 Mark Dowie, “Pinto madness,” Mother Jones, September/ 
October 1977. 
2 Stanton A. Glantz, John Slade, Lisa A. Bero, Peter Hanauer and 
Deborah E. Barnes, The Cigarette Papers (Berkeley, CA: Univer-
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 The movement against smoking has been remarkably 
successful in exposing the actions of tobacco companies. 
Fines of hundreds of billions of dollars have been 
imposed. Yet the companies still do all they can to expand 
sales around the world and to resist regulations, such as 
plain-paper packaging, that discourage smoking. 
 If ever there was an industry causing mass death, it is 
the tobacco industry. One estimate is that a billion people 
may die this century due to tobacco-related diseases. How 
many tobacco company executives have gone to jail for 
their responsibility? 
 Another example is the scandal involving the 
Australian Wheat Board (AWB), a government agency 
(privatised in 1999) with a monopoly on selling Australian 
wheat. Between 1991 and 2003, Iraq was subject to UN 
sanctions that blocked the import of many items. The 
AWB was eager to make sales to Iraq during this time—so 
eager that extra payments were paid to dealers, money that 
went to the regime in violation of the sanctions, right up 
until the time the Australian government sent troops as 
part of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. A$290 million in bribes 
was involved, a huge support for Saddam Hussein’s 
regime. The story eventually broke in Australia, and there 
was an inquiry and recommendations for criminal charges, 
but the police did not proceed: no AWB officials were 
prosecuted for crimes, much less went to jail.3 
                                                                                                                                          
sity of California Press, 1996); Robert N. Proctor, Golden 
Holocaust: Origins of the Cigarette Catastrophe and the Case for 
Abolition (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2012). 
3 Caroline Overington, Kickback: Inside the Australian Wheat 
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 Despite payments by the AWB and other importers, 
the sanctions against Iraq were remarkably effective, not 
in hobbling Saddam Hussein’s grasp on power, but in 
harming the Iraqi people. Due to shortages of sanitation 
equipment, medicines, and other vital materials, the death 
rate due to malnutrition and disease soared. Perhaps one or 
two million Iraqis died as a result of the sanctions. In a 
famous quote, US secretary of state Madeleine Albright 
was asked whether the sanctions could be justified given 
the death of half a million Iraqi children. She answered, “I 
think this is a very hard choice, but the price—we think 
the price is worth it.” 
 Some commentators have judged the sanctions 
against Iraq to constitute genocide: actions taken know-
ingly leading to mass death in a target population.4 No one 
was ever charged with a crime. 
 The 2003 invasion of Iraq, led by the US govern-
ment, was not approved by the UN Security Council. In 
the eyes of many legal scholars, it was an illegal war, yet 
no one responsible was ever charged.  
                                                                                                                                          
Board Scandal (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 2007). 
4 Geoff Simons, The Scourging of Iraq: Sanctions, Law and 
Natural Justice, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998). For a 
discussion of the shortcomings of international governance in this 
case, see Joy Gordon, Invisible War: The United States and the 
Iraq Sanctions (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2010), pp. 221–230. 
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 Journalist James Risen has told of corruption in the 
aftermath of the invasion.5 To prop up the collapsed Iraqi 
economy, masses of US cash were flown from the New 
York Federal Reserve Bank to Iraq. The amounts were so 
great, even in US $100 bills, that entire cargo planes were 
filled with the cash, ultimately $12 to $14 billion. To be 
handling so much cash was a temptation for everyone 
involved, including US soldiers who were supposed to 
count or distribute some of the money. Accounting proce-
dures were so lax that billions of dollars went missing, no 
one knows where—at least no one in official places. 
Information was pieced together indicating that a couple 
of billion dollars were stored in Lebanon on behalf of 
corrupt Iraqi government figures. Although provided with 
addresses, US officials showed little interest in pursuing 
the cash or the criminals. Apparently it was all too embar-
rassing for US figures involved in the operation. 
 
Crime and the law 
Breaking the law is an offence, and not breaking the law is 
okay, right? Well, it depends. Some laws are broken so 
often and enforced so infrequently that few are concerned. 
Laws against jaywalking are an example, in places where 
pedestrians routinely cross the street anywhere they 
please. So is photocopying or scanning a book that’s in 
copyright. Cash-in-hand payments to tradespeople enable 
tax avoidance. Technically, in many places, these actions 
are illegal, but no one bothers about them.  
                                                
5 James Risen, Pay Any Price: Greed, Power, and Endless War 
(Boston: Mariner Books, 2015). 
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 Then there are legal loopholes, which are ways to 
cheat legally. In the US tax code, legislators have written 
in hundreds of special exemptions that apply to a single 
business or individual.6 Corporate lawyers search for 
loopholes to minimise the tax their companies pay. Tax 
havens—countries imposing little or no company tax—are 
legal, and expressly designed to help multinational 
companies avoid tax in the countries where they do most 
of their business.7 
 There’s an old saying that the golden rule means “He 
who has the gold makes the rules.” In other words, those 
with wealth have influence over how the law is written 
and enforced. Consider an example: a company owner 
decides to fire all the employees and hire new ones at 
lower wages. In some places, this is legal; in other places, 
it’s not legal, but government regulators would not bother 
to prosecute. In such circumstances, the main restraint on 
this sort of action is the organised action of workers and 
their supporters, for example via a work-in or a blockade. 
 So there are two ways to think about crime and the 
law. One is the technical one: something is only a crime if 
it’s against the law. The other is the social one: something 
is a crime if it defies widespread community expectations 
for fair and ethical behaviour.  
                                                
6 Donald L. Barlett and James B. Steele, America: Who Really 
Pays the Taxes? (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994). They also 
describe a multitude of ways the US tax system has been manip-
ulated to serve the rich. 
7 See chapter 11, “Trade deals and tax havens.” 
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 If someone is homeless and sleeps on a park bench, is 
this a crime? If someone passes out leaflets in a shopping 
centre, is this a crime? Technically, these behaviours may 
or may not be legal, depending on local laws. Socially, 
observers will differ in their views about homeless people 
or leafletting: whether something is a crime depends on 
the way you think about the behaviour and about the law. 
 
State crime 
State crime refers to crimes committed by governments 
and government agents.8 However, in many cases, actions 
by governments are treated as above the law. An example 
is torture. Nominally, in nearly every country in the world 
torture is considered a crime, but seldom is anyone 
charged or convicted of committing torture, least of all by 
the governments that sanction it. 
 Consider first the manufacture of equipment used for 
torture, everything from thumbscrews to electroshock 
batons. This is a huge industry.9 There are “security fairs” 
held in countries around the world displaying the latest 
                                                
8 Jeffrey Ian Ross, ed., Controlling State Crime, 2nd ed. (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2000); Jeffrey Ian Ross, 
ed., Varieties of State Crime and Its Control (Monsey, NY: 
Criminal Justice Press, 2000); Dawn L. Rothe, State Criminality: 
The Crime of All Crimes (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2009); Dawn L. Rothe and Christopher W. Mullins (eds.), State 
Crime: Current Perspectives (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press, 2011). See also the discussion of state terror-
ism—a type of state crime—in chapter 7. 
9 See publications of the Omega Research Foundation, 
https://omegaresearchfoundation.org/publications/. 
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equipment for surveillance and control. There is also a 
well-developed system for training personnel in “ad-
vanced interrogation techniques,” a euphemism for tor-
ture. Yet it is rare, indeed almost unheard of, for anyone 
involved in what should be called the torture trade to be 
considered a criminal. 
 Then there is torture in practice. Governments know 
it is going on, but usually will do nothing unless there is 
adverse publicity, and naturally enough they usually avoid 
publicity if at all possible. 
 In the aftermath of the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan 
and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, there were reports about 
torture in US facilities. There wasn’t much concern until 
photos from Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq became public in 
2004. These showed Iraqi prisoners being piled naked on 
top of each other, a hooded Iraqi prisoner in a stress 
position apparently in fear of being electrocuted, and an 
Iraqi prisoner being threatened by a dog, among other 
gruesome images. It was only because of the massive 
publicity generated by these photos that a few US prison 
guards were charged with crimes. However, the US 
government avoided the word “torture,” referring instead 
to “abuse,” and the US mass media followed suit. The 
government implied actions by guards at Abu Ghraib were 
their own initiative, ignoring evidence of higher 
responsibility.10 
                                                
10 Jennifer K. Harbury, Truth, Torture, and the American Way: 
The History and Consequences of U.S. Involvement in Torture 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 2005); Alfred W. McCoy, A Question of 
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 Abu Ghraib prison torture was an anomaly, not 
because it involved torture, but because it was exposed. It 
was business as usual in the sense that higher officials 
escaped any censure. 
 Then there are more routine forms of torture. In US 
prisons, it is commonplace for prisoners to be subject to 
treatment that fits usual definitions of torture. Supermax 
prisons, in which prisoners are kept in isolation most of 
the time, serve as a form of torture, using the techniques of 
sensory deprivation pioneered by the British in Northern 
Ireland.11 Restraint chairs and electroshock weapons are 
regularly used to control resistant prisoners, and guards 
may knowingly allow prisoners to assault each other.12 It 
would be possible to argue that there are more crimes 
committed against prisoners in US prisons than the 
prisoners ever committed on the outside, especially 
considering that many are in prison for victimless law-
breaking such as using drugs. Yet the guards responsible 
for direct assaults on prisoners are almost never charged 
with crimes. Even less likely is it that politicians and 
planners who design prison systems will ever be thought 
of as criminals. 
                                                                                                                                          
Torture: CIA Interrogation, from the Cold War to the War on 
Terror (New York: Metropolitan, 2006). 
11 Carol Ackroyd, Karen Margolis, Jonathan Rosenhead and Tim 
Shallice, The Technology of Political Control (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1977). 
12 On one aspect of this, see Joanne Mariner, No Escape: Male 
Rape in U.S. Prisons (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2001), 
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To summarise several points covered so far, most attention 
in the media is to crimes of individuals and to crime by 
people lower down the social hierarchy. Corporate crime 
is neglected because it is systemic and those most respon-
sible are top executives. In practice many laws are broken 
all the time with impunity, and powerful and influential 
groups are able to influence lawmakers and prosecutors so 
that their shady operations, such as tax avoidance, are 
technically legal. One special category is state crime, 
which is crime by governments and their agents. It 
receives little public attention and is seldom punished. 
 
Collins on crime 
Sociologist Randall Collins provides a valuable insight 
into the dynamics of crime.13 He notes that conservatives 
explain crime as an individual failing, due to genetics or 
poor character: their solution is punishment. However, this 
approach doesn’t solve the problem and is best understood 
as a moral and political position. 
 Liberal explanations focus on crime cultures, includ-
ing poverty, with the solution being rehabilitation. These 
explanations are not satisfactory either, because many 
poor people are not criminals and many rich ones are. 
 Radical explanations see crime as a category of 
behaviour that is labelled as criminal, with convictions 
produced by the law-enforcement machinery. From this 
viewpoint, laws create crime, especially victimless 
                                                
13 Randall Collins, “The normalcy of crime,” in Sociological 
Insight: An Introduction to Nonobvious Sociology (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 86–118. 
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lawbreaking such as illicit drug use, thereby fostering the 
creation of criminal cultures. This explanation doesn’t 
work well for property and personal crimes such as theft 
and assault. 
 The class-conflict model, derived from Marxism, 
sees crimes as due to class relations, especially the exist-
ence of private property. However, socialist societies still 
have crime; indeed, they create new categories of it, 
especially crimes against the state. 
 Collins notes that in Denmark in 1944, there were no 
police. Property crimes greatly increased but crimes 
against people stayed about the same. 
 Collins’ own preference is a picture derived from 
Emil Durkheim, one of the founders of sociology: crime 
and punishment serve as a bond for the rest of the 
community. A stratified society, in which some groups 
have far more wealth and power than others, can be 
unified by rituals, and one potent ritual is punishment of 
those labelled criminals. This helps explain the attraction 
of murder mysteries. Collins says that in power struggles, 
there are plenty of actions that can provide offence. Some 
of these are criminalised—turned into crimes by laws and 
expectations for punishment—and thus provide opportu-
nities for ceremonies of punishment that dramatise the 
moral feelings of the community. Each type of society has 
its own forms of crime.  
 
Tactics: dilemmas for the state 
For government leaders and supporters, the topic of crime 
contains opportunities and dangers. Fears about crime can 
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be drummed up, but there is a risk the spotlight might be 
turned on crimes by those with power and wealth. 
 The first tactic used by governments to foster a 
preferred orientation towards crime is exposure. Govern-
ment leaders direct attention towards low-level crime, and 
crime by individuals, and the media usually are willing 
accomplices. Murder—usually involving killing of one 
individual by another—has become a topic that, to many 
people, is fascinating. The mass media report on murders, 
some of which become ongoing sagas. The case of O J 
Simpson, a famous US gridiron star accused of murdering 
his wife and a friend, attracted enormous media attention. 
Fictional treatments of murder, in novels and television 
shows, are also popular. It’s as if news media and the 
entertainment industry are saying, “Look, here’s what you 
should be concerned about.” 
 The attention to individual crime—murder, yes, and 
assault, robbery and embezzlement—serves to create a 
perception that crime is due to bad people. There is corre-
spondingly little attention to state and corporate crime, 
including the arms trade, illegal wars, and sales of danger-
ous products such as pharmaceutical drugs. The crimes by 
states and corporations cause far more deaths than indi-
vidual murders but in comparison receive little attention. 
 A similar disparity occurs with the second tactic, 
valuing. This doesn’t mean valuing crime, of course, but 
rather valuing efforts against crime. The police, courts and 
various agencies are commonly portrayed in news stories 
and entertainment as the good guys, taking up the noble 
cause of cracking down on drug dealers, robbers, hooli-
gans and welfare cheats. Valuing comes into play in the 
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resources given to enforcement agencies. For example, 
huge amounts of money are provided to anti-terrorism 
bodies but comparatively little to agencies targeting high-
level white-collar crime. 
 The third tactic is to explain the government’s efforts 
against crime, and why they are the right ones and 
effective. This might involve statistics on crime rates, 
arrest rates, expenditures on policing, and so forth. These 
accounts of anti-crime efforts normally ignore questions of 
what should count as crime and whether the most 
damaging types of crime are being addressed. The figures 
include, typically, murder, assault, burglary and so forth, 
and omit a separate classification for state crime. Expla-
nations of crime-fighting are sometimes designed to 
placate the public by indicating that everything is under 
control but sometimes designed to stimulate support for 
greater expenditures. This can be a delicate balancing act. 
Alarms about escalating criminal activity can scare the 
public and provide support for greater spending on prisons 
and policing, but these at the same time send a signal that 
the government is not doing its job of protecting the 
population. In either case, the most important message is 
what is assumed, namely that crimes by individuals, 
especially those with less power, are of primary concern 
and that institutionalised state and corporate crime is off 
the agenda.  
 To provide credibility to the government’s policies, it 
is useful to have endorsements, which constitute the fourth 
tactic. Endorsements can come from police, politicians, 
government officials, media, experts or celebrities, among 
others. The basic line is normally is that the government is 
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doing the right thing, which might be keeping crime under 
control or expanding its efforts against a new type of 
crime, due for example to the drug ice or cybercriminals. 
 It is a different story when it comes to experts who 
present a non-standard view about crime, a story pointing 
to fundamental flaws in crime control. This will differ 
from country to country, but consider the idea of restora-
tive justice. In countries like the US, convicted criminals 
are incarcerated and seldom provided extensive support 
for rehabilitation: the dominant approach is retribution, 
namely punishment. It is so standard that it is simply taken 
for granted in most commentary by police, prison officials 
and politicians. There is another approach, called restora-
tive justice, involving meetings between offenders and 
those harmed and finding a mutually agreed response, 
often with apology and restitution (payment, community 
service and sometimes incarceration). The motivating 
philosophy behind restorative justice is to reintegrate 
offenders into the community, not to brand them for life.14 
 There are many ardent advocates for restorative 
practices but, in the US at least, they receive little public 
attention. Endorsements of the standard retribution model 
are given far more visibility. 
 Consider also the radical critique of US prison policy, 
for example by eminent Norwegian criminologist Nils 
Christie, author of Crime Control as Industry: Towards 
                                                
14 John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Responsive Regula-
tion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
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Gulags, Western Style.15 There are other critics too, within 
the US, who advocate abolishing prisons. These alterna-
tives receive little visibility in the media. 
 The criminal justice system—what critics might call 
the criminal injustice system—offers ample rewards for 
those who emphasise the usual sorts of low-level crime. 
There are many jobs in the system, in what has been called 
the prison-industrial complex, for building prisons, 
running police operations and a host of related activities.16 
In comparison, there are relatively few rewards for those 




If Randall Collins’ ideas about the role of crime in society 
are accepted, then it is predictable that in just about any 
society some actions will be labelled criminal, stigmatised 
and penalised. However, this can be done in various ways, 
with differing social and political effects. In the restorative 
justice approach, damaging behaviours are dealt with by 
community-based efforts to reintegrate the offender into a 
meaningful social group. 
 For rulers, though, there are two great temptations. 
The first is to use the advantages of power to commit 
crimes or, even better, to set up the rules so that personal 
wealth can legally be extracted from the population. The 
                                                
15 Nils Christie, Crime Control as Industry: Towards Gulags, 
Western Style (London: Routledge, 1994). 
16 Joel Dyer, The Perpetual Prisoner Machine—How America 
Profits from Crime (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000). 
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second temptation is to raise the alarm about other sorts of 
crime, by enemies or by people lower in the social hierar-
chy. A parallel double process of persuasion is involved: 
hide high-level crime or make it legal, acceptable and 
even laudable, and at the same time encourage people to 
project their fears and anger about crime onto scapegoats.  
 The result of these temptations and tactics is obvious 
in media coverage (encouraged by government priorities, 
for example funding police and anti-fraud agencies) and 
hence in everyday conversations. If the size of a crime, or 
the proceeds of rules that enable unfair distribution of 
wealth, were the determinant of attention, hardly anyone 
would get excited about low-level theft when corporations 
and governments are extracting, legally or not, billions of 
dollars from the populace. When it comes to crimes of 
violence, if the scale of devastation and death were the 
determinant of attention, then media coverage would 
concentrate on state terrorism, not the small-scale efforts 
of non-state groups. 
 To challenge the dominant narrative about crime is 
difficult, but can be done. It involves continual exposure 
of the techniques used by governments and others to direct 
attention to individual criminals, and efforts to promote 
alternatives. There are many people doing this, in all sorts 
of ways. Useful lessons can be learned from efforts to 
challenge the so-called war on drugs: exposing its sordid 
origins and harmful effects, showing the rationality and 
publicising the beneficial effects of decriminalising drugs 
(as in Portugal), and fostering sensible ways to reduce the 
harmful effects of addiction (rather than assuming legali-
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sation on its own is sufficient).17 Proponents of harm 
reduction want to treat drug use as a social and health 
problem rather than a legal and policing problem. Similar 
efforts can be taken on other issues in which the “crime 
problem” is used to serve vested interests. 
                                                
17 Johann Hari, Chasing the Scream: The First and Last Days of 





It’s the year of the Olympic Games. For many fans, this is 
one of the highlights of the sporting calendar. Even those 
who do not follow sports may tune into the spectacular 
opening ceremony. 
 The modern Olympics supposedly were set up for 
noble purposes: instead of waging war, nations could 
engage in peaceful, healthy competition. From the start, 
though, the games were driven by baser considerations, 
including nationalism and, later, commercialism.1  
                                                
1 Useful treatments include Robert K. Barney, Stephen R. Wenn 
and Scott G. Martyn, Selling the Five Rings: The International 
Olympic Committee and the Rise of Olympic Commercialism 
(Salt Lake City, UT: University of Utah Press, 2002); Jules 
Boykoff, Celebration Capitalism and the Olympic Games (New 
York: Routledge, 2013); Jules Boykoff, Power Games: A 
Political History of the Olympics (London: Verso, 2016); Richard 
Espy, The Politics of the Olympic Games (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1979); Christopher R. Hill, Olympic Politics 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992); John 
Hoberman, The Olympic Crisis: Sport, Politics and the Moral 
Order (New Rochelle, NY: Aristide D. Caratzas, 1986); Jeffrey 
Segrave and Donald Chu (eds.), Olympism (Champaign, IL: 
Human Kinetics, 1981); Alan Tomlinson and Garry Whannel 
(eds.), Five-Ring Circus: Money, Power and Politics at the 
Olympic Games (London: Pluto Press, 1984). 
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 The nationalist bias is apparent in several features. 
Athletes compete as representatives of their country of 
citizenship. In individual events, no more than three 
competitors are allowed from any country. In team sports, 
such as basketball, each country can have only one team. 
So the Olympics, rather than being a genuine world 
championship of the best athletes, are constrained by the 
artificial barriers of citizenship. Team sports in particular 
can become surrogates for international rivalries. 
 In the opening ceremony, watched by billions around 
the globe, athletes march around the host stadium in 
national teams. It is a special honour for an athlete to lead 
the team, carrying the country’s flag. 
 In most media coverage of the Olympics, a country’s 
media concentrate on the progress of their “own” athletes, 
namely the ones representing their country. Viewers are 
encouraged to identify with these particular athletes. For 
example, in the 2000 Sydney Olympics, Cathy Freeman, a 
sprinter in the 400 meters and a prominent Indigenous 
Australian, was favoured to win. She was chosen that year 
to light the Olympic flame. When she won the final in her 
signature event, there was rejoicing throughout the 
country, with saturation media coverage both encouraging 
and responding to this popular interest. Many viewers saw 
Freeman’s victory as not just a personal achievement but 
as representing Indigenous success and, more generally, 
an achievement for the whole country, especially given 
these games were in Australia. 
 Hosting the Olympics is treated as a matter of 
national prestige, as well as kudos for the city. Govern-
ment officials use all sorts of persuasive means, including 
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bribery, to encourage Olympic committee members to 
support their bids to host the Olympics. Politicians and 
entrepreneurs in cities and countries where the Olympics 
are held use the opportunity to sell their preferred image, 
perhaps as a responsible member of the international 
community (for example, Beijing) or a desirable tourist 
destination (for example, Sydney). A winning bid to host 
the games is widely seen as a diplomatic triumph, despite 
the huge costs and headaches in getting the venues ready 
in time. 
 Behind the scenes at Olympic host cities, govern-
ments carry out various forms of civil and social 
engineering in order to present a positive picture to the 
world. This includes moving homeless people out of city 
centres, bulldozing homes, suppressing dissent and 
creating huge facades.  
 Meanwhile, among the athletes, every attempt is 
made to foster a clean image. Competitors, in their quest 
for Olympic gold, will make all sorts of sacrifices, and for 
some this includes performing while injured, using banned 
drugs and using unethical techniques to undermine 
opponents. 
 The Olympics are officially presented as a moral 
paragon, as a unifying enterprise for the world. In practice, 
Olympics politics represent one of the worst models of 
compromise and lack of principle. In order to enable 
participation, nearly every government, no matter how 
dictatorial and corrupt, is allowed to send a team. Thus 
oppressive regimes can bask in the reflected glory of 
having their chosen athletes compete. For some govern-
ments, participation is restricted to those considered 
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acceptable. For decades, numerous governments allowed 
only men to compete, and persecuted minorities are 
commonly excluded. Olympic officials seldom intervene 
in decisions made by national committees. In these ways, 
the Olympic movement panders to nationalism. 
 The Olympic Games have often been used as tools in 
international diplomacy. In 1980, many governments 
boycotted the games in Moscow as a protest against the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In some places, Australia 
among them, athletes were placed in a quandary. Should 
they follow the recommendation of their government and 
boycott the games, or instead attend anyway in order to 
achieve what for many is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity 
to participate in the world’s most prestigious sporting 
competition? In 1984, Soviet-bloc governments held a 
payback boycott of the games in Los Angeles. 
 The Olympics have also become highly commercial, 
especially with the rise of television coverage in the 1950s 
and 1960s, providing huge revenues to the International 
Olympic Committee and leading to transformation of the 
games into an ever greater spectacle. 
 Originally, Olympic athletes were required to be 
amateurs. This gave an advantage to members of upper 
classes who had access to facilities and leisure time for 
training. As the Olympics became more prestigious, some 
governments and athletic organisations gave support to 
their athletes in ways that got around the amateur rule. In 
the Soviet bloc, elite athletes were de facto professionals 
with sham jobs. In the US, athletic scholarships at 
universities, combined with soft study options, enabled 
many athletes to train almost like full-time professionals. 
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Furthermore, many received covert payments or benefits, 
so this era was sometimes called “shamateurism.” The 
ending of the amateur requirement meant these forms of 
hypocrisy were avoided, though at the expense of the 
original Olympic ideal. 
 In the Soviet bloc, scientists were involved in design-
ing training for national teams. The East German team 
was highly successful, producing many world champions, 
and was also notorious for the widespread use of banned 
drugs. The quest for Olympic gold was so strong that 
athletes in many other countries also used drugs. 
 Drugs are only one way to seek a competitive ad-
vantage. In several countries, national training centres 
undertake research to support elite athletic performance. 
In the 1976 Montreal Olympics, the Australian team did 
not obtain a single gold medal, a dismal performance in 
the eyes of political leaders who saw athletic success as a 
source of national pride. In response, the government set 
up the Australian Institute of Sport to undertake research 
and oversee training of elite athletes. This was modelled 
on the Eastern European efforts, but without the emphasis 
on drugs. The AIS has studied training regimens, psychol-
ogy, special technological aids in training, coaching 
techniques and other areas. It has been one factor in the 
later successes of the Australian team, putting it ahead of 
larger countries on a per-capita basis. 
 The rhetoric of sport sometimes proclaims that the 
aim is participation, not winning, but in practice the 
emphasis is on victory, as in US football coach Vince 
Lombardi’s famous saying “Winning isn’t everything, it’s 
the only thing.” The emphasis on winners, and on elite 
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athletes, is obvious in media coverage. Olympic coverage 
is on the finals and on medallists, especially gold medal-
lists. In many countries, coverage is selective, with 
attention given to athletes from the country in question. A 
local hero might be followed through the heats of an 
event, but if beaten, coverage switched to other events. 
Viewers who want to watch the “best in the world” may 
be frustrated by coverage oriented to national competitors. 
 Then there are the unofficial medal totals, listing the 
number of gold, silver and bronze medals obtained by 
athletes from different countries. In 2012, the countries 
with the most total medals were the US, China and Russia. 
However, further down the list, many people in countries 
such as Algeria and Guatemala were proud that a single 
competitor from their country received a medal. 
 Media coverage and medal totals encourage identifi-
cation with a national team, and with a country. Flags are 
in abundance, and national anthems played for winners. 
These processes encourage citizens to identify with the 
elite athletes from their own country. (Immigrants often 
have conflicted loyalties.) 
 When citizens identify with Olympic athletes from 
their countries, many important differences are obscured. 
Just because runners or shooters on an Olympic team do 
well does not mean ordinary citizens from the country are 
any good at running or shooting. They might be, but many 
of them might be unable to run more than a short distance 
and never have used a rifle. Success in the Olympics can 
make viewers feel like winners, by proxy.  
 Olympic athletes must be highly dedicated to achieve 
world-class performance levels. This typically means 
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spending hours per day for years on end. This sort of 
commitment is uncommon. Viewers can bask in the 
illusion that dedication by athletes has some spin-off 
association with dedication by themselves or others in 
their societies. This might be true, but often isn’t. 
 The Olympics, like most sports in other contexts, are 
presented as clean, honest, fair competitions, in which 
those with superior capabilities are victorious. Sports are 
widely seen as separate from the messy and corrupt 
practices found elsewhere in society—they provide an 
escape into an ideal world. This illusion is sometimes 
threatened by the behaviour of athletes, for example when 
they are discovered cheating or when committing crimes 
in their life outside the sporting arena. These violations of 
the image of sport as pure are seen as especially objec-
tionable, and constitute one reason why the crusade 
against drugs in sport is unrelenting: sport must be seen to 
be fair so the illusion of a pure, separate world can be 
maintained. Governments like to be associated with the 
image of sporting success—as long as it’s a clean image. 
 
Other sports 
National identification is promoted via sports such as 
cricket and rugby in which there are national teams, so it 
sometimes can seem like countries are competing against 
each other when actually only teams representing coun-
tries are competing. Commentators say “India defeated 
England” rather than “The cricket team representing India 
defeated the cricket team representing England.” Many 
fans identify with national teams. 
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 In individual sports, like golf and tennis, there is 
some identification based on country of origin. That tennis 
star Rafael Nadal is from Spain can be a source of pride 
for Spaniards, but this is minor compared to what happens 
with the World Cup.2 Football—called soccer in the US—
seems to arouse tremendous passions, and nationalism is 
an important component of this emotional process. Foot-
ball is indeed the “world game”—the US baseball finals 
are misleadingly called the world series—so every 
national team carries the hopes of many of its citizens.  
 The World Cup is broadcast internationally, and is 
the ultimate football competition. Normally, fans will back 
a local team, but when it’s time for the World Cup, these 
parochial attachments are set aside in a bigger type of 
parochial partisanship, identification with the national 
team. Many athletes see their greatest achievement as 
playing in the World Cup, especially in the finals. 
 It should be noted that women’s football is insignifi-
cant in audience ratings compared to the men’s game. 
Many competitive sports remain male dominated in terms 
of prominence. Patriarchy influences sport in various 
ways, intersecting with nationalism, commercialism and 
other factors.3 
  
                                                
2 David Goldblatt, The Ball is Round: A Global History of 
Football (London: Viking, 2006). 
3 On the politics of football, see Gabriel Kuhn, Soccer vs. the 
State: Tackling Football and Radical Politics (Oakland, CA: PM 
Press, 2011). 
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The arbitrariness of sporting attachments 
Most sports fans develop strong commitments to particular 
players or teams. When fans support a local player or 
team, loyalty is usually based in a sense of community, in 
which the team is treated as a representative of the 
locality, city, region or country. 
 Very few fans can observe games dispassionately, 
not caring who wins but simply observing a game of skill. 
Instead, the games involving favoured players or teams 
receive far more attention. If a sport is not played locally 
and is not widely established internationally, few fans will 
have any interest in it. For example, Australian rules 
football has a limited following in China, India or Russia. 
 It may seem logical that fans will support the local 
team, especially when the players are local identities, 
perhaps even meeting with the fans. However, most fan 
identification with players is vicarious, through watching 
their team, not by personally interacting with them.  
 The arbitrariness of these loyalties is shown when 
players are brought in from other parts of the country or 
the world. A US basketball player who joins an Australian 
team usually has no prior connection with Australia, yet is 
eagerly adopted by local fans as part of their team. Players 
and coaches are traded and transferred, basically as 
commodities, but only occasionally does this alienate fans. 
It seems that the name of the team is enough to inspire 
loyalty to it. 
 This is apparent in baseball in the US, where loyalty 
is most commonly to the team with a city’s name, for 
example the Chicago Cubs or the New York Yankees. 
When a team moves to another city, as when the Dodgers 
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moved from Brooklyn to Los Angeles, city-based loyalties 
usually trump loyalties to the players. In any case, players 
are regularly traded, so teams are not composed of local 
athletes but simply of players who have been made part of 
a team with a local name. 
 The same applies to international sport. Players are 
often born and bred in the country they represent, but this 
not essential. There are plenty of cases in which players 
change their citizenship in order to join a team in their 
adopted country. Such players are usually welcomed with 
open arms as one of our athletes. Assignment of loyalties 
is more about the label than about any deep connection to 
the country or its institutions. 
 
Alternatives 
International sporting competitions, such as the Olympics 
and the World Cup, seem so natural that it can be hard to 
imagine any other way of doing things. Therefore it is 
worth noting some possible alternatives, not because they 
are likely or even desirable, but to highlight assumptions 
about sport. 
 One alternative is simply to abolish all elite interna-
tional sporting competitions. Instead, emphasis could be 
placed on mass participation in health-promoting and 
socially engaging sport and physical activity. Research 
shows that physical activity is a reliable way of improving 
happiness—more reliable than watching sporting compe-
titions on television, for example—and there are health 
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benefits too.4 So if the aim is to improve gross national 
happiness, rather than gross national product, then wide-
spread participation in sport is an obvious candidate. 
 Another option is to set up sporting competitions on a 
different basis, so national identification is limited. In the 
1920s and 1930s, there were a number of “workers’ 
games” run as alternatives to the Olympics. In these 
games, competitors did not represent countries. The 
orientation was to achievements by members of the 
working class, at a time when many elite athletes were 
from privileged backgrounds.5 
 Yet another option is cooperative games.6 An 
example is football with an added rule: when a player 
scores a goal, this player joins the opposing team. When 
players switch sides during a game, winning becomes a 
side issue, because it is not even clear exactly who has 
won. This sort of rule undercuts the competitive dynamic 
and orients players to enjoying the game rather than 
                                                
4 John J. Ratey with Eric Hagerman, Spark: The Revolutionary 
New Science of Exercise and the Brain (New York: Little, Brown, 
2008). 
5 Boykoff, Power Games, pp. 60–65; James Riordan, “The 
Workers’ Olympics,” in Alan Tomlinson and Garry Whannel 
(eds.), Five-ring Circus: Money, Power and Politics at the 
Olympic Games (London: Pluto, 1984), pp. 98–112. 
6 Terry Orlick, Cooperative Games and Sports: Joyful Activities 
for Everyone, 2nd edition (Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics Press, 
2006). More generally on the advantages of cooperation, see Alfie 
Kohn, No Contest: The Case against Competition (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1986). 
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winning. Many different sorts of cooperative games have 
been devised and played. Few of them would serve as 
vehicles for accentuating nationalism. Indeed, cooperative 
games might actually help break down national identifica-
tion, as players from different countries helped each other 
in joint endeavours. 
 
Tactics promoting nationalism in sports 
There are several routine methods that promote national-
istic thinking and fervour in sport.7 First is exposure: the 
sports, and athletes identified with countries, need to be 
publicised. Commonly this happens via the media, for 
example the worldwide coverage of the Olympics and the 
World Cup. Note that only some sports are publicised to a 
great extent. Many sports and athletes languish in obscu-
rity, or have very limited followings. It is interesting that 
some of the most widely publicised competitions, with 
global coverage, involve athletes representing countries. 
 Second is valuing: the sports and athletes need to be 
seen positively. This is almost always the case for sport. 
Only a few sports, such as boxing, are stigmatised in some 
circles. Elite athletes as a group are highly esteemed, 
though some individuals fall from grace, especially those 
exposed as cheats or who commit serious crimes. By and 
large, athletes are seen as dedicated and talented, and are 
lauded for their achievements. 
 In 2014, 26-year-old Australian cricketer Philip 
Hughes was killed when hit in the head by the cricket ball 
while batting. This led to a huge outpouring of grief, aided 
                                                
7 See chapter 1 for the framework used for this exposition. 
Sport     69 
 
by saturation media coverage. For example, some major 
newspapers devoted six or more pages to the story for day 
after day. It was the biggest such public grieving spectacle 
since Princess Diana died in 1997. Hughes had played on 
the national team and was well known to anyone who 
followed Australian cricket, though he was not the 
country’s most prominent cricketer. This episode showed 
a confluence of valuing processes: it involved a sport that 
many in Australia have seen as the traditional national 
sport, and one in which the Australian team has often been 
the world’s best, a young player seen as exemplary in 
dedication to his craft, and a sudden drama and tragedy, 
ideal for media coverage. It should be noted that some 
letter-writers were sceptical of giving so much adulation 
to a sportsperson, and pointed out that other people, who 
had made greater sacrifices to serve the community, had 
died without much media coverage. Perhaps a key factor 
was that Hughes contributed towards a sense of national 
identity, at least for those who followed cricket. 
 Nationalistic thinking is promoted using various 
arguments that give a positive interpretation of country-
identified sporting competition. There is the trickle-down 
argument that elite sporting success will be an inspiration 
for others in the country, the economic argument that 
tourism and trade will benefit from international recogni-
tion, and the status-related argument that international 
prestige is tied to involvement in and success in interna-
tional sport.  
 Another key tactic is endorsement of international 
sport by governments and national sporting bodies. This 
works in two ways: governments and sporting bodies 
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endorse participation in international sport, and by 
competing with others implicitly endorse other teams and 
governments. This routine endorsement is usually unno-
ticed, only coming to attention when challenges are made.  
 From the 1960s through the 1980s, as South Africa’s 
apartheid government faced increasing opposition to its 
racist policies, it sought international validation through 
its sporting teams. Opponents of apartheid protested 
against events involving South African teams. For exam-
ple, in the early 1970s, there were protests in Australia and 
New Zealand against matches with the visiting the South 
African rugby team. The point here is that national teams 
serve as de facto ambassadors of governments, and as 
emblems of national pride: endorsement of the team is 
assumed. 
 The final tactic is rewards for joining in the glorifica-
tion of athletes representing countries. The athletes them-
selves receive several types of rewards: the satisfaction of 
achievement at the highest level (being good enough to be 
selected for a national team is impressive), the prestige of 
being a winner at the international level, and occasionally 
financial returns from endorsements and career oppor-
tunities.  
 Companies can gain by associating themselves with 
sports. A few are involved with sports equipment, such as 
running shoes; others attach themselves to teams or 
prominent athletes through sponsorship deals; yet others 
benefit when a country hosts an international sporting 
competition. 
 Governments can gain by associating themselves 
with elite sports. In Australia, prime ministers sometimes 
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attend sporting events, a mutually beneficial media 
opportunity, and by trying to associate themselves with 
sporting heroes. When hosting the Olympics, politicians 
take maximum advantage of the associated international 
prestige.  
 Finally, when identification with international sports 
teams is widespread, there are rewards for ordinary 
citizens: being an avid supporter of the team enables 
solidarity with friends and co-workers. If nearly everyone 
at the office is excited by an international match, then 
those who are uninterested are safer saying nothing—and 
supporting an opposing team can sometimes be awkward.   
 
Tactics against alternatives 
Alternatives to national identification in elite competitive 
sport—including abolition of international competitions, 
workers’ games, and cooperative sports—are seldom 
mentioned. So it might be said that a key tactic against 
these alternatives is cover-up, except that so few people 
advocate such alternatives that active efforts to suppress 
information are hardly necessary.  
 International elite competitive sport has become 
hegemonic: it seems part of everyday reality. Those who 
are not interested in sports ignore the issue, and few of 
those interested in sports spend much time promoting 
alternatives. Meanwhile, young athletes see participation 
in a national team as an aspiration. 
 Then there are tactics to challenge nationalism in 
sports. This does not mean supporting a foreign team, 
because this doesn’t question the importance of national 
identification of some kind. Let’s consider some more 
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frontal challenges. One is to denigrate international 
competitions, for example by exposing corruption, 
cheating and damaging side-effects. There is certainly 
plenty of critical material about the Olympics, for example 
exposés by journalists about the machinations of the Inter-
national Olympic Committee.8 Activists in host cities have 
tried to oppose the repressive and damaging measures 
used by governments to control the image portrayed about 
the games, for example moving homeless people out of 
urban areas and implementing harsh security measures.9  
 Every four years, a fresh crop of critics of the games 
emerges, especially in the host city. However, only a 
portion of their activity is directed against Olympics in 
general, or against the nationalistic dimensions of the 
games. Furthermore, in between Olympic years, there is 
little activity critical of the games or their patriotic 
dimensions. Possible tactics for challengers include ex-
posing shortcomings and abuses (and plenty have been 
documented), denigrating the Games, explaining what is 
wrong with them, and mobilising protests. 
 There is one major obstacle to direct criticisms of any 
international sport: it is easy for others to say that this is 
                                                
8 Andrew Jennings, The New Lords of the Rings: Olympic 
Corruption and How to Buy Gold Medals (London: Pocket 
Books, 1996). 
9 Jules Boykoff, Activism and the Olympics: Dissent at the 
Games in Vancouver and London (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press, 2014); Helen Jefferson Lenskyj, Inside the 
Olympic Industry: Power, Politics, and Activism (Albany, NY: 
State University of New York Press, 2000). 
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criticism of athletes. Elite athletes are sometimes treated 
as almost sacred: when they are unblemished in their 
personal and professional lives, they are considered 
beyond criticism. To question elite sport may be taken to 
imply, “You’ve been putting incredible effort into 
something that’s not all that worthwhile.” 
 Rather than mount a campaign against elite interna-
tional sport, probably a better strategy is to promote 
alternatives—and there are many who do this. Increasing 
public participation in sport is a worthy alternative task, 
with well-documented benefits for health, personal 
satisfaction and social interaction. It would seem a 
reasonable step to argue that government expenditure 
should be redirected away from elite sport towards greater 
public participation. Cooperative sports—rather than 
competitive ones—are a complementary alternative, and 
might be promoted as a way of getting people to think of 
the disadvantages of competition. 
 Finally, there is another option: simply paying no 
attention to elite competitive sport, especially its national-
istic dimensions. Many people are already uninterested, 
but often they are polite about it. This could be encour-
aged, so that avid sports-watching is seen as uncool, or 
simply boring. This is already the case in some circles. 
Whether this could be the basis for something broader 
remains to be seen. 
 
Conclusion 
Sport can serve as a tool to promote nationalism. To do 
this effectively, participants need to be representatives of 
countries, so that engagement in the sport can be inter-
74     Ruling tactics 
preted as a national enterprise. The sports need to be 
competitive, allowing individuals and teams representing 
countries to engage with those from other countries, so 
there is national honour involved in what would otherwise 
just be a contest between athletes. Ideally, the competitors 
are elite performers, without moral blemish, encouraging 
citizens to identify with the athletes representing their 
country. By glorifying national sporting heroes, especially 
winners, identification with one’s country is encouraged, 
while governments bask in reflected prestige. 
 The role of these various components of international 
sport can be seen by imagining alternatives. A global fun 
run, in which participants are identified by some arbitrary 
characteristic such as birthday or height, would not 
provide much fodder for nationalism. A cooperative game, 
with participants joining for a common goal such as 
keeping a ball aloft, might foster a sense of international 
cooperation. A competition between non-elite perform-
ers—for example a swimming contest involving several 
presidents and prime ministers—would be more an 
amusement than a source of national identification, with 
internal opponents of any given president likely to support 
others. 
 Ironically, it is the seeming neutrality and non-
political status of sport that makes it such a potent tool for 
national identification. Because sporting contests seem to 
be separate from politics and instead as places of moral 
virtue where the best athletes win, they are attractive to 
viewers, allowing them to identify with their preferred 
individuals or teams—and national identification comes as 
part of the package. 
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 Because elite international competitive sports are so 
highly entrenched, it is difficult to challenge them. Direct 
criticism has a role, but perhaps more effective in the long 
run is promotion of alternatives, including mass participa-






Spying and surveillance 
 
 
Spies: are they good guys or bad guys? The answer is 
easy: the spies on our side are good whereas the spies on 
their side are the worst of the worst. 
 Spying and surveillance are tricky for governments 
because of secrecy and obvious double standards. Let’s 
look at some of the aspects and complications. 
 Spying on foreign enemies is the easiest case: it’s 
assumed to be a good thing. However, to be effective, 
spying needs to be done covertly, so it’s hard to praise 
spies in public. Furthermore, spying in general is often 
seen as a bit devious, so governments seldom boast that, 
“We have the best spies.” Even mentioning the existence 
of current spies is a bit risky. 
 One solution is to praise past spying operations, done 
for a good cause. An example involves the Enigma 
machine, built in Britain during World War II to break 
Nazi secret codes. Breaking into codes is a type of spying, 
done at a distance, though it is perhaps better called 
surveillance. The story of the Enigma machine has been 
told in books and films, including the 2014 film The 
Imitation Game. It portrayed some British military figures 
unfavourably, with commanders being contemptuous of 
mathematicians and, after the war, showing serious bias 
against Alan Turing because he was gay. But this 
portrayal was in the overall context of the assumption that 
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breaking German codes was a gallant, militarily crucial 
endeavour. 
 Very few people have personal experience of spying, 
or have even talked to a spy about what they do on the job. 
Consequently, ideas about spying are largely shaped by 
media coverage, much of it fictional in novels and films. 
In the widely read novels by John Le Carré, most of them 
set during the cold war, the world of spies is deceptive and 
morally challenging, with agents, double agents and 
double crossing. Overall the impression is that spying is 
somewhat disreputable. Indeed, spying requires lying, and 
thus has a taint about it. 
 Perhaps for this reason, as well as operational se-
crecy, governments say little about their own current 
spies. But when it comes to foreign spies, it is another 
matter: they are mightily condemned. (In practice, many 
foreign spies are monitored but never exposed; some are 
quietly expelled.) A few are arrested, tried and given long 
prison sentences, worse than if they had committed 
murder. 
 The most severe condemnation is reserved for insid-
ers who serve the enemy: citizens, who are supposed to be 
loyal, who sell secrets or, even worse, reveal secrets 
because they believe in the cause of the enemy. Spying is 
cast into the mould of us versus them. 
 However, old-fashioned spying using agents has long 
been superseded by signals intelligence, which involves 
surveillance of electronic communications. All sorts of 
sophisticated techniques are used to monitor phone calls, 
emails and every form of electronic communication. 
Mostly this goes on in secrecy by all involved. Occasion-
78     Ruling tactics 
 
ally, though, there are stories about foreign dangers, for 
example hacking into databases by agents on behalf of 
North Korea or China. Because of secrecy, media stories 
are untrustworthy. Foreign governments seldom fess up 
saying “Yes, we were trying to access your vital data.” 
Informed observers are wary: media stories may be due to 
strategic leaks intended to serve political objectives. 
 
Some ways to refer to an agency 
National security 
agency 
This is the most serious-sounding 
terminology, implying grave 
responsibility. This is the most 
overtly state-oriented expression. 
Intelligence 
organisation 
The word “intelligence” has 
positive connotations because of 
the more common usages of the 
word, so this is a favoured 




This emphasises a potentially 
negative side to agency activities. 
Spy agency This has negative connotations, 
given that spying is often seen as 
somewhat underhanded. 
Secret police or 
political police 
These terms highlight the capacity 
for political repression, and point to 
a connection with dictatorial 
regimes. 
The spooks This is an informal, humorous term.  
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 A lot of surveillance is about economic information, 
for example trade secrets, designs and plans. Supposedly 
every government with suitable capacities does this, but it 
is usually kept secret. Occasionally there are popular cries 
to stop foreigners from “stealing our secrets,” as though 
only foreigners engage in commercial espionage. 
 Then comes the most challenging surveillance of all: 
a government spying on its own citizens. In police states, 
this is a means of keeping control by monitoring dissent. 
In the former East Germany, the Stasi—the feared secret 
police—received information from one out of ten citizens 
in one of the most pervasive monitoring systems ever 
known. In the west, this sort of surveillance is condemned, 
so it is not surprising that western governments’ own sur-
veillance of their citizens is carried out in utmost secrecy.  
 Thinking in terms of in-groups and out-groups, there 
are two sets of processes going on here. Governments seek 
to build loyalty by encouraging citizens to think of 
themselves being part of a loyal in-group, and can foster 
this by creating, exaggerating or stigmatising out-groups. 
Foreign enemies are prime candidates for being out-
groups and for bolstering in-group solidarity. Terrorists 
serve the same function, especially when they are seen as 
foreign or alien. But what if some of the “enemy” are 
actually part of “us”? This makes things trickier. The 
internal enemy could be communists, capitalists, ethnic 
groups, religious groups and so on. The risk to the gov-
ernment is that its own agents, including ones undertaking 
surveillance, will come to be seen as the enemy. 
 Consider the former Soviet Union, in which people 
were encouraged to report family members who were 
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enemies of the state. For those who did this, one reward 
was greater identification with the state: for them, the out-
group was class enemies. But for others, family loyalties 
were greater, and attempts by the government to encour-
age spying caused questioning of the state itself: for them, 
the state became an out-group. 
 Only in some circumstances can groups create loyalty 
that outweighs all competing loyalties. One of the reasons 
for the celibacy of priests in the Catholic Church is that it 
removes a competing source of loyalty: wives and 
children. Some cults require celibacy whereas others break 
down personal loyalties by expecting or mandating sexual 
relations with many different partners.1 Governments have 
seldom been able to break down family loyalty; when they 
try, they risk being seen as the enemy of the people. 
 The governments of Australia, Britain, Canada, New 
Zealand and the US for decades had an intelligence-
sharing arrangement called the Five Eyes agreement. 
Secret monitoring stations were set up to collect every 
possible electronic communication, and software devel-
oped to search the resulting data. This operation was so 
secret that its existence was hidden from the public, and 
even its name, Echelon, was secret.  
 New Zealand campaigner Nicky Hager made the first 
major breakthrough. Through conversations with workers 
at the facility at Waihopai run by the Government 
Communications Security Bureau, the New Zealand 
government’s signals intelligence agency, he gradually 
                                                
1 Lewis A. Coser, Greedy Institutions: Patterns of Undivided 
Commitment (New York: Free Press, 1974). 
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pieced together more and more information. The more 
information he obtained, the more he was able to suggest 
he knew more than he did, and thereby gather additional 
information. His 1996 book Secret Power2 became well 
known among those who followed the machinations of 
government spy agencies, who also read James Bamford’s 
The Puzzle Palace about the US National Security Agency 
and related exposés.3 Hager’s discoveries received some 
publicity when in the late 1990s repression-technology 
expert Steve Wright wrote about the Echelon surveillance 
system in a report to the European Parliament.4 
 Wider public awareness of massive western govern-
ment surveillance of their own citizens did not occur until 
Edward Snowden’s massive leak of documents from the 
US National Security Agency—the lynchpin agency in the 
Five Eyes agreement—hit the news in 2013.5 Snowden’s 
amazingly detailed information overshadowed previous 
                                                
2 Nicky Hager, Secret Power: New Zealand’s Role in the Interna-
tional Spy Network (Nelson, New Zealand: Craig Potton, 1996). 
3 James Bamford, The Puzzle Palace: A Report on America’s 
Most Secret Agency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982). 
4 Steve Wright, “The Echelon trail: an illegal vision,” Surveil-
lance & Society, Vol. 3, Nos. 2/3, 2005, pp. 198–215. 
5 For informative accounts, see Glenn Greenwald, No Place to 
Hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA and the Surveillance State 
(Hamish Hamilton 2014); Michael Gurnow, The Edward 
Snowden Affair: Exposing the Politics and Media Behind the NSA 
Scandal (Blue River Press, 2014); Luke Harding, The Snowden 
Files: The Inside Story of the World’s Most Wanted Man 
(Guardian Books 2014). 
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findings, which were for the most part forgotten or 
ignored. The evidence was clear: massive government 
surveillance, carried out in supposedly democratic coun-
tries, was standard practice, not only against foreign 
enemies but also against ordinary citizens. It was bad 
when done by the East German Stasi. Why was it okay in 
the US? 
 Whereas previously the spying had been kept out of 
the public eye, not just for operational reasons but to 
prevent outrage, now it needed to be explained and 
justified. For governments and their apologists, a series of 
rationales emerged. One was to attack the messenger, 
calling Snowden a traitor. Another was to say, as had been 
said many times before, “If you’ve got nothing to hide, 
you have nothing to fear,” implying that only criminals 
and terrorists should be concerned about government 
surveillance. There are many replies to this presumption in 
the form of a question. One of the easiest is to say, “In that 
case, please give me your credit card numbers and 
passwords.”6 
 Governments can try to justify surveillance through 
the usual us-versus-them dichotomy, assuming surveil-
lance is entirely against enemies of the state and people. 
The trouble is that many citizens start distrusting the state 
itself. This is apparent in the popularity of 9/11 conspiracy 
theories. Setting aside the question of whether President 
George W. Bush or other US officials actually had 
                                                
6 Actually, the issues are more complicated than this. See Daniel 
J. Solove, Nothing to Hide: The False Tradeoff between Privacy 
and Security (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011). 
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anything to do with the planning or execution of the 
attacks on 11 September 2001, that so many people 
believe they might have suggests a deep-seated distrust of 
the US government. 
 Then there is the role of US spy agencies in other 
countries: they often team up with repressive govern-
ments, in particular with security forces involved in 
surveillance, arrests, torture and killings. For example, 
rage in Egypt against President Hosni Mubarak, who 
stepped down in 2011 following massive protests, was in 
part directed against his ruthless security apparatus and, by 
association, US partners.7 So there is an international 
dimension to outrage over spying on citizens: when 
governments share intelligence information against al-
leged enemies, this can undermine trust among citizens 
who know about it. 
 
Secrecy and surveillance 
Scott Horton in his book Lords of Secrecy provides a 
powerful indictment of secrecy in US agencies involved in 
spying and surveillance. Horton argues that public discus-
sion is essential for a democratic society, citing the 
example of ancient Athens, where citizens were involved 
in important decisions, including about security, namely 
going to war. Ancient Athens was successful in relation to 
its more authoritarian rivals, such as Sparta, because it was 
a “knowledge-based democracy,” gaining strength from 
                                                
7 Scott Horton, Lords of Secrecy: The National Security Elite and 
America’s Stealth Warfare (New York: Nation Books, 2015), p. 
157. 
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sharing and debating ideas from many individuals and 
sectors of society. 
 Horton traces the rise of excess secrecy in the US to 
the emergence after World War II of the national security 
elites, who dealt with nuclear weapons development and 
the challenge from the Soviet Union. He says the problem 
of unaccountable power was recognised by President 
Harry Truman and senior advisers who set up the Central 
Intelligence Agency; they established oversight mecha-
nisms via the legislative branch of government, namely 
Congress. However, according to Horton, the huge size 
and resources of the spy agencies, combined with their use 
of secrecy, before long overwhelmed and captured their 
congressional overseers. Secrecy became a tool to build 
bureaucratic empires, to hide failures and to carry out 
policies without scrutiny. 
 The next sector of society with the potential to 
restrain the agencies was the media, but the US mass 
media became tools of the state, being reluctant to break 
stories about any sort of abuse, for the example the 1968 
My Lai massacre in Vietnam or the torture at Abu Ghraib 
prison revealed in 2004. So, according to Horton, the one 
remaining group with the potential to challenge unac-
countable secrecy is whistleblowers, who have become a 
target for suppression. 
 Horton’s analysis points to the powerful role of 
secrecy in agencies involved in spying and in undeclared 
war, in particular the use of drones for extra-judicial 
assassination. Secrecy can become an end in itself. Horton 
himself is not making an argument against surveillance or 
drones or wars. He just wants there to be an open discus-
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sion so that better informed decisions, with support from 
politicians and the public, can be made. 
 This is enough background to indicate the complexi-
ties of spying and surveillance in relation to building 
loyalty to the state. Basically, the government has to 
pursue seemingly contradictory directions, maintaining 
secrecy for operational reasons and to hide corruption and 
abuses, while somehow convincing members of the public 
that monitoring them is for their benefit. 
 In the following sections, I first outline tactics to 
build loyalty to the state in relation to spying and surveil-
lance, then tactics against alternatives to the standard 
approach, and finally tactics to challenge surveillance. 
 
Tactics to build loyalty 
The first tactic is exposure of good things about the state. 
Here the challenge is the greatest. The safest approach is 
to expose only achievements, such as spying successes in 
past wars and successes in preventing terrorism. However, 
this has to be done carefully so as to suggest that bad guys 
are the only targets. By carefully picking stories to release, 
and angles on those stories, the aim is to encourage people 
to value the role of intelligence services, positioning them 
as protectors of the population.  
 Their role is explained as a necessary function of 
maintaining security. Part of the explanation involves 
suitable framing. Rather than refer to spying and surveil-
lance, the usual language is of intelligence and national 
security.  
 Governments routinely endorse their intelligence 
agencies, and reward them generously with good salaries 
86     Ruling tactics 
 
and conditions, as part of ample budgets that signify the 
importance of their task. 
 In these ways, governments try to build citizen 
loyalty to the agents of control. However, compared to 
many other areas—museums, elections, sport, education, 
media—the task is greater because spying itself is often 
seen as a shady sort of activity, involving deception and 
underhanded methods. It’s a bad method of achieving a 
good goal, and the negative associations with the method 
tend to rub off on the goal. So for many governments, the 
less said the better. Justifications are only brought forth 
when the issue has been publicised or when arguing for 
greater resources. Their ideal technique is to condemn 
spying by other governments and hope that no one even 
thinks about their own spying. 
 
Marginalising alternatives 
Are there any alternatives to the usual government spying? 
This is a difficult question to answer, because there is so 
little discussion of alternatives. Let’s consider some pos-
sibilities. 
 One alternative is to say there should be no spying at 
all. This is easy to challenge, because the bad guys—
foreign governments—are spying on us, so we need to spy 
on them. So the no-spying option is usually posed as, 
“There should be no spying on our own people.” This is 
actually a radical alternative in countries where the 
government is repressive and nearly all surveillance is 
against internal opponents. To this option, governments 
regularly use the method of fear-mongering, raising the 
alarm about terrorists, communists, traitors, heretics or 
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others who threaten the fabric of society, in other words 
the government. 
 There are, in some cases, actual opponents who pose 
some danger to the public: terrorists and criminals for 
example. Such opponents are valuable for governments 
because they help justify spying on everyone. For the 
moment, assume there are legitimate reasons for surveil-
lance. How should it be done? 
 The usual approach is to have a system but make sure 
it is under legitimate political control, for example with 
scrutiny by elected politicians, who supposedly serve as 
agents of the public. The trouble is that spy agencies 
become too powerful and can win over their political 
masters, invoking the necessity of secrecy to ensure that 
effective controls are seldom invoked. On a more nasty 
level, spy agencies can collect dirt on politicians, implic-
itly threatening to covertly release the information. The 
FBI under J. Edgar Hoover supposedly engaged in this 
sort of blackmail. It is the sort of technique used by crimi-
nal organisations: demand participation in crime and then 
use the possibility of exposure to deter disloyalty. 
 So what about alternatives that involve something 
completely different? One possibility is promoting social 
justice. Rather than spying on opponents, instead address 
the sources of their grievances. This is good for a long-
term view, but does not address the possibility of immedi-
ate threats. 
 One alternative is to introduce a “citizens inspec-
torate,” namely citizens who have the power to check 
what spy agencies are doing and to make reports and 
recommendations. To be effective, a citizen inspectorate 
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would need to be sizeable and have a significant turnover 
to prevent capture by the agencies. 
 Some agencies already have an oversight body or 
individual, for example an inspector-general to whom 
complaints can be made by employees or members of the 
public. The trouble with such systems is that they usually 
become closely aligned with the agency, the same problem 
that occurs with legislative oversight. 
 If citizen inspectors were randomly chosen and 
served short terms, they would be less likely to be able to 
bought off or intimidated: some of them might be 
independent enough to make probing assessments and 
discourage abuses. 
 Agency heads would detest such a proposal, no doubt 
arguing that citizen inspectors, lacking security clearances, 
could not be allowed to know what agencies are doing. 
This objection is the familiar claim that secrecy prevents 
scrutiny. 
 Another alternative would be to set up a secure ave-
nue for leaks from agencies. By analogy with WikiLeaks, 
it might be called SpyLeaks. This would enable abuses to 
be exposed with less likelihood of reprisals. Then comes 
the question of who would have access to the leaks. 
Perhaps legislators, or citizen inspectors, or even the 
general public.  
 Given the efforts of the US government to shut down 
WikiLeaks, it is obvious that SpyLeaks would never get 
off the ground. If it were ever implemented by agencies 
themselves, it might well have a back door so that agency 
officials could identify the leakers.  
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 Giliam de Valk and I wrote an article about “publicly 
shared intelligence.”8 Giliam in his PhD research com-
pared the performance of the Dutch intelligence services, 
which operated with the usual secrecy, with a very differ-
ent sort of intelligence operation: the Shipping Research 
Bureau. The Bureau operated at the time of apartheid in 
South Africa, when there was an international embargo of 
oil imports as a form of pressure against the regime. 
However, some companies broke the embargo, sending 
their ships surreptitiously to deliver oil to South Africa. 
The Bureau sought to collect information about these 
rogue traders and expose them, thereby shaming the 
companies.  
 The Bureau used secrecy in some aspects of its 
collection and analysis of data. Individuals sent the Bureau 
information about ships, and it sought to verify this infor-
mation, but did not release the names of its informants. 
But the Bureau’s reports were public. Unlike spy agencies, 
it made its assessments available for scrutiny. 
 Giliam in his research found that the Bureau’s reports 
were far more accurate than reports of the Dutch intelli-
gence agencies. Publicly shared intelligence apparently 
had an advantage. This was what you might expect: open 
scrutiny improves quality. The same thing happens in 
science. The quality of the open scientific literature, which 
is subject to peer review before publication and available 
for scrutiny by anyone after publication, is widely 
                                                
8 Giliam de Valk and Brian Martin, “Publicly shared intelli-
gence,” First Monday: Peer-reviewed Journal on the Internet, 
Vol. 11, No. 9, September 2006. 
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regarded as superior to secret corporate or government 
research. Similarly, open source software, in which the 
code is publicly available for scrutiny, is usually superior 
to proprietary software.  
 Publicly shared intelligence thus offers an alternative 
to the usual government surveillance. By drawing on the 
resources of the entire population both for inputs and 
evaluation of assessments, this form of intelligence would 
have the advantages of open source alternatives. (We 
didn’t call it open source intelligence because that name 
was already used for a different alternative: intelligence 
drawing on openly accessible information, but lacking the 
open scrutiny essential for quality control.) 
 Publicly shared intelligence would be a frontal chal-
lenge to conventional intelligence operations built around 
secrecy. As expected, there has been no government 
interest in this alternative. For all practical purposes, it is 
invisible. No government has sought to test it. 
 From this brief discussion of ways to provide 
stronger oversight of spy agencies, it should be obvious 
that agencies will do nothing to publicise options that 
enable significant independent citizen involvement, much 
less actually implement them. 
 
Challenging government surveillance 
A key method of challenging surveillance is to expose it. 
Secrecy serves spy agencies by hiding abuses and failures. 
The bigger the abuse, usually the greater the secrecy. 
 Whistleblowers, leakers, investigators and journalists 
play crucial roles. Edward Snowden revealed unparalleled 
amounts of inside information. He was highly effective 
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because he kept a low profile until he had gathered the 
information. (He kept his plans secret.) He then carefully 
chose a journalist and media outlet—Glenn Greenwald of 
the Guardian—to whom to release the information. When 
Greenwald wasn’t responsive, Snowden contacted Laura 
Poitras, a dissident filmmaker and friend of Greenwald’s, 
and arranged to meet them. Snowden chose well: the 
Guardian’s editors refused to buckle to pressures from the 
National Security Agency and its British equivalent, and 
went ahead with exposé after exposé. 
 Another exposure technique is to reveal the identities 
and activities of spies. The magazine CovertAction 
Information Bulletin beginning in 1978 published the 
names of a number of CIA agents. So effective was this 
outing that in 1982 the US Congress passed a law making 
such disclosures illegal and subject to severe penalties. 
This response suggests the power of exposure: spies aim 
to gather information about others but they don’t want 
information gathered about themselves: their efforts rely 
on secrecy and deception, for example false identities. 
 Today, it is far easier to collect and publish infor-
mation. Citizens with digital cameras can record police 
use of force as it happens, in many cases exposing abuses 
that in previous decades would have been hidden from the 
public. Similarly, recording of the identities and activities 
of spies can be a powerful technique. 
 Another important technique is to counter the 
justifications for surveillance. This is a big area. One 
technique used by agencies is to lie about the value of 
information gathered, for example in preventing terrorist 
attacks. Critics can expose the failures of agencies, for 
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example in not picking up on clues about the 9/11 attacks 
or not anticipating the Arab spring. There were important 
failures decades ago too, for example the falsity of the 
alleged “missile gap” between the US and Soviet nuclear 
arsenals in the late 1950s, and the failure to anticipate the 
collapse of communist regimes in 1989. These were all 
failures of US agencies; there would be equivalent 
shortcomings in agencies in other countries that need to be 
exposed and criticised. 
 Next is the issue of official channels. Many govern-
ments establish laws and regulators for privacy protection. 
In practice, though, these seldom do much to control 
surveillance operations. Indeed, there is a body of writing 
on how privacy protection is routinely outflanked by 
technological developments and rogue operations.9 What 
does privacy legislation do in the face of ever-expanding 
use of security cameras? What about revenge porn, when 
people post sexual images of former sexual partners? 
What about the Five Eyes surveillance of citizens? 
 Most employees tasked with enforcing privacy laws 
and regulations do their best, and no doubt many 
worthwhile protections have been implemented. But this is 
a losing effort in the face of an onslaught of monitoring 
capacities, including ones where people voluntarily offer 
information that potentially can be used against them, 
mostly in social media, also subject to monitoring and 
analysis by governments. 
                                                
9 For example, Simon Davies, Monitor: Extinguishing Privacy on 
the Information Superhighway (Sydney: Pan Macmillan, 1996), 
chapter 6. 
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 Rather than rely on privacy protection to limit 
surveillance, a more promising approach is to mobilise 
support, indeed to build a social movement. But despite 
people’s serious concerns about government surveillance 
and many abuses, there is little sign of the development of 
a broad-based anti-surveillance movement.  
 There are many initiatives. The group Anonymous 
has taken direct action online in support of WikiLeaks. 
There are many supporters and users of encryption who 
oppose efforts by US government officials to mandate 
backdoors to encryption systems using the rationale of 
needing to be able to track down terrorists. Then there are 
software developers and entrepreneurs making accessible 
the means to avoid surveillance. These include the devel-
opers and promoters of the Tor browser, search engines 
like duckduckgo that do not record searches, convenient 
encryption systems and anonymous remailers, among 
others. A basic test is to ask, “Would this system be useful 
to dissidents in a repressive regime?” If it is, then it is 
probably worth promoting everywhere, including in 
countries where governments ostensibly respect civil 
liberties, because when it comes to surveillance, lots of 
governments are seeking powers that can easily be used to 
suppress dissent—and quite possibly are, given the 
secrecy involved in the whole system. 
 Part of challenging surveillance is resisting it, and 
that is not easy in a world with ubiquitous monitoring. It’s 
possible to keep a low profile, but this might involve 
considerable inconvenience, for example not having a 
credit card, not driving (in areas where vehicle licence 
numbers are monitored) and not using a mobile phone. 
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Another form of resistance is to insert incorrect infor-
mation into databases, for example “accidentally” using a 
slightly different birthday or address for different data-
bases, or perhaps some politician’s phone number. 
Although this can make it more difficult to collate data 
about you—you may end up with lots of nearly identical 
but slightly different versions of yourself on databases—it 
does little about surveillance more generally. Fake profiles 
on Facebook, Google and other platforms are common, 
many of them manufactured and sold to enhance the 
buyer’s online image.  
 Because remaining outside routine surveillance is so 
difficult, and putting false information into databases 
usually has a marginal impact, probably a better form of 
resistance is to make public statements or otherwise pro-
test surveillance openly. Some opponents set out to disable 
security cameras. Others perform colourful protests in 
front of the cameras for the delectation of operators. 
 
Spying and patriotism revisited 
There are various ways to oppose spying operations, but 
how do these relate to state power? To start, much 
surveillance is undertaken by the state, so opposition 
directly challenges state power. Other surveillance is 
undertaken by companies, for commercial purposes. Face-
book and Google collect information about users to better 
direct advertisements, the lifeblood of their operations. 
However, as Snowden’s leaks revealed, spy agencies use 
various means to tap into private information streams.  
 Probably just as importantly, private data collection 
makes people become used to exposing their lives online, 
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without thinking about how data is being collected by 
banks, phone companies and social media companies. 
Surveillance is increasingly seen as normal, as nothing 
much to worry about. When people regularly reveal details 
about their lives to anonymous companies and government 
agencies, they are likely to come up with rationalisations 
to justify what they do. This helps explain why anti-
surveillance has not become a major social movement. 
 However, governments are still caught in their own 
contradictions. They undertake surveillance, but want to 
keep it secret and therefore have difficulty justifying it 
when it is exposed. They want to make people believe that 
all spying is on bad guys, but then are exposed spying on 
their own citizens. So they point to the dangers of crimi-
nals and terrorists, but at the risk of becoming tainted by 
their association with internal spying, often associated 
with repressive regimes.  
 Government thus can have a hard time finding the 
optimal balance between hiding and justifying their spying 
operations. Surveillance is not a good means for them to 
drum up support. Opponents can use the inherent contra-
dictions in state surveillance in mobilising resistance, but 
have their own challenges in trying to get people to care 
enough to act, given the gradual encroachment of data-
gathering methods and the immediate benefits to individ-
uals in acquiescing to this data-gathering. 
 Perhaps the most powerful technique is to use the 
expanded capacities for collecting data against govern-
ment agencies themselves. Already, police are changing 
their behaviour because of the ubiquity of cameras 
recording their actions. Perhaps government officials may 
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decide to change their operations if they start becoming 






On 15 December 2014, a man named Man Haron Monis 
took hostage a group of patrons at the Lindt café in Martin 
Place, in downtown Sydney. The police Tactical Response 
Group was called. There was a stand-off lasting over 16 
hours. In the dramatic climax of the siege, Monis killed 
one of the hostages, the police stormed the café, another 
hostage was killed (probably by a stray police bullet) and 
so was Monis. 
 This event received saturation coverage in the media, 
with continuous television treatments and page upon page 
in the daily newspapers. After the siege was over, there 
was an outpouring of sympathy for the two hostages who 
died, with Martin Place being covered with thousands of 
bouquets. 
 The siege seemed to unite people in support of the 
state.1 The prime minister, Tony Abbott, took a strong 
stand against Monis’ action and in support of the police, 
and the federal opposition leader, Bill Shorten, backed 
him to the hilt. 
                                                
1 Paul H. Weaver, News and the Culture of Lying (New York: 
Free Press, 1994), makes the point that news is oriented to crisis, 
thereby promoting crisis government, giving greater power to the 
executive and removing power from routine decision-making 
processes. 
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 Was it a terrorist incident? This was debated in the 
aftermath. Monis certainly was not a typical terrorist, and 
was not part of any group making demands. The most 
common view was that he was a “disturbed” individual, 
with a long history of crimes and strange behaviour. 
 Association with Monis was toxic politically. Some 
years earlier, the New South Wales opposition leader, 
John Robertson, had written a letter in support of Monis, 
who was a constituent. Although this was nothing special 
at the time, after the siege it was deemed sufficient to 
trigger a push for Robertson to resign. 
 Whether or not Monis’ siege counts as terrorism, it 
served much the same function—from the point of view of 
the state. It illustrates how terrorism serves the state. US 
President George W. Bush, in the aftermath of the 11 
September 2001 terrorist attacks, declared, “You are either 
with us or with them [the terrorists].”2 
 The state is normally considered to include the 
government, various government agencies, and perhaps 
government-owned businesses. The eminent sociologist 
Max Weber defined the state as the governing entity 
claiming a monopoly over the use of legitimate violence—
legitimate in the eyes of the state. “Legitimate violence” 
here refers to the police and military. Armed challenges to 
the state are considered illegitimate, and are to be 
repressed without reservations.  
 The basis for the legitimacy of the state is that it 
protects the population against threats, most dramatically 
the threat of invasion, conquest and subjugation. In times 
                                                
2 See also the discussion of this quote in chapter 8 on language. 
Terrorism     99 
 
of war, the power of the state increases dramatically in 
order to defend the population—and the state itself. 
 Terrorism provides a substitute for war in terms of 
mobilising support for the state. Citizens identify with the 
government and look to it for protection. If “War is the 
health of the state,” terrorism is a booster shot.3 
 Why is terrorism so effective in boosting state 
power? After all, many people die every day, for various 
reasons. Some die from disease; some are killed in traffic 
accidents; some are murdered; some kill themselves. 
Furthermore, in most places these and other dangers cause 
far more deaths than terrorism. In many countries, traffic 
accidents kill hundreds or thousands of people per year, 
and many could be prevented by safer roads or by 
diverting travellers to safer modes of transport, such as 
trains. After 9/11, many US travellers avoided planes and 
drove instead. Because driving is much riskier than flying, 
the death rate from travelling accidents increased, perhaps 
raising the death toll by more than the 9/11 attacks 
themselves.4  
 It is worthwhile, therefore, looking at the mecha-
nisms by which terrorism serves to generate support for 
the state.5 The first tactic is exposure. A siege in a café, 
                                                
3 Randolph Bourne famously said, “War is the health of the 
state.” See chapter 13. 
4 Gerd Gigerenzer, “Dread risk, September 11, and fatal traffic 
accidents,” Psychological Science, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2003, pp. 286–
287. 
5 The exposition here presents the system-support tactics outlined 
in chapter 1. 
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with hostages, is ideal fodder for media coverage. It has 
drama, danger and an enemy, with police as the saviours, 
providing a story that combines fear and potential reassur-
ance. Traffic accidents and heart attacks seldom offer such 
a compelling narrative. 
 In large part, terrorism obtains media coverage 
because it is designed to do so. Some analysts have 
described terrorism as “communication amplified by 
violence.”6 The goal of what is conventionally called 
terrorism is to capture public attention. The victims of the 
terrorists are not the actual targets, but tools to generate 
attention. The media come calling and provide the conduit 
for gaining awareness from the wider public. 
 Terrorist attacks provide an ideal opportunity for 
agents of the state—police or the military—to be heroes. 
They respond to the threat, becoming the protectors of the 
population. In this way, protection of the state becomes 
fused with protection of the population. The state is seen 
as the guardian of public safety. Terrorists are cast as 
villains, as pure evil. For the purposes of the state, the 
terrorists need to be evil, so a classic morality play is 
enacted. Humanising the terrorists—seeing them as 
                                                
6 Alex P. Schmid and Janny de Graaf, Violence as Communica-
tion: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media (London: 
Sage, 1982). See also Brigitte L. Nacos, Mass-Mediated 
Terrorism: The Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and 
Counterterrorism (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002); 
Joseph S. Tuman, Communicating Terror: The Rhetorical 
Dimensions of Terrorism (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2003). 
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regular people, perhaps even fighting for their ideals—
would confuse the message. 
 Terrorism is usually explained to the population in 
simple terms: the bad guys, the terrorists, are trying to 
harm “us” and destroy “our” way of life.7 Other factors are 
ignored or skated over, such as the harm or injustice that 
might have created grievances (especially harm done by 
the state itself), the double standards involved in ignoring 
state terrorism (discussed later), or that there might be 
better ways to deter or discredit terrorism. Official 
explanations for terrorism almost never mention that if 
suitable opportunities for citizens to express their views 
existed, many grievances would evaporate. In cases of so-
called “international terrorism,” almost always there are 
“international grievances”—government involvement in 
foreign countries, such as invasions, occupations, corpo-
rate exploitation or drone attacks—for which no opportu-
nities for citizen participation in decision-making exist. 
 The most important technique by which terrorism is 
interpreted by the state is framing, usually in a Hollywood 
template with the government as the good guys and the 
terrorists as the bad guys, with the only way for the good 
guys to win being through superior force. With this way of 
thinking, terrorism provides an unquestionable justifica-
tion for state violence. 
 Anti-terrorism is enshrined through laws and regula-
tions. In this way, the state indicates that terrorists are the 
official enemy, and that opposing terrorism is legally 
                                                
7 Ziauddin Sardar and Merryl Wyn Davies, Why Do People Hate 
America? (Cambridge: Icon, 2002). 
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mandated. Indeed, anyone who does not go along with this 
agenda might be caught up in anti-terrorism laws and 
regulations. The connection between anti-terrorism laws 
and patriotism is most obvious in the US Patriot Act, an 
anti-terrorism law passed after 9/11. The acronym8 is 
intended to indicate that anti-terrorism is patriotic. 
 The state’s agencies usually give a stamp of approval 
for anti-terrorism policies, with the main debates occur-
ring within a narrow band of disagreement of how unre-
strained agencies can be. A whole range of agencies may 
be involved: government executives, parliaments, courts, 
the military, police, spy agencies, and corporate contrac-
tors. By going along with government anti-terrorism 
agendas, they help legitimise them. 
 Finally, anti-terrorism is imposed on the population 
through repressive measures, including extensive surveil-
lance, interrogations, arrests and show trials. Vocally 
opposing the government’s anti-terrorism agenda may be 
enough to trigger targeted surveillance, harassment (for 
example, extra screening at airports), denial of jobs, or 
worse. Imposing penalties, formal or informal, for being 
critical of anti-terrorism discourages dissent. On the other 
hand, those who enthusiastically join in the anti-terrorism 
chorus may be rewarded with jobs, promotions, research 
funding and media opportunities. Conspicuous patriotism, 
via anti-terrorism, can pay.  
                                                
8 The USA PATRIOT Act stands for Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism Act. 
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 Thus in a range of ways, governments can mobilise 
support by drumming up concern about terrorism. The 




A physical attack on civilians is a powerful method of 
gaining attention. As noted earlier, it is a mode of 
communication, using violence against civilians to send a 
message to a broad audience, with special salience for 
governments. 
 Normally, when groups do something seen as unfair, 
or just bad, they try to reduce public outrage by hiding 
their actions, disparaging the targets, explaining away 
their actions, using official channels to give a stamp of 
approval, and intimidating or rewarding people involved. 
Although harming innocent civilians is widely seen as 
reprehensible, do terrorists use any of these methods to 
reduce outrage? Quite the contrary: terrorists routinely try 
to increase outrage.9 
 The most powerful terrorist actions are open rather 
than hidden. Bombings or shootings are done in public. 
Sometimes terrorists film and publicise their atrocities, for 
example beheadings. They often try to maximise media 
coverage. The 9/11 attacks were highly successful, occur-
ring in broad daylight for all to see, targeting icons of US 
capitalism and the state. Individual terrorists may try to 
                                                
9 Many of the ideas here are addressed in Brian Martin, Justice 
Ignited: The Dynamics of Backfire (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2007), chapter 12. 
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hide their identity, but usually their organisations take 
responsibility for acts. That is the whole point: terrorists 
are trying to gain attention through the use of violence.  
 Terrorists can do little to reduce public outrage from 
their acts. They have minimal capacity to devalue their 
targets or to use official channels to give an appearance of 
justice. They seldom have access to sympathetic media to 
reinterpret their acts by lying about what they have done, 
blaming others, or minimising the consequences. Indeed, 
they are just as likely to exaggerate the impact. 
 So it seems that terrorists do everything possible to 
generate outrage over their actions. They almost seem to 
want to make violence backfire against them, generating 
greater disgust and opposition. How then can terrorism be 
considered a rational strategy? The one plausible explana-
tion is that terrorists hope their opponents, who are much 
stronger, will over-react, use excessive state violence and 
trigger greater resistance to the government. Other expla-
nations involve processes that are less functional for 
achieving the explicit goals of the terrorists. Terrorism can 
be an expression of resentment, getting back at detested 
governments or officials. It can build in-group solidarity, 
and attract new followers, through a type of initiation, but 
at the expense of generating greater opposition at the same 
time. Most terrorist acts are carried out by men; using 
violence can be a way of asserting male superiority and 
excluding most women. 
 Whatever the reasons, anti-state terrorism serves the 
state, so there is a mutually reinforcing interaction 
between states and their violent opponents, with neither 
side having much incentive to search for alternatives. Yet, 
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if terrorism is considered purely in functional terms, 
namely being effective in achieving its goals, then 
nonviolent alternatives would be far superior in most 
cases. But for states, terrorists provide the ideal opponents, 
offering a rationale for their own violence. 
 The words “terrorism” and “terrorist” are widely used 
as if they have a clear meaning. I have used them here to 
refer to the use of violence against civilians by non-state 
groups, with al Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks as a prime example. 
However, looking more closely at the concept of terrorism 
soon generates confusion.10 There are actually dozens of 
different definitions. Furthermore, governments seldom 
bother with academic definitions, but simply label their 
opponents terrorists. The US government, fighting in 
Vietnam, labelled the National Liberation Front, 
commonly called the Viet Cong, as terrorists. In South 
Africa under the racist system of apartheid, the govern-
ment labelled its opponents, the African National 
Congress, as terrorists. In the Philippines, the government 
labels its armed opponents, engaged in a rebellion in rural 
areas, as terrorists. In India, Maoist rebels fight the 
government in parts of the country; the government calls 
them terrorists. But in these conflicts, governments often 
                                                
10 See Conor Geerty, The Future of Terrorism (London: Phoenix, 
1997) for a critique of the expression “terrorism” as originally 
referring to state terror and eventually becoming an incoherent 
term of condemnation. On the peculiar logic underpinning anti-
terrorist practices, see Richard Jackson, “The epistemological 
crisis of counterterrorism,” Critical Studies on Terrorism, Vol. 8, 
No. 1, 2015, pp. 33–54. 
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are responsible for far more rape, pillage, torture and 
murder than their opponents. So perhaps these govern-
ments should be called terrorists too. 
 That is exactly what some scholars have done. They 
take the term “terrorism” at its face value, namely as 
referring to actions that strike terror into the minds of 
citizens, and note that by this definition, governments are 
by far the biggest terrorists. High-level aerial bombing can 
be just as terrifying as explosions in marketplaces, and 
torture by governments can be just as devastating as 
torture by insurgents. Terrorism by governments is called 
“state terrorism.”11 
 In the Indochina war, two or three million Vietnam-
ese, Cambodians, Laotians and others died due to US 
military actions, which included bombing, torture, assassi-
nations (tens of thousands of them), and forced move-
ments of populations into secure compounds, which might 
be called concentration camps. A large percentage of the 
victims were civilians. Similarly, in places like Guatemala 
                                                
11 Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, The Political 
Economy of Human Rights (Boston: South End Press, 1979); 
Frederick H. Gareau, State Terrorism and the United States: 
From Counterinsurgency to the War on Terrorism (Atlanta, GA: 
Clarity Press, 2004); Alexander George (ed.), Western State 
Terrorism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991); Michael Stohl and 
George A. Lopez (eds.), The State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of 
Governmental Violence and Repression (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood, 1984); Michael Stohl and George A. Lopez (eds.), 
Terrible Beyond Endurance? The Foreign Policy of State 
Terrorism (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1988). See also the 
discussion of state crime in chapter 4. 
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and Indonesia, where hundreds of thousands of civilians 
have been killed, nearly all the killing has been on behalf 
of governments. 
 When governments undertake large-scale killing, 
they nearly always accompany this by measures to reduce 
public outrage.12 They usually 
  
• hide what they are doing, at least from wider 
audiences 
• devalue their targets (using the label “terrorists” is 
just one technique) 
• reinterpret their actions by lying (for example, 
civilians killed are called insurgents), minimising 
consequences, blaming others (such as “rogue ele-
ments” being covertly funded) and framing their 
actions as worthy (for example, protecting national 
security) 
• use official channels to give an appearance of 
justice (such as formal inquiries into killings) 
• intimidate and reward people involved, including 
journalists and witnesses. 
 
The double standard is stark.13 Governments kill, or 
threaten to kill, large numbers of civilians, something that 
                                                
12 Brian Martin, “Managing outrage over genocide: case study 
Rwanda,” Global Change, Peace & Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, 
2009, pp. 275–290; Brian Martin, “Euthanasia tactics: patterns of 
injustice and outrage,” SpringerPlus, Vol. 2, No. 256, 6 June 
2013, http://www.springerplus.com/content/2/1/256. 
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strikes terror into the hearts of potential victims. Yet many 
of these same governments are able to escape censure for 
their own activities, while pointing the finger at allegedly 
dangerous enemies, the so-called terrorists, turning their 
comparatively low-level attacks into justification for 
massive mobilisation and retaliation. This double standard 
is accomplished by parallel sets of tactics, on the one hand 
to reduce outrage from the government’s own actions and 
on the other to mobilise outrage against the “terrorists.”  
 It is not surprising that there is vastly more scholar-
ship on non-state terrorism than on state terrorism, and 
that the very idea of state terrorism is almost never 
presented in the media or textbooks and is largely 
unknown to the wider public. It is in this context that it is 
possible to say that terrorism strengthens the state. This 
doesn’t happen automatically: governments do everything 
possible to ensure that it does. 
 In the face of armed opposition, governments might 
adopt measures to de-escalate conflict, for example by 
promoting social justice, opening avenues for citizen 
participation, prosecuting government agents involved in 
torture and killing, and introducing a range of measures to 
promote reconciliation. In a free and open society, with 
opportunities to bring about change through the system, 
terrorism would lose much of its attraction, and it would 
not aid recruitment or popular support.  
                                                                                                                                          
13 See also Brian Martin, “How activists can challenge double 
standards,” Interface: A Journal for and about Social Movements, 
Vol. 7, No. 2, 2015, pp. 201–213. 
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 What often happens instead is an insidious process of 
reinforcement. After an anti-state terrorist attack, the 
government responds massively, for example with arrests, 
torture or bombings—and in the course of this response 
harms previously uninvolved civilians. This results in new 
grievances, giving support to insurgent groups, who mount 
further attacks, leading to more reprisals, and so forth. The 
government, by choosing repression as its response to 
terrorism, fosters the very conditions that stimulate more 
terrorism. Do governments seem to worry about this? In 
many cases, not at all. The more they are attacked, the 
more governments gain greater power and legitimacy. 
 This pattern was apparent in Afghanistan after the 
western invasion in October 2001, supposedly in retalia-
tion for the 9 September 2001 attacks in the US. (Nearly 
all the 9/11 attackers were from Saudi Arabia.) Bombing 
in Afghanistan killed thousands of civilians, but this was 
not publicised in the west, a type of cover-up. The 
intended targets, the Taliban, were demonised as terrorists, 
even though the CIA had supported them in the 1980s 
after the Soviet government invaded Afghanistan. The 
bombing of Afghanistan was explained as part of the war 
on terror, even though it terrorised the Afghani population. 
The attack was authorised by the United Nations Security 
Council some time afterwards. 
 If anyone wants to increase the power of the state, a 
terrorist attack is probably the single most effective way to 
do so. After 9/11, there was enormous international 
sympathy for the US government and people. The gov-
ernment massively increased military funding and 
especially funding for national security. Dissent was 
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portrayed as a threat. Patriotism was given an enormous 
booster shot. The same thing has happened in other 
countries after terrorist attacks, including Australia. In 
October 2002, there was a bombing in Bali; though this 
was in Indonesia, the primary victims were western 
tourists, with 202 killed, 88 of them from Australia. The 
number of Australians killed was nearly as high a propor-
tion of the Australian population as the 9/11 death toll was 
of the US population. Similarly, legislation was introduced 
to give much more power to security agencies, and their 
funding was increased dramatically. 
 
What to do? 
For those who are critical of excessive patriotism and 
wary of the power of the state, what can be done to oppose 
the role of terrorism in strengthening the state? This is a 
very big subject, so only a few possible actions and initia-
tives can be mentioned. 
 On an individual level, it is possible to become better 
informed about violence around the world, to be better 
able to put terrorism in context. Since the end of the cold 
war, there have been dozens of major conflicts, with the 
most deadly ones being in Africa, including the Congo, 
Algeria, Rwanda, Sudan and Burundi: in each of these 
countries, hundreds of the thousands of people have died 
in wars or genocides. The wars in the Congo have been 
the most deadly, with some five million deaths. Compared 
to this, international terrorism leads to relatively few 
deaths. The implication is that the threat from non-state 
terrorism in the west has been blown out of all propor-
tion—thus serving to strengthen states—while more 
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serious threats to the lives and safety of the world’s 
population are mostly unknown to wider audiences. 
Becoming aware of the figures and examples can provide 
an antidote to the continual drum-roll about dangers from 
terrorism.14 
 It is also worth studying the figures about other 
threats to personal safety, such as traffic accidents, 
drowning in bathtubs, falling over and domestic violence. 
For most people, these are much greater threats to safety 
than terrorism. 
 Another approach is to support alternatives that 
undermine the attractions of terrorism for potential 
terrorists. Greater social justice—treating people more 
fairly, and addressing grievances—can foster commitment 
to a society. Also important is opening channels for 
change through the system. When people feel that they are 
being treated badly and that there is no legitimate way to 
make a difference, some of them may want to resort to 
violence, even when it is counterproductive. 
 Research shows that methods of nonviolent action, 
such as rallies, strikes, boycotts and sit-ins, are usually 
more effective than violence in achieving the goals of 
campaigners. Spreading the message about the power of 
nonviolent action, and developing campaigns that use this 
power, provide models for others to follow.15 
                                                
14 Virgil Hawkins, Stealth Conflicts: How the World’s Worst 
Violence Is Ignored (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2008). 
15 For specific applications to terrorism, see Tom H. Hastings, 
Nonviolent Responses to Terrorism (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 
2004); Senthil Ram and Ralph Summy (eds.), Nonviolence: An 
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 Although nonviolent action may be more effective, 
the sad reality is that governments seldom promote it, but 
rather raise the alarm about terrorism, repress dissent, 
resist nonviolent protest, and create the conditions that 
foster terrorism. Nonviolent campaigners thus face a 
double challenge: to demonstrate to others that nonvio-
lence is a better option than violence, and to confront 
authorities that resist peaceful change and thus create 
conditions that stimulate violence. This is the challenge of 
dealing with a government-terrorism symbiosis.  
 When alarms about terrorism are raised, another 
approach, at an individual level, is to say “ho, hum” and 
treat the whole issue as unimportant. Whenever terrorism 
is reported on television, change the channel. If everyone 
ignored it, the purveyors of concern about terrorism would 
lose credibility. Unfortunately, this approach would not 
make much difference unless adopted by a large number 
of people.  
 Humour is another response. Indeed, quite a few 
people feel that terrorism alarms are silly, and make jokes 
about them. This can be risky at airports, where authorities 
over-react to the slightest comment. Some types of 
humour may be safer and more revealing. A “supportive” 
humorous political stunt involves pretending you support 
the cause you are making fun of. For example, you could 
go around an airport or railway station reporting 
                                                                                                                                          
Alternative for Defeating Global Terror(ism) (New York: Nova 
Science Publishers, 2008). For my approach, see “Nonviolence 
versus terrorism,” Social Alternatives, Vol. 21, No. 2, Autumn 
2002, pp. 6–9. See also the discussion in chapter 13. 
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unattended bags—even if unattended only briefly—or 
perhaps reporting “suspicious behaviour” by well-dressed 
businessmen. The next step is to work in teams. One 
member leaves shopping bags unattended, each one 
containing a balloon, or a present for the finder, while 
another reports these potentially dangerous bags to the 
authorities. However, stunts like this could go seriously 
wrong if there was an actual attack while staff were 
investigating false alarms. 
 My assessment is that it is not easy to develop a 
campaign to address the out-of-proportion alarm about 
terrorism. Governments do what they can to tout the risk, 
and this feeds perfectly into media news values, while 
meanwhile more serious problems are neglected. At a 
basic level, the first step is not to get caught up in the 
terrorism alarm, but beyond this, it is difficult to develop a 
campaign to change the agenda. This is an area where 
social experimentation is needed: activists can try out 
various ways to redirecting attention, making fun of 
terrorism alerts, promoting non-state responses, or in other 
ways addressing the mutual reinforcement cycle between 







 “We invaded Iraq.” I’ve read this statement numerous 
times. It refers to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, but the times 
I’ve seen it, the author is not a US soldier, commander or 
policy-maker, but instead a critic of the invasion. These 
US critics are disgusted by the lies and damaging actions 
of the US government—their own government! Hence the 
word “we.” 
 Critics know full well the invasion was decided upon 
by George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and 
company, sold to a few other governments and carried out 
through military chains of command. To say “We 
invaded” is shorthand for something like “Top decision 
makers in the US government ordered the US military to 
organise an invasion. Isn’t it terrible that ‘our’ government 
did this?”1 
 The trouble with “We invaded Iraq” is that it col-
lapses the distinction between the government and the 
population. “We” suggests that the writer identifies with 
the government. 
 A US government official who supported the inva-
sion of Iraq would never say, “We protested against the 
invasion,” meaning that people in the US protested. Pro-
                                                
1 The word “our” only works for US readers. Foreigners cannot 
be expected to feel ownership of or association with the US 
government. 
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testers are different from, indeed against, the government: 
protesters are “they.” 
 The uses of “we” and “they” in relation to the 
invasion of Iraq provide an example of how assumptions 
about people and governments enter language and then are 
strengthened in people’s minds by the constant repetition 
of that language. This is a very big topic, and I’m only 
going to touch the surface by mentioning several examples 
in which language reflects and promotes the identification 
between individuals and the state. 
 Consider these different entities: 
 
• Country: a geographical area, encompassing people, 
institutions and much else 
• Government: the system of political leaders or 
rulers 
• People: everyone living in a country 
 
In most news reporting about national and international 
affairs, the country, government and people are not 
distinguished. Think of “Berlin today said,” “The US 
intervened” or “Britain is reluctant.” In media conventions 
applying to international affairs, the name of the country 
or the capital city is treated as referring to the government 
or, more precisely, top officials in the government. 
 The effect of this sort of language is that it is difficult 
to talk about—and think about—situations in which 
people’s views or actions differ from those of government 
policy-makers. Let’s go back to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. 
Shortly before the invasion, there were massive rallies 
across the world, the largest anti-war protest in history. 
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Millions of people demonstrated their opposition to the 
impending war. Yet the conventional language used to 
describe what happened is inadequate and misleading. It is 
inaccurate, in a literal sense, to say, “The US invaded 
Iraq” because not everyone joined the invasion. It would 
be inaccurate in the contrary direction to say, “The US 
demonstrated against an invasion of Iraq” because not 
everyone in the US demonstrated—but a much larger 
number demonstrated against the invasion than were 
involved in the invasion. (I’m setting aside the considera-
tion that most US government officials did not refer to an 
invasion at all, but instead talked about liberating Iraq.) 
 Governments are complex organisational entities. To 
say they act, speak, bargain or feel is to liken them to 
individuals who, in contrast, are assumed to be unitary. If 
a part of a person’s body refuses to cooperate, it is seen as 
dysfunctional, perhaps dangerous, like cancer. Treating a 
country like an individual invites the assumption that 
opponents of government policy are similarly dysfunc-
tional, or even dangerous.  
 When Bush said, “You are either with us or with 
them [the terrorists],” he played on this analogy of the 
country with an individual. This “us”—in this instance 
“us” is “US”—is treated as unitary, when in reality there is 
no single “us.”  
 If Bush hadn’t been able to draw on the linguistic 
assumption of government-country unity, he would have 
had to say, “Either you support US government terrorism 
policy or you oppose it.” That’s less punchy and less 
threatening. It’s far easier to oppose policy than to oppose 
“us”! 
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 The use of country names for government actions can 
be called “statist language”: it linguistically attributes the 
actions of the state—the government and especially 
leading figures in the government—to the people, to an 
entire society. It makes it awkward to talk about internal 
tensions or dissent.2 
 Statist language is a convention: it is the standard 
way of writing and speaking, especially about interna-
tional affairs. Any other way can sound strange or 
cumbersome. It’s easier to say, “Iraq invaded Kuwait” 
than “Iraqi military forces invaded Kuwait.” 
 This convention can mask citizen opposition to 
government. Saying “China decided” discourages people 
from realising or remembering that it was only the 
Chinese government, and probably just a few people at the 
top, who made a decision, and that the bulk of the popula-
tion were not involved or consulted and many of them 
may not have wanted this decision if they had been 
consulted. 
 In systems of representative government, government 
leaders have the endorsement of being elected, but this 
does not mean their policies reflect the unified desires of 
the entire population. The freer the society, usually the 
more that differences of opinion can be articulated. 
                                                
2 This chapter draws on my article “Statist language,” Etc.— A 
Review of General Semantics, Vol. 66, No. 4, October 2009, pp. 
377–381. For a sophisticated treatment of language and national 
identity, see Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism (London: Sage, 
1995), pp. 87–127. 
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 Statist language is one type of what can be called 
unitary language, in which a group of entities is treated as 
a whole. Unitary language is appropriate when groups 
operate under a command system, such as the human 
body, or a group using consensus decision-making, so 
everyone agrees. But whenever there is significant conflict 
or internal disagreement, unitary language can be mis-
leading. The statement “General Motors condemned the 
strikers,” when the strikers are GM workers, offers a  
different image than “GM management condemned GM 
workers.” 
 Unitary language often reflects a hierarchical 
worldview in which rulers or bosses speak on behalf of 
their subordinates, whether or not there has been any 
consultation. In the United Nations, when government 
representatives speak on behalf of their countries this 
might be reported as “China said” or “Germany said.” In 
1994, the government of Rwanda held a seat on the UN 
Security Council. The Rwandan government orchestrated 
a genocide beginning in April, but tried to hide this from 
the outside world. When the Rwandan Security Council 
representative reported falsely that the killings had 
stopped, conventional statist language might have ex-
pressed this as “Rwanda told the Security Council the 
killings had stopped.” But it certainly wasn’t the Rwandan 
people saying this: they were perpetrators, victims or 
bystanders of the ongoing genocide. 
 Another feature of statist language is the assignment 
of people to countries and vice versa. The people living in 
France are the French, the people living in Guatemala are 
Guatemalans, and so forth. Conversely, without the 
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French there is no France. As noted by Michael Billig, “A 
form of semantic cleansing operates in these terms: there 
is no gap between the people and its country.”3 There are a 
few anomalies in the linguistic binding of peoples and 
countries. For example, there are no United Kingdonians, 
and for much of the world “Americans” refers to US 
people, not inhabitants of South and North America. 
Generally, the grammatical conventions associating 
people with countries serve to make the division of the 
world via national boundaries seem natural rather than the 
result of political and social action. 
 
Sexist language 
Statist language has many parallels with sexist language. 
A few decades ago, it was conventional in English to use 
“he” to mean “he or she,” to use “chairman” to refer to 
either a man or a woman in the role of chair, and to use 
“man” to mean “humans.” Male pronouns were standard 
when referring to both sexes.  
 Feminists challenged what they called sexist lan-
guage. They said male words made women invisible by 
making readers visualise men rather than both sexes. Male 
language made it harder to imagine a woman in a role, 
especially a traditionally masculine role.  
 Defenders of the convention argued against change, 
saying that everyone knew that “he” included both sexes 
and that “he or she” is clumsy and “they” is ungrammati-
cal. They made fun of critics by pointing to the alleged 
absurdities involved in removing mention of men from 
                                                
3 Billig, Banal Nationalism, p. 78. 
120     Ruling tactics 
language: “woman” would have to be replaced by 
“womon” and perhaps “person” by “perdaughter.”  
 The conservative defenders of sexist language lost, so 
much so that many writers, in quoting from text written in 
the 1960s or earlier, painstakingly notate male pronouns 
with “[sic]” or replace them with “[he or she]” to highlight 
their awareness of, and perhaps distaste for, the sexist 
language in the original. 
 
Examples 
Statist language is so common that it easy to produce a 
host of examples. To provide illustrations, I picked an 
issue of the New York Times, the newspaper most 
commonly cited as setting a standard for others. I chose an 
arbitrary issue, 8 January 2009, the first day I was able to 
purchase a copy during a visit to the United States. 
 On the front page is a story titled “China losing taste 
for debt from the U.S.”4 Its lead paragraphs include 
passages such as “Beijing is starting to keep more of its 
money at home,” “declining Chinese appetite for United 
States debt,” “China has spent” and “Beijing is seeking to 
pay.” Of course it is not literally “China” that is “losing 
taste for debt,” because the article makes no mention of 
debt preferences among Chinese people, but actually top 
Chinese economic policy-makers. Only later in the article 
are there more precise references to “the Chinese govern-
ment,” “Chinese businesses” and “China’s leadership.” 
                                                
4 Keith Bradsher, “China losing taste for debt from the U.S.,” 
New York Times, 8 January 2009, pp. A1, A10. 
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 On page A6 is the story “Ex-prostitutes say South 
Korea and U.S. enabled sex trade near bases.”5 The refer-
ence to “South Korea” and “U.S.” must refer to military or 
political authorities, because the average South Korean 
plays no role in the sex trade and the average U.S. citizen 
knows nothing at all about U.S. military bases in South 
Korea, much less the existence of the sex trade—unless, 
perhaps, they have read this or a similar article. 
 This story occasionally uses statist language but for 
the most part uses more precise references. The first 
sentence is “South Korea has railed for years against the 
Japanese government’s waffling,” which doesn’t reveal 
who in South Korea had railed—the government? activ-
ists?—but pinpoints the target of complaint, the Japanese 
government.  
 In the second paragraph, the article says “Now, a 
group of former prostitutes in South Korea have accused 
some of their country’s former leaders of a different kind 
of abuse: encouraging them to have sex with the American 
soldiers who protected South Korea from North Korea.” 
Note the precision of “a group of former prostitutes” and 
“some of their country’s former leaders” compared to the 
reference to “protected South Korea from North Korea,” 
which implicitly groups North Korean citizens with the 
North Korean government as a threat to South Korea, 
again a single undifferentiated entity. 
                                                
5 Choe Sang-Hun, “Ex-prostitutes say South Korea and U.S. 
enabled sex trade near bases,” New York Times, 8 January 2009, 
p. A6. 
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 On page A12, one of the several stories on the con-
flict in Gaza is titled “As Gaza battle goes on, Israel is set 
to negotiate with Egypt on cease-fire.”6 The title refers of 
course to the governments of Israel and Egypt. The first 
sentence begins “Israel said Wednesday …” This common 
formulation suggests that “Israel” is a person speaking 
with a single voice. It disguises the diversity of political 
opinion within Israel over policies and actions concerning 
Gaza. Although many readers understand this diversity 
and treat “Israel said” as “Israeli government spokepeople 
said,” the statist shorthand may discourage thinking of the 
complexity. For those not familiar with complexities of 
Israeli politics, “Israel said” reinforces a mental image of 
discrete entities, Israel, Egypt and Gaza. 
 Paragraph three begins “Israel suspended its military 
operations in Gaza for three hours …” Perhaps the Israeli 
government or military suspended military operations; 
most Israelis had no say in this decision, and many 
members of Israeli peace movements would not like to be 
implicated in any decision to use military force in the first 
place. 
 Paragraph five begins “Hamas fired 22 rockets into 
Israel …” How many readers would stop to think that 
perhaps not every member of Hamas supports firing 
rockets? Certainly not all of them were involved in the 
firing itself. 
                                                
6 Steven Erlanger, “As Gaza battle goes on, Israel is set to negoti-
ate with Egypt on cease-fire,” New York Times, 8 January 2009, 
p. A12. 
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 Elsewhere in the article there is similar statist lan-
guage, but more precise language is also used, with 
references to, for example, “the Israeli Army,” “the Israeli 
government,” and “the government spokesman.” It is cer-
tainly possible to write without statist constructions. 
 These are just a few examples taken from one issue 
of the New York Times. The same observations could be 
made using news reports from innumerable sources. 
 
Alternatives 
Instead of “We invaded Iraq” or “The US invaded Iraq,” 
what would be a more accurate formulation? One possi-
bility is “the US military invaded Iraq” or “The US 
government launched an invasion of Iraq.” Referring to 
the military or the government helps to direct attention to 
those acting, thereby allowing that others, including 
members of the US population, may not be involved or 
supportive.  
 The use of a country’s name to refer to the govern-
ment is quite convenient, and alternatives are cumber-
some. The obvious alternative to “US” would be “US 
government” or perhaps “USG” for short. Those who want 
to be really precise in their language would say that “US 
government” is still unacceptable, because not everyone in 
the government supports actions taken in the name of the 
government—certainly not the invasion of Iraq. 
 When talking or writing about government actions, it 
is straightforward to avoid constructions that conflate the 
government and the people in a country: just avoid any 
statements that refer to the country acting as a whole. This 
means not saying something like “China declared” but 
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instead “a representative of the Chinese government 
declared” and not saying “India is having talks with 
Pakistan” but instead perhaps “Indian and Pakistani 
government officials are having talks.” Because the alter-
natives are cumbersome, it is all too easy to revert to 
conventional expressions. 
 Another option is to use the abbreviated form but in 
an unconventional way. You might say “India opposed the 
trade agreement” when actually Indian policy-makers 
supported it—however, only those who are knowledgeable 
about the issue will understand that you are referring to 
civil society groups or popular opinion, not the 
government. 
 Statist language brings a pervasive bias into report-
ing, especially on international affairs, typically favouring 
governments over opponents and popular movements and 
sometimes over popular opinion. Using different expres-
sions is not easy: habits run deep. Challenging those habits 
is a small step towards better understanding and better 
strategic thinking. Non-statist language will not solve the 
world’s problems but it can help make them more 







Robert Jovicic was born in France 1966 and came with his 
Yugoslavian parents to Australia at the age of two. He 
grew up Australian. His parents became Australian citi-
zens but Jovicic never bothered to do so, because he had 
permanent migrant status. But it wasn’t as permanent as 
he might have thought. Jovicic became involved in 
criminal activities. After spending time in jail, he was 
deported from Australia, to Serbia, where he was unable to 
work (having been given only a short visa) and didn’t 
know the language.  
 Jovicic was vulnerable to expulsion from Australia 
because he lacked citizenship. If his parents had been in 
Australia when he was born, he could have remained in 
Australia despite any crimes.1 
 Most people in the world are a citizen of a country; 
some are citizens of two or more countries. Being a citizen 
normally means you have the right to reside in a country. 
Usually you can obtain a passport and travel to other 
countries. 
 Citizenship is a key tool used by governments to 
control populations. If you are not a citizen of any 
country, you are “stateless” and at risk of being sent 
somewhere you don’t want to go, or even imprisoned. 
                                                
1 After publicity about his desperate plight, Jovicic was able to 
return to Australia and be granted permanent resident status. 
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 A century or more ago, citizenship was not such a big 
deal. Relatively few people travelled a lot, but for those 
who did, there were fewer controls. Passports are a recent 
invention. 
 The very idea of citizenship reflects identification 
with a state, indeed it assumes the existence of states. 
Without a state, you are a person. When subject to the 
administration of a state, and accepted as one of its 
subjects, you are a citizen. As a citizen, you have some 
rights and privileges not available to those who are not 
citizens—called aliens. Perhaps it is no coincidence that 
people from outer space are called aliens. They are not 
subjects of governments of the planet earth. 
 The control function of citizenship is most apparent 
in the plight of refugees. People under threat in their own 
countries due to war or persecution seek asylum some-
where else, but acceptance is not automatic: they have to 
be assessed and certified as refugees, and even then they 
may be kept in camps and prevented from full member-
ship in the receiving country.  
 Australia illustrates some of the worst practices 
regarding refugees. Except for Aborigines, the descend-
ants of people who inhabited the continent for tens of 
thousands of years, nearly everyone in Australia is either a 
recent immigrant or a descendent of immigrants since the 
first white settlement in 1788. Despite Australia being a 
nation of immigrants, recent governments have demonised 
refugees arriving by boat. They are intercepted by the 
navy and either pushed back to their port of departure or 
taken to detention camps in various locations. Those who 
make it to the Australian continent are also put in camps, 
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sometimes for years, sometimes with no prospect of 
release. Many of the refugees are escaping conflicts, such 
as in Afghanistan and Iraq, where the Australian military 
is involved. The Australian government wants to fight the 
enemy abroad but not accept responsibility for the human 
consequences of the conflicts. 
 Since the early 1990s, Australian governments have 
demonised asylum seekers in a populist pitch to xenopho-
bic elements of the population. It is a classic case of 
building in-group support by treating out-groups as 
dangerous. Although many Australians have relentlessly 
campaigned against the government’s refugee policy, 
nevertheless both major political parties have continued 
with the policy, making it ever more punitive, because 
they believe this wins voter support. 
 At the same time, the Australian government has run 
one of the largest planned immigration programmes in the 
world, on a per capita basis. Hundreds of thousands of 
immigrants are accepted each year, mainly in two catego-
ries: family reunions—existing family members already 
reside in Australia—and occupational migrants, who bring 
skills or money to the country. The result of the ongoing 
immigration programme is that one out of four Australians 
was born outside the country, from a range of countries: 
Britain, New Zealand, China, India, Philippines, etc. The 
parents of many other Australians were born outside the 
country, most notably as part of the post-world-war-II 
wave of immigrants coming from Britain, Italy, Greece, 
Egypt and elsewhere. 
 So there is a contradiction at the heart of the Austral-
ian government’s treatment of immigrants. Those coming 
128     Ruling tactics 
through formal channels are welcomed; those coming by 
sea as refugees are portrayed as a threat to the country.2 
 Most people prefer living where they are. They have 
ties to family and friends, cultural associations, local 
knowledge and many other connections to their commu-
nity. Most refugees are fleeing violence, exploitation or 
extreme disadvantage. Most would prefer to stay in their 
homeland if it could become stable, safe and prosperous.  
 The “open borders” movement argues in favour of 
eliminating barriers to people moving to different parts of 
the world.3 To most people, this sounds totally impractica-
ble. Millions of people would immediately want to move 
to the richest countries. But of course a switch to open 
borders would not happen overnight. Imagine this sce-
nario. In 20 years, barriers to moving between countries 
would be removed. There would be intense pressure from 
rich countries to end the conflicts that generate so many 
refugees—for example in Afghanistan, Iraq, Sri Lanka and 
Syria—to challenge repressive rulers and to implement 
policies to eliminate corruption and enable people to make 
a decent living through honest labour. Taking these steps 
would dramatically reduce incentives to move to other 
countries. They would also reduce internal migration, a 
serious problem in many countries.  
 Ending conflicts, promoting responsive government, 
eliminating corruption and promoting prosperity are 
                                                
2 Other contradictions in the treatment of immigrants are covered 
in chapter 11, “Trade deals and tax havens.” 
3 http://openborders.info; Teresa Hayter, Open Borders: The 
Case Against Immigration Controls (London: Pluto, 2000). 
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exactly the supposed goals of world development, but 
there is little pressure on rich countries to push in these 
directions. Indeed, many major conflicts are either initi-
ated by western governments (think Afghanistan and Iraq, 
among others) or simply ignored (Congo, Burundi, among 
others). Rich-country economic policies have served to 
exploit poor peoples of the world, through a range of 
measures, while massive corruption undermines prospects 
for economic improvement. 
 For the moment, the idea of open borders is a utopian 
vision that can serve to stimulate thinking and direct 
action towards a different sort of world, one in which 
controls over poor people are replaced by controls over 
exploitative practices. The idea of open borders is also 
useful when thinking about tactics concerning citizenship 
that serve the state—or challenge it. 
 
Promoting country loyalty via citizenship 
Let me start with the perspective that citizenship can serve 
state elites by encouraging people to identify with their 
country and state. What methods are used to do this? The 
first is exposure of citizenship itself. This mainly occurs 
by a contrast with non-citizens. Probably the majority of 
people in most countries never even think of citizenship as 
it applies to themselves: they simply take it for granted. It 
becomes to their consciousness only when outsiders—
immigrants or refugees—seek citizenship. It also enters 
awareness when travelling to areas where passports and 
visas are required. In some countries, citizenship must be 
verified before being able to vote or undertake certain 
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jobs. In filling out forms, you may have to indicate your 
citizenship. 
 The second promotion tactic is valuing. Many people 
may take their citizenship for granted or treat it in a purely 
pragmatic manner, as a necessity for getting around, 
something like packing suitable clothes for a trip or 
obtaining a trade qualification in order to get a job. 
However, for others, citizenship is a matter of great pride. 
Governments foster this for new citizens, in special 
ceremonies. More generally, patriotism is commonly 
intertwined with valuing citizenship, as a symbol of a 
connection legitimised by government. Furthermore, many 
people may come to think of citizenship as an achieve-
ment or highly desirable attribute, as something special 
about themselves, rather than as an arbitrary designation 
that is created and administered by governments. 
 The third promotion tactic is explanation or, in other 
words, giving reasons for citizenship. Among legal 
scholars, the rationales for citizenship are discussed, but 
for the general public, there is little discussion of citizen-
ship as a system. Instead, most commentary is about who 
gets to be a citizen, who is excluded and the justifications 
for different treatment. For example, the Australian gov-
ernment justifies its immigration programme mainly in 
terms of the national interest, with two main groups: 
business immigrants, who bring cash and business skills, 
and family reunions. There are various debates about 
these, and complaints about abuses of the system, but 
seldom any questioning of citizenship as a system of 
controlling movement. 
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 The fourth promotion tactic is endorsement. Govern-
ments give their official support to citizenship arrange-
ments, with various formal processes associated with 
them: employment restrictions on non-citizens, issuing of 
passports, citizenship ceremonies, and the various patriotic 
events and rhetoric. Citizenship is a key means of 
demarcating an in-group, citizens of a country, from an 
out-group, everyone else. 
 The fifth promotion tactic is rewards. Being a citizen 
has quite a few advantages, depending on the country, for 
example being able to come and go, have jobs, receive 
welfare benefits and undertake lower cost education. Most 
people born in a country and who remain in it take these 
advantages for granted, but for others, gaining the benefits 
of citizenship is a major issue, especially for those without 
a lot of money, education and connections. 
 In summary, citizenship is one of the elements of the 
complex of practices and ideas that cement many people’s 
identification with a country. This means in practice 
association with the country’s government, because the 
government sets and administers the rules for citizenship, 
in accordance (usually) with international agreements 
between governments. Citizenship serves to control 
people’s movements in a world where travel is easier than 
ever before and where restraints on the movement of 
capital have been dramatically reduced.  
 Citizenship thus is caught in the middle of some deep 
contradictions. Governments are committed to the system 
of citizenship because it gives them power, but it also is a 
potent trigger for suspicion and even anger at out-groups, 
including non-citizens who engage in commerce, for 
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example buying property or selling goods in competition 
with locals. 
 
Alternatives to citizenship 
Quite a few people don’t really care about citizenship. If 
you were born a citizen and never travel anywhere 
requiring a passport, being a citizen may not seem 
important. Others treat citizenship as a pragmatic matter, 
something necessary to get a job and move around, and 
have no particular attachment to the country or countries 
of which they are citizens. 
 Then there are a few people who envisage something 
different. They might prefer to think of themselves as a 
citizen of the world, a “global citizen,” with primary 
loyalty to all humans, or perhaps the biosphere or the 
planet, including everything from air to rocks. The 
implications of an alternative model of citizenship can be 
a matter for discussion. Does this mean freedom to move 
to any part of the world? Or could a person only settle in 
an area if invited by local residents? What about services 
now provided by governments, such as unemployment 
payments? Does global citizenship imply dissolution of 
governments, or only that governments have to adapt to 
free movement of citizens?  
 One possibility would be to look at the arrangements 
within the European Union, which allow free movement, 
without passport controls. The New Zealand and Austral-
ian governments have removed restrictions on movement 
between the two countries. Could such arrangements be 
gradually expanded to more parts of the world? 
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 For the purposes here of looking at tactics, it can be 
useful to look at a particular alternative. However, alter-
natives to citizenship are so far off the mainstream agenda 
that it is not necessary to specify details. There is virtually 
no public discussion of alternatives to the conventional 
model of citizenship. For those with money and skills, 
there is considerable mobility, and citizenship is not a 
rigid restraint. For those fleeing wars, exploitation, 
discrimination or poverty, the citizenship system is a 
barrier to finding a safe haven. It is for this latter group 
that public discussion of alternatives is hardly ever 
discussed as a serious option. So the first tactic against 
alternatives is a de facto cover-up. 
 Next is denigration of alternatives. To the extent that 
the idea of open borders is even acknowledged, it is 
usually dismissed as unrealistic if not dangerous. More 
revealing, though, is attitudes towards those seeking to 
move to other countries but not welcome by governments. 
Legitimately, they can be called asylum seekers or 
refugees, or migrants seeking a better life. They are also 
given derogatory labels. In Australia, people who attempt 
to arrive by boat seeking asylum are commonly called 
illegals, even though what they are doing is legal accord-
ing to international law. They are called queue-jumpers, 
even though there is no queue for seeking asylum. They 
are called economic migrants (often with a contemptuous 
tone of voice), suggesting they have no justification to 
migrate, even though other sorts of economic migrants, 
who have more education, money and connections, are 
welcome. Sometimes, it is even suggested that asylum 
seekers are criminals or terrorists.  
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 Because alternatives are not on the agenda, there is 
not much public discussion of them. If open borders 
entered the public debate, then undoubtedly arguments 
would be raised against the possibility, but for the moment 
the discussions remain among academics. Similarly, there 
seems to be little need to take action to dampen enthusi-
asm for open borders through formal investigations or 
intimidation of proponents. In Australia, the dominant 
discourse is driven by policies on refugees. Opponents of 
the government’s policies typically argue in terms of 
international agreements concerning human rights, not in 
terms of alternatives to citizenship. 
 
Challenging the citizenship-patriotism connection 
Because citizenship is so often taken for granted, a first 
step in challenging usual assumptions is to point out 
contradictions in the uses of citizenship, for example the 
different way the rich and poor are treated.  
 One of the key flash points in citizenship struggles 
involves responses to immigrants: people seeking to 
change their residence and sometimes their citizenship. In 
quite a few countries, governments put tight constraints on 
acceptance of “unwelcome” immigrants. Pushing for fair 
treatment of asylum seekers is an attempt to ensure that 
international agreements are followed. There are many 
campaigners involved in supporting the rights of refugees. 
 However, there is another side to the issue: govern-
ments pushing for free movement of capital and the 
selection movement of labour to serve corporate agendas. 
Highly skilled or wealthy individuals receive a welcome 
seldom extended to asylum seekers arriving outside the 
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usual protocols. Questioning the free flow of capital can 
buy into a nationalist agenda. It is not so obvious whether 




It seems like there are two categories of citizenship, or 
perhaps two categories of citizens. People who have 
plenty of money and connections experience no barriers to 
travel and to being able to live in other countries for short 
or longer times. These are people who have the mobility 
of capital: barriers have been removed, so they have 
various options for deploying their labour. Call this 
category P, for privileged or professional. 
 People in the second category have insufficient 
money, skills or connections to move to more desirable 
parts of the world. This category includes refugees. It also 
includes people who are tied to land (farmers), to family 
networks (through obligations) and to local sets of 
institutions. People in the second category have limited 
mobility; the cost in trying to move can be enormous, both 
financial and associational. Call this category R, for 
residential or restricted. 
 There seem to be different ways of thinking about 
these two categories of people. P-people are welcome, at 
least in some places, whereas R-people are unwelcome 
except in special circumstances. Governments typically 
welcome P-people but create barriers to R-people.  
 For P-people, citizenship becomes a secondary 
matter, because it does little to restrict movement or work. 
For R-people, citizenship is a crucial form of control. 
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Nearly all the scare-mongering about immigration and 
refugees is about mobilising concern by local R-people 
against R-people from elsewhere.  
 
Double standards 
The use of citizenship as a method of control contains an 
intrinsic double standard. First is the standard applied to 
those without money, skills and connections. They are 
citizens of their own country, but have little prospect of 
gaining citizenship in another country, except through 
enormous efforts and sometimes extreme sacrifice. 
 For many governments, these sorts of people are 
undesired as potential immigrants. Furthermore, many 
citizens identify with their governments and see the poor 
people of the world as undesirable intruders, who should 
stay where they are. This fear of foreigners is often linked 
to racism. It has become almost an inevitable accompani-
ment to nationalism and country-centreness. Politicians 
can promote this sort of xenophobia as a means of 
building support, and because of the level of popular 
support for measures against these sorts of immigrants, 
some politicians fear to move too far in other directions. 
 However, there is another group of people: those with 
money, skills and connections. For many practical 
purposes, they are free to move to other countries for 
visits, jobs and permanent residence. Though how easily 
they can do this depends on the person and the country, 
billionaires usually have more options than millionaires. 
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Conclusion 
Citizenship is a crucial element of the way the world is di-
vided into countries, each administered by a government. 
If you’re a citizen, you’re part of a recognised unit—a 
country. If you’re not a citizen, you’re called “stateless” 
and are much more vulnerable to ill treatment. Hence 
there is a great incentive to be or become a citizen, thus 
reinforcing everyday nationalism and the governments 





In Australia, the government and the media give extraor-
dinary attention to the state of the economy. One of the 
most common talking points is jobs. “The jobless rate has 
increased from 4.8% to 5.0%. The government needs to 
take action.” “Two hundred thousand new jobs were 
created in the past three months.” 
 Loss of specific jobs can be a source of alarm. “We 
need to provide support [meaning a government subsidy] 
to the car industry, otherwise hundreds of jobs will be 
lost.” “A factory just closed, and 25 workers lost their 
jobs.”  
 There are lots of things to question concerning the 
jobs mantra. Seldom does the government talk about 
opportunity costs: a tariff or government subsidy to 
manufacturing industry could instead have been provided 
to a different sector, perhaps saving more jobs. Massive 
investment in mining of iron ore or uranium might have 
created several times as many jobs if put instead into solar 
power and energy efficiency. 
 One of the assumptions in these discussions is that 
the goal is more jobs. Hardly ever is there discussion of 
whether these jobs are satisfying, secure or full-time—all 
very relevant considering that many new jobs in Australia 
are part-time and not permanent. Government statistics are 
based on the arbitrary definition that if you work at least 
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one hour per week, you are “employed.” This minimal 
requirement is designed to boost the figure for the 
employment rate. 
 An alternative perspective is that the goal should not 
be jobs, but rather satisfying work for everyone, and 
furthermore that paid work should not be the primary way 
in which the allocation of the economic product—who 
gets what—is determined; instead, allocation should be 
according to need. This radical view is hardly ever articu-
lated by mainstream commentators. 
 Set all this aside, and consider one additional 
assumption underlying commentary on jobs: the focus is 
always on Australian jobs. Never does anyone talk about 
the value of creating more jobs in other countries, 
especially in poor countries. Discussions about “the 
economy” are about the Australian economy, or more 
generally about the world economy and the economies of 
Australia’s largest trading partners. Almost completely 
absent is anyone asking, “How can Australian economic 
policy help poor people of the world?”  
 The government focuses on boosting the Australian 
economy, or sometimes boosting the fortunes some certain 
groups within Australia, most commonly those better off. 
Investors, such as investment funds, focus on returns for 
themselves or their members. Trade unions focus on jobs, 
wages and conditions for their members. 
 Concern about world poverty is commonly seen as 
separate from concern about the Australian economy. 
World poverty is treated as a matter for the foreign aid 
budget or for voluntary organisations like World Vision or 
simply for someone else, such as the United Nations, or 
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perhaps for the governments of other countries. Alterna-
tively, world poverty is seen as something that will be 
addressed by improvements in the world economy, in the 
usual trickle-down effect: as the rich become richer, some 
of their wealth will provide jobs and greater income to the 
poor. Meanwhile, though, attention is continually directed 
to what is good for Australians. 
 Occasionally, there is some thought to workers else-
where—they are stealing Australian jobs! When call 
centres are closed in Australia and the work taken to India, 
there are lots of gripes about loss of jobs and poorer 
service, with only occasional mention of the benefits for 
workers elsewhere. Similarly, Australian exports are seen 
as a good thing because they bring money into Australia, 
and only secondarily because they are providing a service 
or product to others. 
 Overall, discussions of the economy within Australia 
are incredibly country-centred: they are almost entirely 
about what serves Australians. The government is seen as 
the key player in the economic arena, designing policies 
that will serve Australian businesses and workers. 
 Sometimes attention is drawn to regional or local 
jobs and economic performance, such as job loss in the 
state of New South Wales or the city of Sydney. There 
might be reports about economic growth in China: 
because there is so much trade between Australia and 
China, the Chinese economy affects the much smaller 
Australian economy. 
 In Europe, discussions of “the economy” might be 
either about a country such as Italy or Germany, or the EU 
more generally. In the US, the state or local economy will 
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receive some attention along with the US economy gener-
ally. In neither case is there much awareness of how things 
are going in Peru, Cambodia or Zambia—they are off the 
radar. 
 The relative attention to jobs and economic perfor-
mance can be seen as a form of competition for attention. 
Those with the most power and influence try to make 
people aware of things from their perspective. Govern-
ments seem to have the greatest influence, with mass 
media usually following government priorities. This 
process can be looked at in terms of tactics. 
 
1. Exposure. Governments collect and publicise 
statistics about the national economy, and to a lesser 
extent local economies. 
2. Valuing. More jobs and greater economic growth 
are always seen as a good thing, while other priori-
ties, such as happiness, equality or the environment, 
are secondary. 
3. Explanations. Attention is focused on paid work 
and economic indicators are treated as signs of what 
is most important.  
4. Endorsement. Governments and various agencies 
make authoritative announcements about jobs and the 
economy, giving this emphasis a stamp of approval. 
5. Rewards. Those who go along with the dominant 
framing—especially those who collect and interpret 
statistics and who write about the economy—can 
expect a receptive and sympathetic audience. 
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 Australian news reports often tell whether the share 
market has gone up or down, and give the latest exchange 
rate with the US dollar. Sometimes reports tell about 
economic trends in major countries, especially China and 
the US. The economies of poor countries are almost never 
mentioned. 
 Another aspect of self-centredness in public dis-
course about the economy is the issue of “Australian-
made.” Decades ago, it was a matter of pride for some 
Australians to buy a Holden, the General Motors car 
manufactured in Australia. Buying a Toyota or some other 
car from Japan or Korea was somehow not supporting 
Australia. Those days are long gone: foreign cars are 
common, and most people buy the cars they think are the 
best value, which means the Australian car-manufacturing 
industry is collapsing. 
 Nevertheless, there are complaints from some sectors 
when the government is said not to be doing enough for 
Australian businesses. When tariffs were reduced on some 
products, such as clothes and food, imports boomed. Yet, 
because of residual loyalty to the idea of being Australian, 
some companies advertise themselves as being “Austral-
ian owned” or “proud to be 100% Australian,” though 
some of these claims are dubious. 
 Then there are concerns raised when foreigners buy 
properties and businesses in Australia. This is sometimes 
presented as a foreign threat. There is a bit of racism 
involved: there may be concerns raised about Chinese 
investors buying Australian land, but none about British 
investment. There is a clear double standard too, because 
some Australian-based multinationals have bought 
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properties or companies in other countries, with never a 
peep of protest from commentators, except perhaps that it 
might be unprofitable. 
 There are two competing pressures on discourse 
about imports and exports. One is to maintain Australian 
ownership and to buy Australian-made goods; the other is 
to buy whatever is cheaper or better, whether made in 
Australia or elsewhere. The thrust of capitalist markets is 
towards greater international competition, so the appeal of 
being “Australian-made” has been declining. The key 
thing to note is that both discourses put Australians at the 
centre, as beneficiaries either as workers and owners of 
Australian businesses or as consumers of services and 
products. There is little thought in either configuration of 
thinking about benefiting people in other countries, except 
as a spin-off of world economic growth. 
 A question arises: how does thinking about “the 
economy” become so centred on benefits to the home 
country? The primary driver is the national government, 
where decisions are made about government expenditure, 
trade agreements, investment guidelines and the like. It is 
in the government’s own interest to build the national 
economy: after all, the government obtains revenue by 
extracting it from the economy. Regional and local gov-
ernments want to develop their own economies, but they 
have fewer resources to do so. 
 The Australian economy is semi-closed. Capital can 
move fairly freely, but labour cannot. People in Australia 
can move to different parts of the country in search of 
better jobs, among other things, but immigration to 
Australia is restricted. It is a central contradiction of 
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global capitalism, with its rhetoric about free markets, that 
people cannot readily move across borders in search of 
jobs. The result is an orientation to the economic entity in 
which people can move. In Europe, this is the EU, so there 
is a division of attention between national economies and 
the EU economy. The Australian government has little 
incentive to think more broadly in terms of its goals.  
 
Economics in the media: an example 
My comments here about the self-centredness of Austral-
ian economic discourse are based on observations over 
many years. To back up these generalisations, it would be 
necessary to carry out interviews, analyse media discourse 
or listen to focus group discussions. Here, more modestly, 
I only illustrate the Australian media’s orientation to the 
Australian economy. I picked an issue of the Sydney 
Morning Herald, considered one of Australia’s quality 
newspapers, choosing the issue of 23 February 2015, the 
day I wrote the first draft of the preceding text. My 
comments here are about articles concerning economics in 
the news pages.1 
 On page 2, there was an article about whether 
workers in pubs should continue to be paid higher wages 
on holidays declared by Australian states, in addition to 
the standard eight national public holidays. For example, 
the government of the state of Victoria declared a public 
holiday on the weekend of the grand final of the Austral-
ian Rules football competition. The Australian Hotels 
Association, representing pubs and clubs—where food and 
                                                
1 A separate analysis could be undertaken of the business pages. 
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alcohol are served—wanted uniformity across the country 
in what are called penalty rates of pay. This was a story 
about national economic matters. 
 On page 3 was an article about a scandal in the 
National Australia Bank, one of Australia’s four major 
banks. NAB financial advisers had been exposed for 
offering misleading advice to customers, causing the 
customers to lose large amounts of money. Due to 
additional leaked documents about the scandal, adding to 
previous exposés, there were calls for a royal commission 
into Australia’s financial planning sector. This was a story 
about national economic matters. 
 A brief report on page 6 began “Access to affordable 
medicines could be under threat in Australia if the US gets 
its way in secretive negotiations over a trade deal involv-
ing 12 Pacific-region countries, academics have warned.” 
The theme was risks to Australian patients. The report 
concluded with the statement “Trade Minister Andrew 
Robb said he would not agree to anything that was against 
Australia’s interests.” Both sides in the argument about the 
trade agreement thus used the rhetoric of benefiting 
Australians. 
 An article titled “Annual coal health toll $600m, 
doctors say” reported on estimates of damage to health in 
the Hunter region, around the city of Newcastle. The 
article highlighted a clash between economic benefits to 
the state versus health costs. “A 2014 report for the NSW 
Minerals Council estimated Hunter coal contributes in 
total $6.3 billion annually to the state’s economy, or 
almost half of the total mining industry’s output in the 
state. The region’s coal industry also employed more than 
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18,000 people.” The orientation is to the economy of the 
state. 
 On the comment pages, the editorial for the day 
addressed the issue of the federal government’s payments 
for childcare assistance, saying “Taxpayers subsidise 
childcare by almost $7 billion a year,” something that 
“helped the economy by allowing more mothers and 
fathers to balance work and parenting, which in turn has 
increased productivity, economic growth and living 
standards.” However, the editorial stated, this system may 
not be efficient. The assumption is that childcare policy 
should be about benefiting the Australian economy. 
 Among the letters to the editor, a section was devoted 
to ones about housing. An article the previous day, titled 
“Rich pensioners may be too much at home,” raised 
concerns about people owning million-dollars homes and 
receiving the aged pension: perhaps they should move out. 
Letter-writers contested this, for example pointing out that 
the median house price in Sydney was approaching a 
million dollars. The assumption underlying this debate 
about the economics of retirement was that the trade-off 
between what was fair to individuals, in particular elderly 
homeowners, and fair to the Australian taxpayer. 
 Among the letters, there was one offering a contrast 
to the usual emphasis on money: Jenny Blake commented 
that, “… the joy of being part of your grandchildren’s 
lives can never be calculated in dollars and cents. It is a 
sad society we have become when everything is measured 
by money.” 
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Challenging economic self-centredness 
There are quite a few ways to challenge the orientation of 
economic thinking and discourse towards self-interest, 
with “self” often involving an identification with the 
country and the state. These can be generally classified 
into methods of confrontation, fostering alternative identi-
fications, and putting priority on different goals. 
 Methods of confrontation directly challenge the 
standard orientation of economic thinking. The Occupy 
movement’s slogan of “We are the 99%” is an example: it 
switches the orientation from economic growth to 
economic inequality. Then there are those who raise 
awareness about poverty and disadvantage. They expose 
crimes of the wealthy, point to exploitation of workers, 
oppose trade deals that benefit the rich, and question the 
world system of trade and debt. There are actually lots of 
people pushing for a different set of priorities and who 
provide a different agenda than the usual one built around 
the rhetoric of economic nationalism. 
 A second set of methods seeks to promote identifica-
tion with a different group than the country, region or city 
that is the usual focus of economic discourse. The tradi-
tional socialist emphasis on the working class is a classic 
example: the working class transcends national boundaries 
and pits workers against the ruling class, thus questioning 
economic nationalism with a different focus. However, 
working-class consciousness often is linked to wages and 
conditions of workers, and thus feeds into the preoccupa-
tion with what is good for workers—in this country. Trade 
unions officials usually put the interests of unionists in 
their union first, above other considerations. Seldom do 
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they make decisions with a primary concern about 
workers worldwide. Those who are unemployed or in non-
unionised sectors of the world economy are not often of 
great concern. 
 Rather than identifying with workers, another possi-
bility is identifying with poor people worldwide—even if 
you are not one of them. This is the approach of those 
concerned with poverty reduction, movements against 
exploitation, campaigners for rights of the most disadvan-
taged, public health advocates, and various others. 
Whether identifying with poor people is an effective 
counter to economic nationalism is probably best assessed 
on a case-by-case basis. 
 A third set of methods to challenge state-centred 
economic thinking questions the assumptions in conven-
tional growth economics. An example is the idea of a 
steady-state economy, namely one that doesn’t grow any 
more. The steady-state economy is a long-term necessity, 
at least when growth involves tangible things like energy 
and consumer goods, simply because eventually resources 
and non-renewable energy sources will be exhausted. 
Therefore, it makes sense to start planning for a steady-
state now.2 
 Research on happiness offers another way of 
questioning normal thinking about economics. Greater 
income does, on average, lead to higher reported 
happiness, but only up to a point. Above a modest 
standard of living, greater incomes lead to little or no 
                                                
2 A classic reference: Herman E. Daly (ed.), Toward a Steady-
state Economy (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1973).  
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increases in reported happiness levels. One striking 
finding is that in countries like Britain, Japan and the US, 
recorded average happiness levels have hardly changed 
nationwide over several decades, while the per capita 
gross national product has greatly increased. What this 
means is that people are earning more and they have 
bigger houses, nicer cars and more electronic gadgets—
but they are no happier, on average, than earlier genera-
tions who were, by today’s standards, deprived.3 
 The interpretation of these findings has been con-
tested, but what all economists accept is that money has a 
declining marginal utility: an extra dollar means a lot more 
to a poor person than to a billionaire. The implication, in 
terms of collective welfare, is that there are greater 
benefits from bringing people out of poverty than in 
adding to the wealth of those already well off. In other 
                                                
3 Gregg Easterbrook, The Progress Paradox: How Life Gets 
Better While People Feel Worse (New York: Random House, 
2003); Bruno S. Frey and Alois Stutzer, Happiness and 
Economics: How the Economy and Institutions Affect Wellbeing 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002); Bruno S. Frey 
in collaboration with Alois Stutzer, Matthias Benz, Stephan 
Meier, Simon Luechinger and Christine Benesch, Happiness: A 
Revolution in Economics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008); 
Richard Layard, Happiness: Lessons from a New Science 
(London: Penguin, 2005). There are some who dispute this 
finding. See, for example, Michael R. Hagerty and Ruut 
Veenhoven, “Wealth and happiness revisited—growing national 
income does go with greater happiness,” Social Indicators 
Research, 64, 2003, 1–27, and subsequent articles by Richard 
Easterlin and by Veenhoven and Hagerty. 
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words, a more equal distribution of income and wealth 
should be the goal, rather than increases in gross domestic 
product: growth (progress) in equality, not growth in 
wealth. Research suggests this will increase overall 
happiness. Indeed, people who are materialistic, seeking 
ever more income and possessions, tend to be less happy 
than average; therefore, fostering a more caring and less 
acquisitive society would improve wellbeing overall.4 
 Then there are particular activities that usually in-
crease personal happiness, including helping others, 
expressing gratitude and being physically active. These do 
not require much money, and just about anyone can 
undertake them. Potentially, they provide an alternative 
direction for economic priorities. 
 Much of the research on happiness—also called 
flourishing or wellbeing—is oriented to the individual, 
which has the disadvantage of meshing with individualism 
in materialistic striving. However, it is possible to rethink 
some of the happiness-promoting activities as collective 
endeavours, and furthermore ones that lead to social 
changes. For example, helping others is a potent method 
of improving one’s own happiness, as long as this doesn’t 
become routine or obligatory. Designing a society around 
enabling people to help each other directly—without 
government as the intermediary body, collecting taxes and 
providing welfare services—offers more prospects for 
happiness. 
                                                
4 Tim Kasser, The High Price of Materialism (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2002). 
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 This leads into economic alternatives, of which there 
are many. Some alternatives involve a greater role for 
government, other less. For example, a guaranteed annual 
income is usually assumed to be provided by government, 
whereas local currencies reduce the role of the central 
government. 
 One of the most promising economic alternatives is 
building the commons, namely the resources that are 
freely available to everyone. Two traditional types of 
commons are libraries and public parks. Anyone can 
check out a book from a library or, these days, use the 
Internet. Anyone can visit a park area in a city. The history 
of libraries and parks is instructive: workers had to 
struggle to introduce and maintain these facilities.5 After 
all, they are competitors to private enterprise. It is possible 
to imagine a world without libraries, but instead only 
bookshops and Internet cafés, and a world without public 
parks, but instead only privately run parks charging 
substantial fees for entrance. 
 With the development of computing and the Internet, 
a new type of commons has emerged, referred to as the 
digital commons. Its best-known feature is free software, 
such as the operating system Linux. Free software is 
produced by collectives or networks of programmers who 
provide their services without charge, and the resulting 
products are available to anyone. One of the slogans of the 
free software movement is “free as in free speech, not free 
beer.” The key to free software, and its close relation open 
                                                
5 Raymond Williams, The Long Revolution (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1965), pp. 73–74. 
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source software, is that the code is publicly available, so 
anyone can use it or modify it, but not copyright it.6  
 The open source movement has inspired parallel 
developments in a range of areas. For example, there are 
now open-source colas, with the ingredients displayed on 
beverage containers, and open-source code to run 3D 
printing, an alternative to regular manufacturing. 
 The open source movement is expanding the role of 
the commons, and is thereby providing an alternative to 
government as a source of economic welfare. The 
commons is a more general alternative to the economic 
role of government, which is to collect taxes and provide 
both individual and collective services. Governments can 
support commons, as in the case of libraries and public 
parks, but in other cases governments oppose commons 
and instead support corporations and their efforts to 
undermine or outlaw commons. This is apparent in 
government support for expansion of intellectual property 
regimes that protect the monopoly-privilege positions of 
software companies, pharmaceutical manufacturers, large 
book and journal publishers, and Hollywood producers.  
                                                
6 Samir Chopra and Scott D. Dexter, Decoding Liberation: The 
Promise of Free and Open Source Software (New York: 
Routledge, 2008); Karl Fogel, Producing Open Source Software: 
How to Run a Successful Free Software Project (Karl Fogel, 
2005); Glyn Moody, Rebel Code: Linux and the Open Source 
Revolution (New York: Basic Books, 2001); Steven Weber, The 
Success of Open Source (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2004). The differences between free and open source 
software and their associated movements are important but are 
not central to the discussion here. 
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 In summary, there are at least three approaches to 
challenging economic nationalism: confronting economic 
self-centredness by questioning standard assumptions and 
silences, for example as done by the Occupy movement; 
promoting identification with a different group, such as 
local government or the working class; and questioning 
assumptions underlying conventional thinking about 
economics, as in research on happiness and in the 
commons as the basis for an economic alternative. All of 
these are occurring and, to counter them, governments 
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Globalisation is the process by which goods, services and 
all sorts of activities become spread about the world rather 
than restricted to particular localities. Globalisation can 
occur with all sorts of things. Stamp collecting is a global 
activity, and many collectors trade stamps with people in 
other parts of the world.  
 The controversies over climate change, nuclear 
power, fluoridation, vaccination and pesticides are glob-
alised in the sense that the same sorts of arguments, 
participants and actions are found in different places, and 
there is considerable sharing of information and ideas 
between groups in different places.1 There are differences, 
to be sure. For example, in countries with nuclear power 
stations, opponents focus more attention on reactor 
accidents and long-lived radioactive waste than in 
countries with no nuclear facilities. In some places, where 
nuclear power has never been a serious option, there is 
little debate about it. Globalisation does not mean that 
exactly the same ideas, activities or products are found 
everywhere, but rather there is a process by which similar 
developments occur in many places, often with adapta-
tions to the local circumstances. 
                                                
1 Brian Martin, “The globalization of scientific controversy,” 
Globalization, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2008, http://globalization.icaap.org/ 
content/v7.1/Martin.html 
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 Sport is increasingly globalised. There is one major 
global sport with a huge following, football (otherwise 
known as soccer), and many others for which there are 
international competitions, such as table tennis and 
swimming.  
 The English language is gradually becoming a global 
language, becoming the dominant second language in 
many countries in addition to countries where it is the first 
language.  
 Globalisation is not always a good thing. Organised 
crime is increasingly global, with ties between syndicates 
in different countries. In the illegal drug trade, production, 
distribution and sales often occur across country borders. 
 Despite globalisation, the majority of most activities 
in the world occur locally and nationally. Most families, 
for example, live together rather than being spread across 
several countries. Most commuting is local. Despite the 
increasing ease of international travel, many more trips are 
to nearby locations. Globalisation needs to be seen in 
conjunction with the contrary process of localisation. 
 My interest here is in one particular type of globalisa-
tion: the rise of large corporations whose operations span 
several countries, and the associated distribution of goods 
and services in markets in these countries. This can be 
called corporate globalisation, to distinguish it from other 
types of globalisation. Global trade has existed for centu-
ries; corporate globalisation involves an increase in the 
number and power of corporations, with headquarters in 
one country, that have significant operations elsewhere. A 
well known example is McDonald’s, whose outlets are 
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found in dozens of countries and whose trademark arch is 
one of the world’s most recognised logos. 
 
Tactics and corporate globalisation 
The state and globalisation seem, at least on the surface, to 
be in tension with each other. The state exercises its power 
from control over politics and economics within a country, 
whereas multinational corporations have as primary goals 
expansion and profits regardless of where they are based. 
State elites presumably have most to gain by putting state 
interests first, whereas multinational corporate elites care 
less about any particular state and more about corporate 
interests. 
 This tension is resolved by noting a common interest 
between elites, namely those with most power and money 
who are at the apex of political and economic systems. 
Governments derive much of their income, through 
taxation, from economic activity that is controlled and 
stimulated by large corporations. Governments cannot 
easily act against the interests of the largest corporations, 
and few politicians want to, because they are lobbied by 
corporate representatives and usually subscribe to a 
capitalist ideology. Similarly, corporations depend on 
governments to provide the legitimacy and coercion 
necessary to preserve private property and to establish and 
enforce rules for markets. Without governments, corpora-
tions could be challenged by their own workers, under-
mined by unscrupulous rivals, and lose access to markets.2 
                                                
2 Robert L. Heilbroner, The Nature and Logic of Capitalism 
(New York: Norton, 1985), p. 105: “remove the state and the 
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 A convenient way to understand the relationship 
between states and multinational corporations is in terms 
of a cooperative alliance of those with the most power and 
wealth against those with much less. However, there are 
tensions in the relationship, with leaders of the state and of 
multinational corporations being pulled in different 
directions by the logics of their respective enterprises. One 
important tension arises from a central contradiction in 
global capitalism, concerning the mobility of capital and 
labour. By the logic of capitalism, both capital (money for 
investments) and labour-power (workers) should be able 
to move freely, so that capital can be deployed in areas of 
greatest profitability and labour can similarly move to 
where wages are highest. According to neoclassical 
economic theory, this increases overall productivity to the 
greatest extent. Accordingly, leaders of multinational 
corporations have pushed against any restrictions on 
where and how they can run their operations, and finance 
capitalists have sought freedom to move money about as 
they wish. In this context, the so-called Tobin tax, a tiny 
percentage tax on any cross-border flow of money, is a 
radical proposal, because it would put a brake on the most 
volatile forms of financial speculation. 
 What then about the mobility of labour? Companies 
usually prefer to have access to labour at lower wages if 
skills are similar. One option is immigration; another is 
guest workers, who come from lower-wage countries but 
                                                                                                                                          
regime of capital would not last a day.” See also Michael Moran 
and Maurice Wright (eds.), The Market and the State: Studies in 
Interdependence (London: Macmillan, 1991). 
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do not gain citizenship. For example, most of the routine 
work in Saudi Arabia is done by millions of guest workers 
from India, Pakistan, Egypt, the Philippines and other 
countries. However, state elites put severe limits on the 
movement of people who otherwise like to serve the 
desires of corporate leaders. The reason is that state 
loyalty is served by fostering a sense of us versus them: 
the in-group bias of humans can be harnessed to build 
loyalty to the abstract entity of a country. 
 Think of it this way. If states did not exist, and there 
were no border controls or requirements for passports, 
then people would be free to move wherever in the world 
they liked, with the primary constraint that there was a 
place for them in a new location. Most people would 
probably prefer to stay near those among whom they grew 
up and built relationships, but some—especially in areas 
of exploitation and violent conflict—would prefer to 
move. 
 This does not work when there are states that create 
their own rationale by providing services to a population, 
such as education and military defence, while maintaining 
various forms of control over the population in order to 
extract a surplus (through taxes and other means). 
Unrestrained movement of people disturbs the connection. 
If people can move freely, they are less likely to be 
susceptible to the methods that state supporters use to 
build identification with a country and its government. If 
they travel widely, they are exposed to a variety of 
political leaders and systems and may decide that the one 
they grew up with could be improved.  
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 Those with money and desirable skills have, for 
centuries, been better able to move across boundaries, and 
some of them have developed global perspectives as a 
result. But until the last century, most long-distance travel 
was slow and expensive, and hence restricted. There has 
been extensive migration, for example from Europe to 
various colonised parts of the world, and from Africa to 
life elsewhere as slaves. Mobility is nothing new, but the 
ease of going back and forth within weeks or days is 
unprecedented. 
 Cheap and easy mobility poses challenges to state 
administrators. The extensive use of identity cards 
(passports) is a recent innovation, introduced by states 
seeking to establish themselves as the only legitimate 
controller of people’s movements.3 
 All this suggests that the contradiction between the 
mobility of labour, which would serve capitalists, and 
control over the mobility of labour, which serves states, 
has become ever more acute. This contradiction reveals 
itself in the different methods used by governments in 
relation to trade agreements. 
 
Trade deals 
Global trade has existed for millennia, well before the rise 
of the state system and the imposition of border controls. 
The industrial revolution and the emergence of modern 
                                                
3 John Torpey, The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, 
Citizenship and the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000). 
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states happened over the same period, and each transfor-
mation shaped the other.4  
 The usual thinking about trade is that it is mutually 
beneficial. Why then would a government set up barriers 
to trade, such as high tariffs or prohibitions against 
imports of specific goods? The reason is to protect local 
enterprises from foreign competition. Unrestricted trade, 
combined with protection of private property, typically 
results in the development of oligopolies and monopolies. 
Without restrictions, these could spread across boundaries, 
engulfing local businesses. Protectionism enables a local 
economy, under government or local business ownership, 
to survive and expand until ready to compete internation-
ally. As a rule, free trade serves those with the greatest 
economic power. 
 So we come to contemporary trade agreements. They 
are often called free trade agreements, but this is mislead-
ing because they usually contain various restraints on 
trade, including quotas and intellectual property protec-
tion, and none enable significant mobility of labour. The 
label “free trade” is useful to proponents because it 
suggests that everyone will benefit while disguising the 
mechanisms that restrain local decision-making. For 
example, the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) contains provisions allowing corporations to 
sue governments over any law or regulation that hurts 
profits. Many of the legal actions initiated under 
NAFTA’s Chapter 11 are against the Canadian govern-
                                                
4 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD990-
1992 (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1992). 
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ment due to its environmental regulations. Critics have 
said that trade deals enable corporations to override the 
policies of sovereign states. 
 Many trade deals mainly benefit the powerful groups 
in the stronger parties to the deals. In the US, Congress 
extends the duration of copyright whenever it is about to 
expire, so for books, it is now 70 years after the death of 
the author, with a related term for corporate works. This 
extension of copyright has been dubbed the Mickey 
Mouse Protection Act, because it retains the Disney 
Corporation’s intellectual property rights over the cartoon 
figure of Mickey Mouse, which would otherwise expire.  
 Intellectual property includes copyright, patents, 
trademarks and trade secrets, among other forms of law 
that restrict people’s use of ideas and their expression. It is 
a restraint on trade: a copyrighted text cannot be used by 
others for commercial purposes. The rationale for copy-
right is to allow a creator exclusive rights for a period of 
time in order to stimulate creative production. The 
duration of copyright, initially quite short, has been 
extended far beyond any rational basis. Will authors really 
want to write more novels because they know their heirs 
(or their publishers) will be able to restrict others from 
publishing them for decades after their death? What 
difference will 70 rather than 50 years of post-death 
protection make to their productivity or creativity? In 
nearly every case, the benefits from such extended 
protection flow not to the creator but to non-creators 
whose control is guaranteed by the government. Such 
examples make it obvious that intellectual property 
regimes are in the service of powerful groups, especially 
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pharmaceutical companies, major publishing houses, 
software companies, and Hollywood producers.  
 Companies based in the United States gain most of 
the benefit from these restraints on trade, sometimes called 
monopoly privilege. In nearly every other country in the 
world, greater monopoly privilege is harmful as assessed 
on a national basis. For example, people and local 
companies in Australia pay vastly more for access to 
products covered by copyright, patents and other forms of 
intellectual property than any returns from Australian 
ownership. In practice, this means that Australians 
(individuals, companies and the government) pay far more 
for access to pharmaceutical drugs, proprietary software, 
books and Hollywood films produced in the US or other 
countries than returns from its own products similarly 
covered. However, this did not prevent the Australian 
government agreeing to extend its own copyright term 
from 50 to 70 years post-death, something overwhelm-
ingly advantaging US owners over Australian ones. 
 This is just one example of many showing that trade 
deals serve multinational corporations over local interests, 
and that governments will make agreements that hurt 
national interests. They do it because their loyalties are 
more to wealthy and powerful groups: they see the world 
from the perspective of these groups and sincerely believe 
that their actions will also serve the general interest.  
 This does pose a difficulty for governments. They 
need to sell the deals to their own people. They are caught 
in a dilemma: how to serve the interests of corporate (and 
government) elites while convincing citizens that they are 
serving national interests. Few of them think of this 
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challenge in these terms, because they believe they are 
serving national interests, but in practical terms they have 
to negotiate the two prongs of the dilemma. To highlight 
the dilemma, it is useful to look at the usual techniques 
used by those who take actions that others might see as 
unfair: cover-up, devaluation, reinterpretation, official 
channels and intimidation. My expectation is that when 
perpetrators in these circumstances are trying to serve two 
contradictory goals, their use of these methods will be 
inconsistent. 
 Let’s begin with cover-up and its obverse, exposure. 
In negotiating trade deals, governments collectively 
operate with great secrecy, not revealing the proposed 
terms of the agreements. Yet at the same time they 
trumpet the great advantages of the deals for their citizens. 
The secrecy—the cover-up—of the provisions of the deals 
is to hide their damaging aspects from their own citizens, 
who might be able to mobilise to resist them. (Politicians 
say secrecy is needed so negotiators can discuss sensitive 
matters confidentially.) On the other hand, political 
leaders are quite happy to say how wonderful the deals 
will be for everyone. The tension between these two 
stances is bridged by “trust us.” 
 In 1997, while the Multilateral Agreement on Invest-
ment (MAI) was being negotiated in secret, a US citizens’ 
group, Global Tradewatch, obtained the text, which had 
hitherto been kept secret, and circulated it to campaigners 
in several countries. This exposure was instrumental in the 
popular efforts to stop the MAI.  
 You might think that if deals were really so good for 
everyone, politicians would be pleased to tell everyone 
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about what conditions were being discussed and what 
trade-offs were being considered. The reality is that many 
of the points being discussed are unwelcome to citizens, 
especially to specific groups. When the Australian 
government was negotiating a “free trade” agreement with 
the US government, it does not look good to say, “We’re 
going to agree that no Australian-produced sugar will be 
allowed to be sold in the US.” It looks like a restraint on 
trade rather than free trade. 
 In 2015, while the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
was being secretly negotiated, WikiLeaks obtained and 
published the proposed chapter on intellectual property. 
This was embarrassing to some of the governments, 
because they were seen as acting against the national 
interest, instead serving the interests of pharmaceutical 
and other companies. (This is not to mention that strength-
ening intellectual property provisions basically means 
restraining rather than freeing enterprise.) This is another 
example of how governments need to finesse the question 
of cover-up and exposure: this involves hiding the 
provisions and negotiations from citizens while telling 
everyone—especially politicians who have to approve the 
agreement—how wonderful life will be following 
approval. The idea is to obtain political backing without 
being influenced by popular resistance. (It should be noted 
that most politicians undoubtedly believe in the value of 
the trade deals they support.) 
 Next consider the value attached to trade agreements, 
positive or negative. As already mentioned, governments 
tout the advantages of the deals, appealing to the positive 
connotations of “free” in “free trade.” Critics, on the other 
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hand, have sought to discredit many trade deals, especially 
the ones mainly benefiting the rich and powerful. 
 Closely associated with values associated with trade 
deals are the many explanations of how they work or don’t 
work. Proponents point to many advantages, usually 
ignoring harmful effects, and critics do the reverse. Critics 
often try to frame the deals as serving the interests of large 
corporations at the expense of national sovereignty, which 
nominally is under citizen control or at least influenced by 
citizens via elections and public debate. However, the 
responsiveness of elected representatives to the popular 
will is elusive when it comes to trade agreements, as 
indicated by the secrecy involved in the negotiations and 
the reluctance of governments to sponsor a wide-ranging 
public discussion. 
 The legitimacy of trade deals derives from their 
official status. They are inter-government agreements, and 
to the extent that governments have credibility, so then 
should the agreements. It would hardly seem fair if 
corporations simply stitched together a set of rules for 
trade and imposed it on the world’s population. Govern-
ments, especially those with fair elections, have much 
greater credibility for this purpose. Many members of the 
public trust what political leaders say, at least until blatant 
hypocrisies emerge: new leaders often have a honeymoon 
period, short or long, and may be able to push through the 
deals, especially when critics do not have details in 
advance to muster contrary arguments: many deals are 
faits accomplis. For corporations, governments are an 
essential part of the process to make the deal and to 
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provide protection of private property and regulations to 
enable large corporations to thrive.  
 However, the fact that trade agreements are negoti-
ated by governments provides remarkably little leverage 
for critics. This is the appearance of justice without the 
substance. After all, trade agreements are seldom a major 
election issue and politicians in any case do not have to 
follow through on election promises. 
 Finally, there are the methods of intimidation and 
reward. Intimidation of trade-deal critics through funding 
cuts or discrediting individuals is probably not as 
important as the great awards for those who support the 
deals. Some corporations and industry sectors receive 
direct financial benefits. Some individuals receive jobs 
and promotions. Journalists can gain better access when 
they are sympathetic. 
 In summary, governments play a double game in 
praising trade deals while restricting what members of the 
public know about the process and outcomes. Their basic 
strategy has to be to please two audiences: the corpora-
tions that benefit from the deals and the public that elects 
the politicians and which can agitate in opposition. The 
main ways that unpleasant truths about the deals—
especially that their primary benefits are to large 
corporations—are dealt with is by hiding them from the 
public as long as possible. Meanwhile, the deals are touted 
under the assumption that benefits to the economy 
automatically lead to benefits for everyone.  
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Tax havens 
Another source of tension for governments is the existence 
of tax havens, which are locations enabling individuals 
and businesses to avoid or minimise the tax they pay.5 For 
example, a multinational corporation can establish its 
central office in a jurisdiction with low taxes and high 
financial secrecy, such as Switzerland, Hong Kong or the 
Cayman Islands, and then use transfer pricing to reduce its 
apparent income in higher-tax places like France and 
Sweden. 
 Tax havens are just one aspect of a wider process of 
tax avoidance and corrupt money transfers. Taxation is 
one of the powers of governments, and indeed one that 
enables the state to exist. Taxation can be thought of as an 
imposition on free exchange between individuals and 
groups; it is intended to be compulsory, and perhaps is the 
only state compulsion that remains widespread.6  
 In this context, it is not surprising that many people 
do what they can to reduce their tax, and many otherwise 
law-abiding citizens think nothing of cheating when it 
                                                
5 Nicholas Shaxson, Treasure Islands: Tax Havens and the Men 
Who Stole the World (London: Bodley Head, 2011); Gabriel 
Zucman, The Hidden Wealth of Nations: the Scourge of Tax 
Havens (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015). 
6 Slavery and serfdom have been legally abolished, though forms 
still continue in parts of the world. Military conscription has been 
abolished in most countries, and jury duty and voting, though 
compulsory in some countries, are neither onerous nor difficult to 
avoid if really desired. Taxation, though, is standard everywhere. 
Only the means of imposing tax vary. 
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comes time to file their income tax forms. When trades-
people ask to be paid in cash, it can be a sign that they do 
not intend to report the money as taxable income. 
 Although tax avoidance is widespread in many 
countries, the focus here is on the richest individuals and 
companies, the ones with annual incomes in the millions 
or billions of dollars. They have a capacity to pay, but 
commonly do what they can to reduce their tax bills. No 
surprise here. What might be surprising is that govern-
ments often seem quite happy to allow this to occur. They 
sometimes produce fiery rhetoric about tax avoidance but 
at the same time serve the rich at the expense of the poor, 
and this is something to be hidden when possible. 
 First, to take an extreme example of corrupt behav-
iour, consider loans to dictatorial regimes. In quite a few 
cases, the dictator and his family (very rarely her family) 
skim vast quantities of money from the loans into private 
bank accounts, held for example in Switzerland through a 
shell company in the Virgin Islands. Vast means billions 
of dollars. This is out-and-out theft. So what do Western 
governments do about it? They demand that the country 
honour the debt, namely that the corrupt government (or a 
successor government) cut government expenditure and 
raise taxes in order to pay interest and capital on the loans. 
Another approach would be to say to their own banks, 
“You made a bad loan. Too bad. You just lost the capital. 
Don’t be foolish and do it again. If you want your money 
back, you’d better do something about Swiss banks that 
hide the proceeds of crime.” In practice, Western govern-
ments usually allow these sorts of crimes to continue. 
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 Then there is tax avoidance that is nominally legal. 
Large multinational corporations use transfer pricing to 
minimise their tax. This involves pricing internal transfers 
of goods and money within the company’s operations in 
different countries in a way that ensures that tax is as low 
as possible. Usually this means that most of the profits 
appear to come from parts of the company based in low-
tax places such as Ireland. In countries with higher taxes, 
it is seemingly miraculous that revenues of billions of 
dollars result in little or no profit. 
 If governments wanted to stamp out this sort of 
practice, it wouldn’t be hard—at least in principle. After 
all, the rules for international finance are collectively 
made by governments and international bodies dominated 
by governments. In practice, corrupt practices and legal-
but-unfair practices have continued for decades. The obvi-
ous explanation is that the most powerful governments 
operate to serve the wealthy and powerful at the expense 
of their own populations. This creates a challenge for 
governments: how to justify their policies to their own 
populations. 
 Consider possibilities for cover-up and exposure. I 
can speak of my impression of how this is dealt with in 
Australia: the role of tax havens and transfer pricing is 
seldom front-page news. It is more likely to be relegated 
to the business pages of some newspapers. Instead, 
governments encourage the media to report on cheating by 
those lower down, for example welfare fraud, when an 
unemployed person obtains more benefits than officially 
allowed. Low-level cheaters may be given stiff penalties, 
perhaps even going to prison, whereas executives of 
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companies benefiting from massive rip-offs, legal or 
illegal, are seldom brought before a court. 
 There is a lot of reporting on taxation, with most of 
the attention on how taxes are too high, especially for 
high-income earners, with the explanation being that 
lower taxes are needed to offer incentives. However, tax 
evasion by rich individuals and companies only occasion-
ally receives attention. There have been some scandals, for 
example the “bottom-of-the-harbour” schemes used to 
evade tax,7 but these have not led to major reform. Official 
inquiries usually lead nowhere.  
 The following news report indicates the problem (the 
Coalition refers to the ruling Liberal-National Party 
government): 
 
Tax paid by companies controlled by Australia’s 
richest business people, including Gina Rinehart, 
James Packer and Lindsay Fox, will remain secret 
after the Coalition succeeded in exempting private 
companies from new tax disclosure requirements.8 
 
Australian billionaires found it embarrassing for infor-
mation to be made public about how little tax they paid—
sometimes almost none at all—so they quietly lobbied 
                                                
7 Companies were stripped of their assets and profits and then, 
before taxes were due, transferred to new, poor owners. The 
stripped companies were metaphorically sunk to the bottom of the 
harbour.  
8 Heath Aston, “Law change shields tax of wealthiest compa-
nies,” Sydney Morning Herald, 16 October 2015, p. 4. 
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against the required disclosures. This illustrates how 
exposure can be a potent way of challenging injustice, and 
how governments can serve the interests of a wealthy 
minority at the expense of the Australian public. 
 It would be possible to examine additional methods 
to reduce outrage over tax havens and other forms of 
large-corporation tax evasion, under the categories deval-
uation, reinterpretation, official channels and intimidation. 
Only sometimes are these methods needed, because cover-
up is usually adequate. Without going through a full 
gamut of methods, suffice it to say that governments play 
a dual game of stigmatising low-level tax evaders while 




Economic inequality can be a source of public outrage, so 
government and corporate elites unite in dampening 
concern.9 In relation to nationalism, there is a special 
challenge for state elites. By dint of their role in serving 
powerful groups, including those in other countries, they 
have a challenging task in maintaining the population’s 
commitment to the country and to the state while reducing 
concern about inequality and actions that benefit the rich 
at the expense of others. 
 This is why corporate globalisation induces such a 
curious mixture of responses by governments, many of 
                                                
9 Susan Engel and Brian Martin, “Challenging economic inequal-
ity: tactics and strategies,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 
50, No. 49, 5 December 2015, pp. 42–48.  
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which promote or tolerate trade deals and tax havens that 
serve the global and mobile rich of the world at the 
expense of their own citizens who have less money and 
fewer options. Opposition to corporate globalisation can 
come from both ends of the political spectrum, from 
workers who feel threatened by cheap foreign labour, 
which can feed into racist feelings, and campaigners such 
as in the Occupy movement who challenge inequality. 
Examining the tactics used by governments provides a 
useful way of mapping the difficulties they face in 





The psychology of rule 
 
 
 “Who’s the leader of your country? What do you think of 
him (or her)?” A few people will answer, “I don’t know 
and I don’t care.” More commonly, though, people have 
strong emotional connections with rulers. These can be 
positive or negative. Quite a few liberal-minded US 
citizens had a visceral hatred of George W. Bush, while 
quite a few US conservatives detested Barack Obama. 
 Systems of rule are invariably accompanied by 
emotions and, more generally, psychological processes. 
Usually these facilitate the operation of the system.  
 Think of dictatorships in which the ruler is glorified. 
In China under the rule of Mao Tse-Tung, classrooms had 
several large photographs: Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin—
and Mao himself. Think of the German Nazi regime with 
mass rallies, Hitler being the commanding figure. 
 Systems of representative government are not exempt 
from exalting the country’s leader. In the United States, 
there is excessive attention to the president. Media specu-
lation about the next president starts more than a year 
prior to an election: there seems to be more attention to the 
question of who is or will be the president than to policies. 
In other countries, a visit by the US president is a very big 
deal. 
 In countries with a monarch, even one without 
power, this provides a convenient figurehead that provides 
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the basis for endless discussion. A royal wedding or the 
birth of a child in line for the throne receives great media 
attention, as if it makes any practical difference. But it 
does make a difference: it is part of the psychology of 
rule. 
 In parliamentary systems, citizens do not vote di-
rectly for the prime minister, who is chosen by elected 
party members. Gradually, though, prime ministers have 
taken on presidential attributes, so much so that opinion 
polls ask people their views about the prime minister and 
possible alternatives. The point here is that attention is 
constantly directed upwards, to the person at the top. In 
any moderately large country, few individuals ever have 
an extended interaction with the ruler. A photo oppor-
tunity perhaps, or a handshake, but in most cases the ruler 
is an icon, a figurehead, known through media coverage 
rather than personal contact.  
 A clue about the psychology of rule is the often-
stated preference for a “strong leader,” one who is deci-
sive, commanding and leading the way, as the term 
“leader” might suggest. Strangely, though, this is in 
contrast with a leader who is cautious and consultative, 
which might seem to be more in tune with the ethos of 
democracy.  Admiration for strong leaders may reflect a 
common pattern of treating leaders as rulers, admiring 
them for being dominant. 
 There is a body of research showing that people have 
a psychological predisposition to support the status quo or 
“the system,” in other words the way the world is 
currently organised. John Jost and colleagues argue that, 
“there is a general (but not insurmountable) system justifi-
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cation motive to defend and justify the status quo and to 
bolster the legitimacy of the existing social order.”1 There 
is evidence that subordinate and oppressed groups may 
support the existing system as much as those in privileged 
and dominant positions.2 It is possible that, after creating 
an egalitarian social order, this psychological motive 
might help to maintain support for it. However, in the 
present world order, system justification serves to encour-
age acceptance of the existence of governments, the state 
system and social inequality. 
 Insight into the psychological dynamics of rule is 
offered by gestalt therapist Philip Lichtenberg in his book 
Community and Confluence.3 He draws on a standard idea 
                                                
1 John T. Jost, Mahzarin R. Banaji and Brian A. Nosek, “A 
decade of system justification theory: accumulated evidence of 
conscious and unconscious bolstering of the status quo,” Political 
Psychology, Vol. 25, No. 6, 2004, pp. 881–919. 
2 This research has affinities with the moral foundation of author-
ity, discussed in chapter 2. 
3 Philip Lichtenberg, Community and Confluence: Undoing the 
Clinch of Oppression (Cleveland, OH: Gestalt Institute of 
Cleveland, 1994, 2nd edition). Other useful sources for under-
standing the psychology of rule include Arthur J. Deikman, The 
Wrong Way Home: Uncovering the Patterns of Cult Behavior in 
American Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1990); Jeff Schmidt, 
Disciplined Minds: A Critical Look at Salaried Professionals and 
the Soul-Battering System that Shapes their Lives (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2000); Judith Wyatt and Chauncey Hare, 
Work Abuse: How to Recognize and Survive It (Rochester, VT: 
Schenkman Books, 1997). There is a vast body of research rele-
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in psychology: projection. In this process, a person 
disowns part of their own personality and attributes it to 
others, namely projects it onto them, rather like a movie 
projector puts an image on the screen. For example, a 
person who is often angry may complain about others 
being angry; a person who is forgetful may accuse others 
of forgetting things. A standard example is a man who is 
uncomfortable with the feminine side of his psyche, 
rejects it and sees it in homosexual men, who he detests or 
even attacks. 
 Lichtenberg says that projection dynamics are at play 
in attitudes towards leaders. Ordinary citizens forget or 
disown their own capacity to take initiative and instead 
attribute it to leaders. When citizens admire strong leaders, 
they disempower themselves (forget or reject their own 
capacities), project their own power onto the leader, and 
admire it.  
 For disliked leaders, the process is similar, just with a 
different emotional content: the key is not admiration or 
hatred for the leader, but the feeling that the leader has 
power and that the follower or subject does not. 
 
Look to governments for action 
The most obvious manifestation of this sort of projection 
is the expectation that for something to happen, govern-
ments need to take action, or perhaps stop taking action. 
The result is an incredible fixation on appealing to 
governments, through letters to politicians, petitions, 
                                                                                                                                          
vant to the psychology of rule. The sources listed here are ones I 
have found useful from an activist and social change perspective. 
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meetings, and so forth. It’s as if no one can act autono-
mously or independently: someone in power has to do the 
acting, and so if you want action, then get politicians or 
other government officials to do it. 
 I regularly see this with whistleblowers.4 After they 
speak out in the public interest about corruption or hazards 
to the public, they are often subject to reprisals from 
bosses, senior management and, sometimes, co-workers. 
So what do they do next? They try to find some official 
body to take action to rectify the situation: the board of 
management, the ombudsman, auditor-general, a govern-
ment inquiry, court or politician. At one level this makes 
sense: often the problems are far greater than what any 
one person can address. Power needs to be exerted. The 
question is, where does the power come from? Most 
whistleblowers instinctively look “upwards,” towards 
those with more formal power, in government or govern-
ment agencies. 
 An alternative source of power is found by looking 
sidewards, towards co-workers, ordinary citizens and 
action groups. To do this requires taking initiative, for 
example going to the media, going to meetings of 
campaigning groups, or helping organise a campaign. But 
many whistleblowers, and others subject to abuse and 
exploitation, feel they are so powerless that their only 
salvation is to find a saviour somewhere up within the 
system, a white knight who will come to the rescue.  
                                                
4 Brian Martin, “Illusions of whistleblower protection,” UTS Law 
Review, No. 5, 2003, pp. 119–130. 
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 The process of projecting one’s power onto leaders 
doesn’t happen automatically. It is helped along in various 
ways, via education, media, elections and a psychological 
process called introjection.  
 Encouragement for projection onto leaders starts with 
what is taught in schools, including instruction (explicit or 
implicit) about the way the system is supposed to work: 
society, and especially government, is presented as a 
hierarchy, with some people in higher positions than 
others, and with those at the top making the crucial 
decisions. Relatively little attention is given to social 
movements and how ordinary people can organise and 
take action. Most schools are themselves organised 
hierarchically, with students being subordinate to teachers, 
teachers to principals, and perhaps principals to school 
boards or education departments. Students are taught to 
seek solutions to their own problems by going to teachers 
or the principal (or perhaps their parents), not to organise 
student protests. 
 The media are a major influence in encouraging 
people to project their power onto leaders. Media stories 
prioritise what governments do, both nationally and 
internationally. Politicians are regularly shown giving 
their views, in part because staffers seek favourable media 
coverage. Even without this, though, journalists and 
editors will run a story about the president or prime 
minister over one about grassroots action. 
 Media stories, as well as giving precedence to politi-
cians and others with formal power in the system, also 
encourage projection by seldom providing any sense of 
how citizens can act on their own, without relying on 
The psychology of rule     179 
 
leaders. There are some stories about trade unions, but 
usually about their actions, not about the daily slog of 
organising. There are some stories about environmental 
groups, usually with attention to spokespeople, not about 
what they spend most of their time doing. 
 The threat of global warming has triggered one of the 
world’s greatest grassroots movements, with groups of all 
sorts taking action, talking to neighbours, cutting back on 
consumption, installing energy-efficient technologies and 
contributing to community initiatives. Yet to look at media 
treatments, nearly everything seems to depend on govern-
ments taking action. Governments do make a difference, 
to be sure. The point here is that media coverage encour-
ages people to look to governments for solutions or to 
condemn governments for doing the wrong thing rather 
than suggesting how people can take action directly. 
 Then there are elections, in which candidates 
compete for people’s votes in order to occupy leadership 
positions. The process of participating in an election can 
serve, in a psychological sense, as one of giving consent to 
the system of rule.5 An unelected national leader can be 
seen as a dictator, as illegitimate; an elected national 
leader is legitimate and is a person to whom the popula-
tion has willingly granted power. Of course not everyone 
votes and not everyone votes for the successful candidate, 
but still elections as formal processes of selecting leaders 
offer legitimacy and facilitate projection of power onto the 
                                                
5 Benjamin Ginsberg, The Consequences of Consent: Elections, 
Citizen Control and Popular Acquiescence (Reading, MA: 
Addison-Wesley, 1982). 
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leader. After all, if voters have voluntarily chosen a leader, 
then deferring to that leader makes sense psychologically. 
Elections are a method of encouraging acquiescence. 
 This is one of the reasons that many dictators run 
sham elections. Even though nearly everyone recognises 
that the election has been rigged in one way or another, 
the process is a ritual that encourages acceptance of the 
outcome. In a way, it is analogous to singing the national 
anthem. 
 Education, media coverage and elections serve to 
encourage projection of power onto leaders, and leaders 
contribute to this through a psychological process called 
introjection. It involves, in this case, psychologically 
taking on the power of others. Leaders assume they have 
power, power that has been granted to them by their 
followers, subordinates or subjects. Now someone might 
say, “Well, actually, leaders do have power, so this thing 
called introjection isn’t needed.” This assumes the com-
mon model of power as something that powerful people 
possess and others have less of. However, a ruler does not 
exert power simply through what is in their own hands: 
their power depends on acquiescence or cooperation or 
eager support.  
 A military commander can do little if the troops 
refuse to obey. Arrest them and put them in prison! But 
this requires someone to do the arresting. Thinking about 
power this way leads to the perspective that it depends on 
quite a lot of people proceeding as if the ruler does indeed 
hold power as a possession: subordinates do as they are 
told, whether with enthusiasm or reluctance, knowing that 
if they don’t, they may suffer penalties implemented by 
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other subordinates who do what they are told. If all the 
subordinates got together and made their own decisions, 
the power of the ruler would evaporate.6 
 Introjection enables leaders to command more effec-
tively. They believe, deep down, that a mandate has been 
granted to them, or that they are powerful, and the result-
ing feeling of authority helps them maintain the loyalty or 
acquiescence of others. In short, belief helps to maintain 
the reality.  
 When leaders deeply believe they are powerful, the 
corollary is that followers are relatively powerless. In 
practice, leaders can do little unless their followers support 
them, by doing their biding. Leaders, somewhere in their 
minds, may appreciate their own limited power, but to be 
effective commanders they have to get rid of this insight, 
so they project it onto their followers. The complementary 
process is that followers introject the belief of their own 
powerlessness projected by their leaders. 
 The concepts of projection and introjection are ways 
of understanding mental dynamics. If these concepts are 
not appealing, it may be more useful to talk about belief 
systems. Leaders adopt belief systems in which they are 
powerful and their followers are not, and many followers 
                                                
6 The idea that people consent to being ruled was first articulated 
by Étienne de La Boétie, Anti-dictator (New York: Columbia 
University Press, [1548] 1942), with the title sometimes trans-
lated as Discourse on Voluntary Servitude. The trajectory of La 
Boétie’s ideas has been examined by Roland Bleiker, Popular 
Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
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adopt belief systems in which they are powerless com-
pared to their leaders. 
 The processes of projection and introjection are most 
obvious in the case of national leaders and power, but can 
be observed elsewhere. Take for example the Nobel 
prizes, bestowed annually on the person or group consid-
ered to have made superlative contributions to physics, 
chemistry, physiology/medicine, economics, literature and 
peace. When you stop to think about it, the committee 
does not change the reality of a person’s achievement. A 
high-performing scientist does not suddenly have greater 
achievement as a result of receiving a Nobel prize: their 
achievement is the same; only the recognition has 
changed. Yet many observers treat the awarding of a 
Nobel prize as a type of anointment to greatness. Suddenly 
the winner is highly sought after for interviews, talks, and 
articles, and their opinions on all sorts of issues—in many 
cases quite separate from their prize-winning research—
are treated with reverence. In psychological terms, great-
ness, in terms of brilliance and wisdom, is projected on 
prize-winners, some of whom introject—psychologically 
accept—this projection and start believing they are more 
exceptional than before. (Of course many might already 
have believed they are qualitatively different from others.) 
 Projection and introjection can be traced back to 
other authority relationships, most obviously between 
children and parents. It is apparent in the Stockholm 
syndrome, in which captives, for example people who 
have been kidnapped, start identifying with their captors 
and lose the capacity to resist or escape even when the 
opportunity arises. It relates to the idea of learned 
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helplessness: experiments show how mice, as a result of 
particular experiments, lose the capacity to try to escape 
electric shocks, even when the opportunity is at hand. 
Projection of power is also apparent in studies of obedi-
ence to authority, in which experimental subjects take 
actions, such as hurting another person, when instructed to 
by authority figures or simply encouraged to by the way 
the experimental situation is set up.7 
 Projection is easier when it is collective. If everyone 
else is applauding a political leader, it is easy to go along 
with the crowd. On the other hand, all it takes is a bit of 
dissent and it becomes easier to dissent. 
 
Tactics of projection 
Projection is a psychological state, orientation or process, 
and the focus here is on projection of people’s power onto 
leaders, especially national leaders. To talk of the tactics 
of projection is to refer to methods that encourage this 
type of projection. These tactics follow directly from the 
previous discussion of the role of education, the media, 
elections and introjection in encouraging projection of 
power onto leaders. 
 First is exposure of the power of leaders, which is 
routinely highlighted in the media, especially during 
elections. Leaders themselves contribute through their 
interactions with others, often touting what they have 
accomplished, while seldom mentioning that they could 
do nothing without the governmental apparatus at their 
                                                
7 Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1974). 
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disposal. National leaders have media teams to promote 
their visibility, in a selective way, highlighting positives. 
 Second is valuing the power of leaders. Again, this is 
routinely promoted in schools, the media and elections. Of 
course, leadership is contested, so leaders are treated as 
good or bad depending on whether a voter supports them 
and/or their party. Still, the principle of leadership is 
seldom questioned. In schools or the media, there are few 
voices saying, “Maybe our national leaders should have 
less power.” 
 Third is explaining that having powerful leaders is a 
good thing, or is just the way things are. The necessity of 
hierarchies is not often the subject of a careful analysis; it 
is more commonly assumed than argued. Arguments may 
be brought out in the face of criticisms. Otherwise they are 
usually relegated to academic journals. Least of all is the 
process of projection ever discussed. 
 Fourth is endorsement of leaders having power, and 
of citizens projecting their own power onto leaders. This 
occurs most obviously during elections, which can be 
understood as rituals in which voters endorse candidates, 
obviously enough, and more generally by participating 
endorse the system of electoral representation in which 
elected officials are granted power to make decisions on 
behalf of the rest of the population. Without the ritual, 
governmental power would not have the same legitimacy: 
elections serve a psychological purpose of encouraging 
projection of power onto leaders. 
 Fifth is rewards for projecting power onto leaders, 
and here it is possible to think of psychological rewards. 
Being part of a community with like-minded others is one 
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reward: if everyone else is treating leaders as holders of 
power, then there is a satisfaction in conforming to this 
way of thinking. More deeply, projection of power allows 
relinquishing one’s own agency and putting trust in a 
higher power. This can evoke the experience of childhood 
and trust in one’s parents, something that for many can 
provide a feeling of security and safety. If the parent 
(national leader) is always there, is a source of good, and 
has been endorsed by the population, there is no need to 
assert oneself, namely to take the initiative to promote a 
different sort of society, one without powerful leaders at 
the top. 
 
Tactics of counter-projection 
One alternative to projecting power onto leaders is simply 
not to project it—not to put so much attention and 
expectations on leaders—but rather acknowledge one’s 
own power to act, and assume the responsibility for doing 
what is possible in the circumstances. Another alternative 
is to project power to a collective, such as a trade union or 
activist group or social movement, while participating in 
it. These sorts of psychological alternatives, namely 
different ways of emotionally engaging with the world and 
the exercise of power in it, are systematically suppressed. 
 Cover-up is the first technique. Schools teach little 
about the agency of ordinary citizens compared to that of 
rulers; mass media give little attention to grassroots 
empowerment compared to the power of leaders; elections 
signal that the role of citizens is voting for rulers; and 
leaders, through their projection of their own dependency 
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onto followers, discourage recognition of the capacity for 
autonomous action. 
 Devaluation is a second technique. In as much as 
grassroots, independent action is acknowledged as exist-
ing, it is typically painted as a threat or as ineffectual. 
Mass protests are portrayed as dangerous threats to the 
social order. For workers to demand decision-making 
roles in the production process is treated as subversion. 
And so on. The implication is that identifying with these 
manifestations of collective action is misguided, indeed 
almost a sign of mental disorder. 
 Reinterpretation is a third technique: it involves 
explanations of why psychological alternatives are wrong. 
Reinterpretation in other contexts, for example to justify 
shooting of peaceful protesters, can involve lying about 
what happened, minimising the consequences, blaming 
others, and framing the actions as legitimate. For psycho-
logical processes, these techniques are internalised within 
a person’s thoughts and emotions. They can involve moral 
disengagement through processes such as displacement of 
responsibility, ignoring consequences, and dehumani-
sation.8  
 Official channels constitute a fourth technique for 
suppressing alternatives to projection of power onto 
                                                
8 Samantha Reis and Brian Martin, “Psychological dynamics of 
outrage against injustice,” Peace Research: The Canadian 
Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies, Vol. 40, No. 1, 2008, pp. 
5–23. See especially the work of Albert Bandura, Social 
Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1986), pp. 375–389. 
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leaders. Official channels include expert panels, ombuds-
men, regulatory agencies and any other formal process 
that promises to provide justice. Elections are one 
important official channel. In the case of projection of 
power, official channels are the recipients of expectations 
for obtaining justice, and top-level leaders are the ultimate 
official channel. In psychological terms, the very existence 
of official channels creates the expectation that someone 
out there will be the savour who slashes through evil 
doings and provides salvation. By the same token, the 
existence of official channels discourages recognition that 
action can be taken directly, without relying on people in 
formal positions of authority.  
 Intimidation is a fifth technique for suppressing alter-
natives. In the material world, this can involve threats, 
dismissal and physical attacks. In the psychological world, 
intimidation can occur by the threat of a different idea to a 
person’s way of understanding the world and their place in 
it. One such threat is posed by cognitive dissonance, when 
ideas about the world clash with actual occurrences. Many 
people believe the world is just.9 Poverty and exploitation 
pose a threat to this belief, and the solution can be the idea 
that people are to blame for their own misfortune, even 
when the evidence suggests otherwise. This is known as 
blaming the victim, and is a common phenomenon.10 The 
idea that people have significant agency separately from 
                                                
9 Melvin J. Lerner, The Belief in a Just World: A Fundamental 
Delusion (New York: Plenum, 1980). 
10 William Ryan, Blaming the Victim (New York: Vintage, 
1972). 
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leaders can be quite threatening, and promptly dismissed 
from consciousness. This is a sort of internal, psychologi-
cal intimidation. It can be thought of as the process of 
introjecting powerlessness, which in practice means being 
fearful of one’s own capacity to act. 
 
Challenging the psychology of rule 
The psychology of rule, including projection of power 
onto leaders and the introjection of powerlessness, can be 
deeply entrenched, sometimes deeper than actual rule. It 
might be said that, “You can take the ruler away from the 
people, but not the ruler out of their minds.” After the 
execution of the king during the French revolution, it was 
not long before there was a new ruler, Napoleon; it might 
be that his rise was easier because of the population’s long 
experience of being ruled. A similar dynamic occurred in 
Russia: after the overthrow of the oppressive rule by the 
Czar, the workers’ and soldiers’ soviets promised an 
egalitarian future but before long Stalin became dictator. 
 Many people assume that a person’s personality is 
fixed, but actually personality is adaptable. Many people 
suffer from anxiety or depression or sometimes both. 
These are aspects of personality, and psychologists have 
spent enormous efforts in finding ways to change them. 
One of the most used methods is cognitive-behavioural 
therapy, in which a person learns to counter unwelcome 
thoughts by thinking about reasons why they are irrational. 
By doing this on a regular basis, it gradually becomes 
habitual, and levels of anxiety and depression can be 
reduced.  
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 Some years ago I was a subject in a study of “person-
ality coaching.” Like other subjects, I first took the stand-
ard NEO Personality Inventory questionnaire, obtaining 
scores on the five main traits of personality, called 
neuroticism, extraversion, openness, agreeableness and 
conscientiousness. Each of these five areas has six sub-
traits. For example, under neuroticism—more politely 
called emotionality—there are anxiety, anger-hostility, 
depression, self-consciousness, impulsiveness and vulner-
ability. After receiving our personality profiles, we 
received weekly coaching for a couple of months, with 
exercises to change any aspect of personality we chose. 
Many subjects decided to try to reduce their scores on a 
sub-trait of neuroticism, which makes sense: who wants to 
be anxious or depressed? I chose a different area: a sub-
trait of openness called feelings, and over the period of the 
study my scores changed to reflect a greater receptivity to 
my own and others’ feelings. 
 The point here is that personality traits, as normally 
measured, may be fairly stable, but they are not fixed. 
They are, in part, a response to environmental influences. 
If the traits of individuals can be shifted through coaching, 
it makes sense to think that traits of many individuals can 
be shifted by changes in culture and the economy. Quite a 
few observers of US culture have noted that narcissism—
characterised by self-centredness, grandiosity, lack of 
empathy, and rage when prerogatives are threatened—has 
become far more common.11 For example, surveys of 
                                                
11 Jean M. Twenge and W. Keith Campbell, The Narcissism 
Epidemic: Living in the Age of Entitlement (New York: Free 
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college students show that in the matter of a few decades, 
far more see their goal in life as personal advancement, 
especially in making money, than serving worthy causes. 
Indeed, personal advancement is seen as a worthy cause! 
This increase in narcissism can be linked to the rise of 
neoliberalism and the associated promotion of materialism 
and individualism. 
 It also makes sense to think of personality as poten-
tially malleable because of the many efforts to get people 
of think and behave in different ways. Some advertising is 
about encouraging people to buy particular products, but 
much advertising is about getting people to think of 
themselves in different ways, and in particular to be 
dissatisfied with themselves, as being incomplete and 
needing a product or service to fix the deficiency. 
 The psychology of rule is no different. There may be 
some basic tendencies in the human psyche, but the 
processes of projection and introjection can be changed, in 
two ways. One way is for people to project power to a 
different recipient; the other is to reduce the tendency to 
project power at all. 
 With this context, it is worth going through different 
types of tactics both to challenge the psychology of rule 
and to promote a different sort of thinking that might be 
called “empowered thinking.” First is the tactic of 
exposure. To counter the constant attention to leaders in 
                                                                                                                                          
Press, 2009). See also Sandy Hotchkiss, Why Is It Always about 
You? The Seven Deadly Sins of Narcissism (New York: Free 
Press, 2003); Anne Manne, The Life of I: The New Culture of 
Narcissism (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2014). 
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education, the media and elections, it is not enough to 
highlight the bad aspects of individual leaders, because the 
deeper problem is the emphasis on leadership, at least with 
the assumption of hierarchy, with its formal differences in 
power. Hating leaders is not so very different from 
adoring them, because each involves projection of power. 
Perhaps being indifferent is a more suitable attitude to 
cultivate. To do this, avoiding attention to political leaders 
can be helpful, instead focusing attention on the power of 
so-called ordinary people. 
 The difficulty of doing this can be seen by trying to 
find textbooks that present history and politics from the 
point of view of the people rather than rulers. There are a 
few choices, such as E. P. Thompson’s The Making of the 
English Working Class and Howard Zinn’s A People’s 
History of the United States. Even after cultivating a 
people’s-history mentality, there is the challenge of every-
day conversations. Within organisations, much gossip is 
about bosses, not about the capacities of co-workers, and 
then there is commentary on the latest news about local 
and national politics, nearly always driven by discussion 
about leaders. If you’re regularly able to turn conversa-
tions away from politicians to how to work together 
independently of leaders, you have a rare skill indeed. 
 The next tactic is devaluing and valuing: devaluing 
the belief in the power of rulers and valuing the belief in 
the power of ordinary people. The devaluing of the power 
of rulers is a bit tricky. As noted earlier, it’s not enough to 
be hostile to the current rulers, as that continues to assume 
that they are important, being worthy of investment of 
emotional energy. Turning love of a national leader into 
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hatred of the national leader may make it easier to 
encourage challenges to this particular leader, but it is not 
clear whether this is a great improvement in challenging 
the emotional investment in leadership. Perhaps a more 
suitable goal is reducing or even removing the emotional 
energy invested in any leader, either positive or negative, 
and either current or future. The importance of this can be 
seen by noticing how many people who detest a current 
leader pin great hopes on some future one. If salvation is 
seen as coming from a change in leadership, the projection 
of power onto leaders has not been devalued. 
 Perhaps a better attitude is indifference, ignoring the 
constant media coverage and discussions about national 
politics (or paying little attention to speculations about 
what the boss will do, or who will be the next boss), or 
perhaps treating all this attention with an attitude of 
detached amusement, rather the way you might respond to 
attention to a celebrity about whom you have little 
knowledge and no interest. How to foster such an indiffer-
ence or detachment is a big topic. At an individual level, it 
might mean reducing media consumption. At an interper-
sonal level, when talking with friends for example, it 
might involve switching the topic or developing some 
humorous gibes about the constant attention to leaders. 
With some friends, it might be possible to say, “It’s 
fascinating how the prime minister has been able to entice 
you into paying attention to herself/himself.” With others, 
“It’s really boring to talk about the prime minister.” Or, 
“Aren’t there some other people we could talk about?” 
 Depending on your occupation and position, you 
might have a more direct way to influence the valuing of 
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others. As a journalist or blogger, you can make choices 
about focusing on leaders and their agency, for example 
focusing on government policy, or on citizens and their 
agency, for example local initiatives for change. As a 
manager, you can make choices about how to interact with 
subordinates, either as a director or a facilitator; to foster 
agency by your subordinates, you can try to avoid intro-
jecting power and deflect others’ interest in your thinking 
and instead encourage independent thinking, for example 
by nominating a person to be a devil’s advocate. In some 
techniques, there’s a fair bit going on besides valuing. The 
point is that by changing one’s behaviour and fostering 
behaviour change in others, it’s possible to influence their 
ways of feeling about power and agency. 
 The next tactic is interpretation, which means 
explaining what’s going on. In this case, interpretation is 
about the ways of explaining the distribution of power. 
Interpretation tactics that serve rulers involve explaining 
unequal power as natural, inevitable, functional, necessary 
or unquestionable. To challenge such interpretation tac-
tics, alternative views can be presented that leaders are 
power-hungry, self-serving, corrupt and a danger to 
society and that it is much better to develop the capacity of 
ordinary people to cooperate and make decisions for 
themselves. In short, rulers are not needed.  
 There is plenty of writing and examples available that 
can be used to counter the standard interpretation tech-
niques, and which can be introduced in conversations, 
meetings, blogs and campaigns. How much this can shape 
feelings about rule, in particular the projection of power 
onto leaders, is an intriguing question. If people were 
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entirely rational, then arguments and evidence would be 
sufficient to change thinking and behaviour, but people are 
commonly driven by their intuitive minds.12 Projection of 
power is hardly ever the result of a calm, careful analysis 
of desirable ways of emotionally relating to rulers and 
subjects. Likewise, overcoming projection of power is 
seldom going to be achieved by arguments alone. Nearly 
always, experience—for example, involvement in grass-
roots campaigns—is more likely to influence gut reac-
tions. After gut reactions shift, then a person may seek out 
evidence and arguments to support their new intuitive 
feelings. So evidence and arguments are valuable, but 
more to support those who already have corresponding 
feelings than to create those feelings. 
 The fourth set of tactics is discrediting tactics used by 
rulers and endorsing alternatives. Translated into the psy-
chology of rule, this means discrediting projection of 
power onto rulers and instead endorsing accepting one’s 
own power and capacity to act. 
 It’s worth reiterating that discrediting rulers’ tactics 
does not necessarily mean discrediting particular rulers. 
After all, lots of people hate the president, or the boss for 
that matter. To hate a person is still to invest emotional 
energy in them, and usually to project some power onto 
them. Lichtenberg observes that agents of rulers, such as 
police, soldiers and informers, often are psychologically 
fused with rulers. When those who are weaker develop a 
passionate hatred of these agents, such as activists who 
detest the police, this can reflect a projection of their own 
                                                
12 See chapter 2. 
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tendencies to identify with rulers. In other words, scorn-
ing, blaming or hating the agents is a means of warding 
off a desire to submit to power. Lichtenberg recommends 
that challengers learn about their own psychological 
tendencies by interacting with agents of power.13 
 Rather than condemning agents of power, what 
should be involved here is discrediting rulership, namely 
the structures and processes of domination, including the 
benign exercise of power and control. It might be easy to 
reject domination at an intellectual level. What’s needed is 
changing one’s intuitive response, to react at a gut level 
against rulership, and favourably towards non-hierarchical 
alternatives. 
 There is research showing that people’s reactions to 
sexually or racially coded information—for example 
pictures of people—are deeply embedded in their minds. 
You might think you aren’t prejudiced, but sophisticated 
experiments show that most people react differently in 
their brains to images of men and women, or black and 
white people.14  
 One way to change automatic responses is to practise 
by using conscious attention and behaviour to shape 
intuition. An example is for a shy person to pretend to be 
outgoing, for instance to approach strangers and start a 
conversation. At first it feels uncomfortable, because the 
intuitive mind yells out in pain. After a few months of 
                                                
13 Lichtenberg, Community and Confluence, 91–95. 
14 Mahzarin R. Banaji and Anthony G. Greenwald, Blindspot: 
Hidden Biases of Good People (New York: Delacorte Press, 
2013). 
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practising being outgoing, the intuitive mind learns from 
the actual behaviour that it’s okay, and stops rebelling. 
 How to apply the same approach to challenging the 
automatic projection of power remains to be systemati-
cally tested. It’s plausible to think it can occur by regularly 
associating revolting things, like a detested food, with 
systems of domination. Likewise, a parallel process of 
valuing alternatives to rulership could be developed. 
 The fifth and final set of tactics involves rewards, 
either refusing the rewards provided by leaders and 
fostering and accepting the rewards of equal relationships. 
In the case of the psychology of rule, the rewards are 
psychological rather than being money, power or position, 
but psychological rewards can be just as potent as any 
others. 
 The reward from projecting power onto rulers is 
being freed of any expectation of agency or responsibility. 
It is like becoming a child who trusts parents to protect 
them. It is a feeling of security. Projecting power can pro-
vide a psychological reward even when the parent/leader 
is oppressive, because this still means acquiescing and not 
being burdened with the expectation of escaping or 
challenging the ruler and acting autonomously. 
 The tactic of rulers is to encourage projection of 
power, and to introject power, so the counter-tactic is to 
refuse to project power. This means accepting one’s own 
power, not relying on rulers or leaders or bosses to be the 
solution to problems, but instead thinking, planning and 
acting in whatever way is possible. It means taking direct 
action rather than appealing to leaders to take action. It 
means planting a community garden rather than asking for 
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official permission to set up a garden. It means using 
encryption and other techniques for secure communication 
rather than relying on government agencies to protect 
privacy. It means cutting your own greenhouse gas 
emissions or joining the “transition town” movement for 
energy security rather than appealing to national leaders to 
establish policies to deal with climate change. It means 
helping communities prepare to defend against aggression 
rather than relying on military defence.15 
 These examples also point to the parallel process of 
providing rewards for alternatives. The psychological 
rewards from direct action include the satisfaction of 
exerting one’s own agency, of making practical steps 
towards alternatives, and of working with others in a 
common cause. Setting goals and working with others 
towards achieving them is known to improve wellbeing.16 
Psychologically, reducing projection of power and taking 
on more responsibility for one’s future can be satisfying 
indeed. This satisfaction can be the basis for continued 
efforts to overcome projection of power and build a 
society without domination. 
 
Conclusion 
To challenge systems of domination, action is crucial, and 
there is plenty of effort put into methods such as protests, 
strikes, boycotts, setting up alternative systems of govern-
                                                
15 Brian Martin, Social Defence, Social Change (London: 
Freedom Press, 1993). 
16 Sonja Lyubomirsky, The How of Happiness (New York: 
Penguin, 2007). 
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ance—and armed struggle, too. Taking action is essential, 
but it does not always lead to changes in the way people 
think and feel. If people feel more secure when projecting 
power onto leaders, then overthrowing a repressive 
government may simply be the prelude to another 
autocratic ruler. 
 One way to foster a psychology of autonomy, self-
efficacy and cooperative endeavour is to begin behaving 
towards others in ways that reflect these ideals. This can 
be done in campaigning groups and in day-to-day interac-
tions. By behaving in egalitarian ways, gradually the 
psychology of rule is transformed into a psychology of 
egalitarianism, along the lines of the sayings “Be the 
change you want to see” and “Live the revolution.” These 
slogans contain important truths: change starts now rather 
than after the revolution, and personal change is part and 
parcel of social change. By following the sentiment in 
these slogans, there is another process, or rather set of 
processes: changes in behaviour lead to changes in 
thought and emotion, and vice versa. 
 While changing the psychology of rule via new 
modes of action is vital, there is also a place for a direct 
focus on psychology, in particular on the mutual processes 
of projection and introjection of power. In this chapter, the 
focus has been on tactics by which projection is fostered 
and challenged. Usually, when thinking about tactics, they 
are out in the world of action, in business, military or 
activist campaigns. But struggles over the way people 
think and feel can also be thought of in terms of tactics, 
and the same sorts of tactics are relevant as in other 
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domains: exposure, valuing, interpreting, endorsing and 
rewarding, and their opposites. 
 One of the advantages of focusing on psychological 
tactics is that it is possible to begin immediately. There is 
no need to join an action group (though that might be 
helpful) and formulate a campaign strategy. Anyone can 
start observing their own environment—including media 
consumption, everyday conversations, topics that trigger 
emotions, and sensations of discomfort and relief—and 
experimenting with different ways of talking and thinking. 
It may not seem like doing a lot, but it can be part of a 
wider process. It is important, too. Otherwise, why would 
there be such incessant efforts to encourage people to 
project power onto leaders?  
 Finally, there is much to learn about the psychology 
of rule and of egalitarianism. These are not important 
research topics in psychology, nor do activist groups 
systematically develop ways of changing the ways people 
think. Indeed, many activists see salvation in different 
rulers, or in their own activist leaders, rather than in 
alternatives to rulership itself. Of course, there is plenty to 
debate in this area, and not everyone aspires to end 
expectations about dependence on leaders. What is 
important is to openly address the issues of leadership, 








Just after World War I, US essayist Randolph Bourne 
wrote, “War is the health of the state.” This statement 
captures key insights about patriotism: war is a means of 
both strengthening state power and stimulating loyalty to 
the state. 
 An ultimate test of loyalty is willingness to die for 
one’s group. The key question is, “what group are you 
willing to die for?” Some parents are willing to die for 
their children. But why should young men be eager to risk 
their lives for an abstract entity called a country? That is a 
mystery. An even stronger test of loyalty is willingness to 
kill for one’s group. Why should anyone offer to kill a 
stranger on behalf of an abstraction? 
 At a general level, war functions to accentuate group 
identification. There is a threat to the group, so members 
rally in defence. The threat is from the “enemy”: to 
safeguard the group, the enemy must be defeated, even 
destroyed. This impulse is deeply rooted in human 
evolution. But this still doesn’t explain why such strong 
loyalty can be attached to the country and government 
rather than to some other entity, such as the family. After 
all, in modern warfare, defeat does not necessarily mean 
destruction for families or individuals—just a new set of 
rulers, perhaps more benevolent ones. Why would a 
mother or father expect a son to risk his life for a country? 
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Part of the answer is that governments use a number of 
techniques to foster identification and loyalty. 
 In Europe in the late 1800s, the socialist movement 
gained great strength. It was epitomised by the slogan 
“Working people of the world, unite!”—though in practice 
the actual slogan referred to working men, with women 
left out of the picture. The idea was that the working class 
would stand together against the ruling class. As political 
crises hit Europe in the early 1900s, with the possibility of 
war, socialist leaders called on workers to refuse to fight 
each other. But then came the so-called Great War 
beginning in 1914—today called World War I but perhaps 
more accurately called a European war—and most 
workers rallied not against the ruling class but in support 
of their governments, to fight and kill each other, 
sacrificing their lives for their states. This was the context 
in which Randolph Bourne said that war is the health of 
the state. World War I stimulated patriotism, strengthened 
European states against their own populations, and 
undermined hopes of a peaceful transition to socialism. 
 In his famous novel 1984, George Orwell envisaged a 
world divided into three competing superstates, Oceania, 
Eurasia and Eastasia, constantly at war with each other. 
War provided the pretext for dictatorship, including perva-
sive surveillance of citizens, including the novel’s 
protagonist, Winston Smith. The novel was completed in 
1948, and it can be argued that Orwell was portraying not 
a future dystopia but rather elements of contemporary 
reality, in the Soviet Union and other repressive com-
munist states of the time as well as aspects of so-called 
western democracies, just emerging from years of total 
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warfare in which citizens were subordinated to the 
common struggle against the enemy, and about to plunge 
into a struggle called the cold war in which there was the 




Efforts to promote patriotism are especially prominent in 
relation to wars. To illustrate some of the methods used, I 
will use a range of examples, especially from World Wars 
I and II, which involved unprecedented mobilisation of 
societies for war. 
 
Exposure 
A crucial technique is exposure: war receives high visibil-
ity. Governments naturally want to highlight their efforts 
against the enemy. The mass media, with their preoccupa-
tion with conflict and emphasis on proximity and local 
relevance, give saturation coverage of war-related stories. 
During wartime, governments and mass media operate 
together to highlight relevant issues, for example that 
sacrifices are needed, that resources for war-fighting are 




Exposure usually operates in conjunction with valuing: the 
war effort is seen as worthy. Supporting the government is 
patriotic. Troops are glorified. This can occur in the 
media, but is even more potent within families and local 
communities. In Australia during World War I, men who 
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volunteered for the army were seen by many as brave, 
loyal and indeed everything a man should be. For many 
women, a man in a uniform was far more desirable than 
one not in the military. Supporting the troops became a 
test of loyalty. 
 The glorification of troops continues after wars are 
over. After World War I, monuments were constructed 
throughout Australia in memory of the soldiers who died 
in the war. In Canberra, the national capital, the War 
Memorial is an impressive building with the name of 
every Australian soldier who died in any war engraved on 
a wall. In small towns and local suburbs throughout the 
country, there are smaller memorials to soldiers. 
 This glorification of Australian soldiers occurred 
despite the fact that Australia was not even under attack in 
World War I: soldiers were sent to Europe to fight on 
behalf of Britain, the home country. Australia had been a 
British colony, only becoming an independent country in 
1901. So Australian nationalism was subordinated to 
British agendas.  
 The glorification of Australian soldiers occurred 
despite World War I being a massive sacrifice of lives for 
little purpose. Anzac Day, 25 April, is an Australian 
public holiday in honour of military personnel who served 
in wars. Anzac stands for the Australian and New Zealand 
Army Corps. The year 2015 was the one hundredth 
anniversary of the landing of Australian and New Zealand 
soldiers at Gallipoli, in Turkey, where they futilely tried to 
advance against Turkish troops. A bloodbath resulted, 
with high casualties on both sides. 
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 Even supporters of the war might say that this 
episode in Australian history was an absurd waste of lives 
and that British commanders were incompetent. Further-
more, some Australian soldiers at the time said they re-
spected their Turkish counterparts. Yet the overwhelming 
sentiment remains that these Australian soldiers were 
brave, advancing in the face of almost certain death. 
Sacrificing their lives for their country was noble. All 
those who “served their country” in uniform are honoured 
today, but especially those who lost their lives in battle. 
Death is thought to have brought them a type of greatness. 
 Critics of war might harbour different thoughts, for 
example that these soldiers were naive and foolish pawns 
in an insane, purposeless conflict, that they would have 
been braver to have not joined the army, or that as 
members of the working class they should have been 
fighting against their upper-class commanders rather than 
other working men. But such thoughts usually remain 
private. Articulating them in public is to transgress against 




A third technique to promote patriotism in relation to war 
is explanation, namely providing plausible reasons why 
military defence is necessary. In many cases, formal 
explanations are not needed, because of underlying 
assumptions: there is an enemy, actually or potentially 
dangerous, and the threat must be countered by lethal 
force. Note that there are several assumptions involved in 
this seemingly simple proposition: (1) there is an oppo-
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nent; (2) the opponent is dangerous: an enemy; (3) the 
way to counter this dangerous enemy is through military 
means.  
 The first assumption—there is an enemy—appeals to 
the idea that we are a group and they are not part of the 
group, and hence they are an enemy. The essence of 
fostering patriotism is the ensure that the in-group is 
thought of as the country or state or nation, and not some 
other grouping such as an extended family, business, 
sporting club, social class or network of like-minded 
individuals.  
 The second assumption, that the opponent is danger-
ous, grows out of a common expectation that out-groups 
are a threat to the in-group. An alternative is that the out-
group is actually more desirable. Maybe the so-called 
enemy is actually a friend bringing salvation. This, to a 
patriot, is treason, discussed later. For the purposes here, 
the assumption of an enemy is part of the rationale for the 
military. 
 The third assumption—that military defence is 
necessary to counter the dangerous enemy—builds on the 
common belief that the only way to oppose violence is 
through superior violence. Defenders of military defence 
hardly need to argue that the only way to stop an invasion 
is through military means. 
 The rationale for military forces can sometimes 
require dubious logic. A classic example is the theory of 
nuclear deterrence touted during the cold war. From the 
side of the US government and its allies, the Soviet bloc 
was the enemy; it was dangerous because of its armed 
forces, especially its nuclear weapons; and the only way to 
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counter this threat was through superior force, including a 
superior nuclear arsenal. The Soviet government was told 
that if they attacked, they would be met by an over-
whelming counter-attack, destroying them. This threat was 
supposed to deter them from attacking. The Soviets were 
assumed to think in exactly the same way, so the result 
was deterrence via mutually assured destruction or MAD. 
 This rationale contained several flaws. Because of 
secrecy about the capability of nuclear arsenals, it was 
easy to exaggerate the threat. In the 1960 election 
campaign in the US, John Kennedy campaigned on a 
claim that there was a “missile gap,” namely that the 
Soviet nuclear arsenal contained more missiles, even after 
being informed by military figures that no such gap 
existed.1 In fact, the US nuclear arsenal was far superior, 
so it was the Soviet missile forces that suffered from 
inferiority. Threat exaggeration has been a recurrent 
feature of US strategic nuclear policy-making. 
 Another flaw in the doctrine of nuclear deterrence is 
its selective application, which operates with thinking like 
this: “It’s good for us to be strong to deter the enemy, but 
some enemies are so dangerous they should not be 
allowed to deter us.” In the 1970s, most of the world’s 
governments signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
The governments of existing nuclear weapons states—US, 
Soviet Union, Britain, France, China—pledged to reduce 
their arsenals, while other governments pledged not to 
                                                
1 Gary A. Donaldson, The First Modern Campaign: Kennedy, 
Nixon, and the Election of 1960 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2007), p. 128. 
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acquire nuclear weapons. The idea of the treaty was to 
stop “proliferation” of nuclear weapons capabilities, 
namely to stop additional governments getting their own 
arsenals. But what does this say about the doctrine of 
deterrence? If governments are deterred from attacking by 
nuclear weapons in the hands of enemies, then surely 
more governments should have their own arsenals, and 
eventually military aggression, or at least nuclear aggres-
sion, would cease.  
 The double standard in reactions to nuclear weapons 
arsenals is sometimes acute. The US government has 
repeatedly raised the alarm about weapons programmes in 
other countries, notably North Korea, Iraq and Iran, all the 
time sitting on its own arsenal of thousands of nuclear 
weapons with sophisticated delivery mechanisms. The US 
government claims it needs the weapons to deter attackers, 
but desperately wants to stop other governments acquiring 
their own deterrents. The 2003 invasion of Iraq was 
launched on the pretext of stopping the threat of Iraqi 
nuclear weapons, a threat that turned out to be non-
existent. 
 Then there is the case of Israeli nuclear weapons, an 
arsenal thought to number dozens or hundreds, about 
which US policy makers never raise any concern. The 
implication is that deterrence doctrine involves an implicit 
double standard: nuclear weapons are a deterrent, or just 
not even mentioned, when they are in the hands of the 
good guys, but are a grave threat to world peace when in 
the hands of bad guys. 
 The case of nuclear weapons and deterrence theory is 
just one example of the rationale behind military races. 
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The enemy’s military threat is misperceived, almost 
always by being exaggerated, thereby justifying a military 
build-up that is seen as entirely defensive and used to 
maintain peace. In blunt terms, our military is for peace, 
theirs is for war. Deterrence theory and related logical-
sounding rationalisations serve to hide or sugar-coat this 
basic assumption. 
 Another common explanation of the need for military 
force is to defend against attack. However, in many cases 
there is no credible threat, yet threats are still invoked. 
One of the arguments is that a threat may arise suddenly, 
so military preparedness is required just in case. Think of 
New Zealand, thousands of kilometres away from other 
major population centres and of no strategic significance. 
Yet the government of New Zealand maintains military 
forces, allied to the US government.2 The argument about 
the need for defence is plausible when there actually is a 
threat, but when there is no threat but no major reduction 




Another key method of promoting group loyalty to the 
state and its military forces is endorsement. In most 
countries, nearly all prominent individuals—politicians, 
                                                
2 The New Zealand government is not as tied to the US military 
as the governments of Australia, Britain or Canada. For example, 
in the 1980s the New Zealand government refused to allow visits 
of US nuclear ships, much to the annoyance of US political 
leaders. 
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religious leaders, business executives, heads of govern-
ment departments, and others—endorse the troops. There 
may be disagreements about particular wars, weapons 
systems or levels of military expenditure, but very few 
people of significance question the basics about military 
forces. To the contrary, many of them state their commit-
ment: supporting the military is a test of loyalty, to the 
extent that anyone who is seen as too weak in their 
enthusiasm may be accused of being unpatriotic. 
 
Rewards 
Rewards are another method of promoting patriotism in 
relation to war. In Palestine, Hamas provides financial 
support to families of suicide bombers. To some, this is 
outrageous, but most other governments give extra 
benefits to at least some of those involved in war-making. 
Veterans may have special hospitals and medical services, 
and may receive special pensions. In the US after World 
War II, the GI Bill gave veterans special access to higher 
education. Many veterans and their families say not 
enough is done for those who risk their lives on behalf of 
their countries. However, many others commit their lives 
to helping others—nurses, teachers and fire-fighters, for 
example—but do not receive special benefits.  
 Far more than material benefits are the psychological 
rewards, with soldiers being treated as heroes. Some who 
display special valour receive citations. 
 Then there are the rewards for those at the top of the 
hierarchy: commanders, generals and top politicians. 
Wartime leaders who perform well are commonly seen as 
exceptional individuals and greatly admired. A classic 
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example is Winston Churchill, Britain’s prime minister 
during World War II. Outside of this war, his record was 
far less noteworthy. The cult of the leader is found in 
many dictatorships; war, requiring mobilisation of a 
society to defend against the enemy, exalts leaders even in 
systems of representative government. This is because 
uniting in a cause encourages individuals to put their trust 
in the leader, and project their own sense of agency to the 
leader.3 
 National leaders thus have much to gain from foster-
ing conflict. An enemy is, in a sense, a leader’s ally in 
building support for the state. 
 In summary, there are five main ways to promote 
patriotism and state-centred thinking in relation to war: 
exposure, valuing, explanations, endorsements and 
rewards. When these work effectively, they become part 
of the culture, adopted by individuals as part of their 
thinking and overriding other loyalties. This is most 
dramatically demonstrated when individuals are willing 
both to kill and to sacrifice their lives for their country and 




Not everyone goes along with the glorification of war and 
the patriotic duty to support the state against its alleged 
enemies. Indeed, in many places opposition to war has 
been vociferous and sustained. There is nothing natural in 
war-related patriotism: support for the country, and for its 
                                                
3 See chapter 12. 
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military forces, is only one way in which loyalty can be 
assigned. The existence of alternative loyalties is why 
continued efforts are exerted to promote patriotism and to 
hide or discredit alternatives. 
 The next step in analysing tactics of patriotism in 
relation to war is to examine direct challenges, taken 
separately from promoting alternatives to war, which I 
address later. Each of the five main methods of promoting 
patriotism can be countered. This is a huge topic. For 
example, peace movements have used a wide variety of 
methods, including advertisements, petitions, rallies, 
marches, refusal to join the military, and blockades. Many 
of these actions are in relation to particular wars or 
weapons systems, for example nuclear weapons.  
 Only some of these challenges to war present them-
selves as direct challenges to patriotism. Indeed, some 
peace activists are careful to portray themselves as true 
patriots, serving their country’s interests by opposing 
disastrous policies that lead to death, destruction and loss 
of civil liberties. Furthermore, peace activists are often 
quite respectful of the troops, emphasising that their 
opposition is to policies and practices, not individuals. In 
this section, I present a few examples of challenges that 
more directly target the promotion of patriotism in relation 
to war. Many of these confrontations involve presenting 
alternatives to war, for example diplomacy or nonviolent 
action; I will address these later. 
 
Challenging pro-military messages 
First consider the high visibility of war stories, war 
reporting and war memorials. Many challenges to the 
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exposure of war occur out of sight. For example, a local 
government might be planning to build a memorial to war 
dead, and some staff members argue that the funds could 
better be spent elsewhere, or that a memorial be built in 
honour of peace campaigners. Librarians might choose to 
order books on peace rather than war. Panels in charge of 
the syllabus for a school district might prefer a text that 
gives less prominence to war. There are many such quiet 
battles over the visibility of war.  
 Most reporting on conflicts gives a one-sided 
perspective, with emphasis on violent acts and on simplis-
tic storylines involving good guys and bad guys. Watching 
the news, it is very hard for viewers to appreciate the 
sources of conflict, to understand the complexities in-
volved, or realise that nonviolent methods are being used. 
For example, news about the Israel-Palestine conflict 
seldom gives any indication that nonviolent methods—
such as protests, strikes, boycotts and occupations—are 
regularly used.  
 Critics of this usual approach to reporting conflicts 
have called it “war journalism” and have proposed an 
alternative, “peace journalism.”4 It involves offering a 
broader, more in-depth treatment of conflicts, including 
driving forces, historical context, different participants, 
options for resolution, long-term impacts and so forth. To 
the extent that journalists—both professionals and citi-
zens—take up the principles of peace journalism, report-
ing of conflicts is transformed: a different sort of picture is 
                                                
4 Jake Lynch and Annabel McGoldrick, Peace Journalism 
(Stroud, UK: Hawthorn Press, 2005). 
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presented, with less emphasis on the latest violent clash 
and more information about causes, motivations, multiple 
players, precedents, initiatives, options and solutions. 
Peace journalists, rather than racing to the scene of some 
new atrocity, will be investigating ongoing conflicts—
often ones invisible in war journalism—probing the back 
stories and exposing dimensions normally ignored.5 
 
Devaluing war and the state 
Given that glorification of troops and their noble cause is 
standard in the usual war-linked patriotism, one option for 
challenging war and the state is to do the opposite: treat 
them as misguided, worthless, counterproductive, repre-
hensible or criminal. This is risky territory for opponents 
of war, because defenders of the faith are very sensitive to 
any criticism—especially criticism of soldiers.  
 On Anzac day, 25 April, in all parts of Australia there 
is a dawn service to remember soldiers who lost their lives 
in war, and a march in which veterans participate, some 
wearing their uniforms. The annual Anzac Day march is 
not a promising time to challenge any part of the Anzac 
legend. In 1980 in Canberra, the national capital of 
Australia, a group of women attempted to join the Anzac 
Day march in memory of women raped in war.6 They 
carried placards including “Rape is war against women,” 
“Soldiers are phallic murderers” and “Women are always 
                                                
5 Virgil Hawkins, Stealth Conflicts: How the World’s Worst 
Violence Is Ignored (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2008). 
6 This information is drawn from articles and letters in the 
Canberra Times. Copies available on request. 
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the victims.” They planned to lay a wreath with a sign 
saying, “In memory of women raped in war.” This protest 
action was a direct challenge to the mythology of the 
noble Anzacs: it suggested that some of them might have 
been rapists. It is well documented that rape by soldiers is 
a frequent occurrence: women in conquered territories are 
prime targets. Sometimes rape is a conscious tool for 
subjugating populations; more often it is an act in which 
men take advantage of their power and the absence of any 
policing of their crimes.  
 Police arrested 14 women, alleging there was an 
imminent breach of the peace. (It is ironic when protesters 
against war are charged with breaching the “peace.”) In 
September, a special magistrate convicted the women. 
Most received fines; three were jailed for a month. 
According to a newspaper story, the magistrate said they 
were “social mutineers” who were involved in “wilful and 
collective defiance of authority, of a sort which in a 
military sense would be called mutiny.” The three who 
were jailed were said to have a “tendency to become 
social anarchists.”  
 The attitude of the police and the magistrate—shared 
by many of the veterans marching on Anzac Day—reflects 
an extreme antipathy towards any action that devalues 
soldiers, in this case by pointing to actions by soldiers that 
are usually ignored in remembrances of a glorious past. It 
is unthinkable that the troops were anything less than 
noble.7  
                                                
7 The magistrate’s comments stimulated a storm of protest. 
Dozens of women prepared for civil disobedience at the following 
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 In many parts of the world, it remains risky to show 
disrespect towards veterans. Lindsay Stone discovered this 
the hard way. She liked to take photos of herself making 
provocative irreverent gestures, as a way of having fun. 
One photo she posted on social media was of herself 
making a rude gesture in front of a military cemetery. This 
was taken up by critics, and Stone was inundated with 
hundreds of thousands of abusive comments. As a result, 
she lost her job.8 This illustrates that many people con-
tinue to be very upset by anyone showing disrespect for 
soldiers. It also suggests that challenging the glorification 
of troops is risky.  
 It is far safer to criticise political leaders who take 
countries to war. The troops, after all, are just doing their 
jobs. 
 With the abolition of conscription in many countries 
and the rise of professional armies that use economic 
incentives for recruitment, is it safer to challenge the 
reverence associated with being a soldier? Professionals 
are volunteers, to be sure, but no longer in a sacrificial 
mission as in World War I. There are many others who 
volunteer for dangerous occupations, such as fire fighting 
and coal mining. Furthermore, the risk to many members 
of military forces in western armies is minimal. Those 
who sit in bunkers in Nevada and pilot drones on the other 
                                                                                                                                          
year’s Anzac Day march. Meanwhile, the government passed a 
new law against such protests. In the end, hundreds of women 
were allowed to join the march. 
8 Jon Ronson, So You’ve Been Publicly Shamed (London: 
Picador, 2015). 
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side of the world are not risking their lives, though their 
jobs require skill and dedication. 
 Then there are mercenaries, a category of soldier 
different from volunteers or conscripts: mercenaries are 
soldiers for hire. In the US, mercenaries are called con-
tractors, a euphemism. Rather than being front-line 
soldiers, contractors more commonly fill support roles 
such as driving vehicles, and undertake unsavoury opera-
tions such as interrogations, renditions and assassinations. 
Few members of the public realise that in the Iraq war 
beginning in 2003, there eventually were more US con-
tractors than US troops. Though most contractors are 
highly professional and motivated by wanting to help 
others, nevertheless to be seen as a “gun for hire” is not 
nearly as glorious as being a regular soldier. So it is not 
surprising that the US government plays down the role of 
contractors and emphasises the contribution of its regular 
armed forces. 
 In many wars, some politicians and soldiers are guilty 
of war crimes. This might be waging an unjust war, killing 
civilians, torturing enemy troops and committing or 
tolerating atrocities. Exposing these crimes is a powerful 
way to discredit those involved.  
 After World War II, leading Nazis were charged with 
war crimes and brought to trial in Nuremberg, Germany. 
This was a more civilised way of addressing war crimes 
than the more common approach of summary execution. 
Nevertheless, what is striking about responses to war 
crimes is that nearly always it is the enemy that is tar-
geted. Making a case that the victor, or the more powerful 
side, was guilty of war crimes is a potent way to discredit 
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war-makers, but it is difficult to get many people to pay 
attention. During World War II, the Allies carried out 
extensive bombing of civilian targets in Germany and 
Japan, yet few called this a war crime.9 
 
Challenging justifications for war 
Part of the connection between war and patriotism lies in 
the official justifications for going to war and continuing 
in war. Challenging the official rationales thus plays a role 
in challenging the patriotism-war link. Doing this is an 
important task, and one often done extremely well. There 
are numerous speeches, articles and books that question 
particular wars, or war in general, with careful arguments 
and ethical considerations. 
 Prior to the US-government-led invasion of Iraq in 
2003, there was a massive protest movement. As part of 
this movement, various writers challenged the official 
rationales for the war. After the invasion, the intellectual 
questioning of the enterprise continued.10 However, this 
level of questioning is unusual. US military involvement 
                                                
9 Eric Markusen and David Kopf, The Holocaust and Strategic 
Bombing: Genocide and Total War in the Twentieth Century 
(Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995). 
10 See for example Michael Isikoff and David Corn, Hubris: The 
Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, and the Selling of the Iraq War 
(New York: Broadway Books, 2007); Sheldon Rampton and John 
Stauber, Weapons of Mass Deception: The Uses of Propaganda 
in Bush’s War on Iraq (New York: Tarcher/Penguin, 2003); 
Norman Solomon, War Made Easy: How Presidents and Pundits 
Keep Spinning Us to Death (New York: Wiley, 2005). 
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in Vietnam began in the 1940s with support for French 
colonialists, and continued through the 1950s and 1960s. 
The US movement against the war gradually developed in 
the 1960s, along with the escalation of the war itself. 
Noam Chomsky’s trenchant criticisms of US policy, for 
example in American Power and the New Mandarins, 
played a significant role in stimulating opposition. 
 Going back to earlier wars, well-articulated opposi-
tion sometimes took quite some time to develop. More 
important, in many countries, was the fact that govern-
ments suppressed criticism. In Nazi Germany, there might 
have been critiques of Hitler’s war plans, but they did not 
have a high public profile. 
 Challenging justifications for war can also be done 
retrospectively, in histories. Very few histories of the US 
offer comprehensive critiques of the war of 1812 or the 
Mexican war, for example.11 Challenging pro-war and 
one-sided histories is important in countering the usual 
justifications for war. 
 
Challenging endorsements 
When national leaders and other high-profile figures say 
they support greater military expenditures and greater 
preparedness for war, this gives greater legitimacy to the 
military and the state. Many people do not examine the 
                                                
11 The classic source is Howard Zinn, A People’s History of the 
United States (New York: Harper & Row, 1980). See also Mark 
Cronlund Anderson, Holy War: Cowboys, Indians, and 9/11s 
(Regina, Saskatchewan: University of Regina Press, 2016). 
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arguments themselves, but rather base their views on those 
in authority or who they respect. 
 There are several ways to counter endorsements. One 
option is counter-endorsements: find some prominent 
individuals who will make statements challenging the 
military. If they are military figures, it’s even more 
effective.12 Just a few counter-endorsements can be effec-
tive, especially when they change a monopoly of elite 
opinion in a contested domain. This can make some 
people unsure of what they should think. 
 Another approach is to expose something wrong with 
those making the endorsements. Perhaps they have made 
rash or inaccurate claims in the past. Perhaps they have 
been guilty of electoral fraud. Maybe they have received 
donations (bribes) from vested interests. They may say 
one thing and do another. Exposing mistakes, corruption 
and hypocrisy can be effective but carries the usual risks 
of attacking the person and not their arguments: it can be 
seen as underhanded. 
 Usually, most of those clamouring for war are not the 
ones whose lives are at stake. Many of them are politi-
cians, media commentators or public figures. A possible 
retort is to ask why they aren’t going to the front lines or 
making any of the sacrifices they are expecting of others. 
 More generally, it is possible to question whether 
opinions or decisions should be made on the basis of 
endorsements. This is an attempt to turn the discussion 
                                                
12 A US general often quoted for his anti-war views is Smedley 
D. Butler, War Is a Racket (Los Angeles, CA: Feral House, 2003, 
originally published in 1935). 
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from the status and prestige of people involved to a 
consideration of the arguments. 
 
Challenging rewards 
Questioning or opposing rewards given to war supporters 
is a delicate business: it can easily go wrong. Consider, for 
example, health and other benefits provided to veterans. 
Saying that these should be reduced is likely to generate 
hostility. More promising is to say that every injured per-
son—whether from battle, construction work or domestic 
violence—should receive the same benefits and support. 
 Then there are the rewards for valiant acts on the 
battlefield, such as the Victoria Cross or Medal of Honor. 
For outsiders to say these are inappropriate or that they 
glorify killing would likely create antagonism. However, it 
could be effective if some of the award recipients question 
recognition of bravery. 
 Easiest to criticise are corporations that make huge 
profits from war-making. Another target is politicians who 
instigate or prosecute military build-ups or wars. Politi-
cians appreciate recognition and praise for their acts; if 
instead they are met with protests and ridicule, they will 
not be pleased. 
 In challenging rewards, it is those whose patriotism 
and sacrifice are least questionable who can have the 
greatest impact. For example, militaristic politicians are in 
the best position to cut back financial benefits to veterans. 
In general, though, challenging rewards for those involved 
in war seems to be one of the least promising ways of 
opposing the patriotism-war connection. 
 




So far, I have outlined five types of tactics for promoting 
patriotism in relation to war—exposure, valuing, positive 
interpretations, endorsement and rewards—and five corre-
sponding counter-tactics for challenging the military-
patriotism complex. Now it is time to turn to another set of 
tactics, involving alternatives to war. Instead of directly 
questioning, devaluing or confronting the system, the idea 
is to propose and promote a different way of doing things. 
An example is diplomacy. As well as saying “This war 
plan is foolish and likely to be disastrous” it is possible to 
say, “Diplomacy should be the first option.” 
 To discuss alternatives to military preparations and 
war is a big task. As well as peacemaking through the 
efforts of professional diplomats, possibilities include 
reducing military expenditures, converting military pro-
duction to production for civilian purposes, relying 
entirely on defensive-only military equipment and strategy 
(for example, fortifications but not tanks), using foreign 
aid to overcome poverty and inequality, building greater 
understanding of other societies (to reduce fear of foreign-
ers) and promoting education and journalistic approaches 




Here, I will look at a specific alternative: defending 
communities through popular nonviolent action—such as 
rallies, strikes, boycotts and occupations—and getting rid 
of military defence. This is called various names: social 
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defence, civilian-based defence, nonviolent defence and 
defence by civil resistance. I’ll usually refer to it as social 
defence.13 
 Converting to social defence would involve a range 
of transformations. Instead of relying on troops and 
weapons to deter and defend against attack, people would 
                                                
13 Anders Boserup and Andrew Mack, War Without Weapons: 
Non-violence in National Defence (London: Frances Pinter, 
1974); Robert J. Burrowes, The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense: A 
Gandhian Approach (Albany, NY: State University of New York 
Press, 1996); Antonino Drago, Difesa Popolare Nonviolenta: 
Premesse Teoriche, Principi Politici e Nuovi Scenari (Turin: 
EGA, 2006); Theodor Ebert, Gewaltfreier Aufstand: Alternative 
zum Bürgerkrieg [Nonviolent Insurrection: Alternative to Civil 
War] (Freiburg: Rombach, 1968); Gustaaf Geeraerts (editor), 
Possibilities of Civilian Defence in Western Europe (Amsterdam: 
Swets and Zeitlinger, 1977); Stephen King-Hall, Defence in the 
Nuclear Age (London: Victor Gollancz, 1958); Bradford Lyttle, 
National Defense Thru Nonviolent Resistance (Chicago, IL: 
Shahn-ti Sena, 1958); Brian Martin, Social Defence, Social 
Change (London: Freedom Press, 1993); Johan Niezing, Sociale 
Verdediging als Logisch Alternatief: Van Utopie naar Optie 
(Assen, Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1987); Michael Randle, Civil 
Resistance (London: Fontana, 1994); Adam Roberts (editor), The 
Strategy of Civilian Defence: Non-violent Resistance to Aggres-
sion (London: Faber and Faber, 1967); Gene Sharp, Making 
Europe Unconquerable: The Potential of Civilian-based Deter-
rence and Defense (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1985); Gene 
Sharp with the assistance of Bruce Jenkins, Civilian-Based 
Defense: A Post-Military Weapons System (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1990); Franklin Zahn, Alternative to the 
Pentagon: Nonviolent Methods of Defending a Nation (Nyack, 
NY: Fellowship Publications, 1996). 
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need to take responsibility for defence themselves. This 
would involve developing and practising skills in nonvio-
lent action, planning for threats and contingencies, and 
designing technological systems so they are unattractive to 
enemies but instead can serve the resistance. For example, 
people might learn the language and culture of potential 
enemies, build links with opposition groups in potential 
aggressor states, and set up resilient communication 
systems.  
 In 1968, Soviet and other Warsaw Pact troops in-
vaded Czechoslovakia. At that time the Soviet government 
dominated Eastern European countries. In Czechoslo-
vakia, there was a reform movement in the ruling 
Communist Party, moderating some of the harsh controls 
previously imposed. This was called “socialism with a 
human face.” These developments were threatening to the 
Soviet rulers, hence the invasion. 
 Czechoslovak military commanders decided not to 
resist the invasion, recognising that armed resistance 
would not succeed. Instead, there was a spontaneous non-
violent resistance by the Czechoslovak people, involving 
rallies and noncooperation.14 The radio network broadcast 
messages advocating resistance and advising against any 
violence. The network received information that Soviet 
                                                
14 H. Gordon Skilling, Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976); Joseph 
Wechsberg, The Voices (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1969); 
Philip Windsor and Adam Roberts, Czechoslovakia 1968: 
Reform, Repression and Resistance (London: Chatto and Windus, 
1969). 
224     Ruling tactics 
troops were bringing jamming equipment in by rail. After 
broadcasting this information, workers shunted the rail car 
to a siding. Meanwhile, people removed street signs and 
house numbers so the invaders could not easily track down 
individuals. 
 Perhaps the most effective part of the resistance was 
talking to the invading troops and convincing them that 
they were doing the wrong thing. The invading Russian 
troops had been told they were there to stop a capitalist 
takeover. Czechoslovak resisters, who spoke Russian, told 
them “No, we support socialism, Czechoslovak-style.” 
Many of the troops became “unreliable” and were re-
placed by ones who could not speak Russian. 
 The active phase of the resistance lasted just a week, 
after which Czechoslovak political leaders made unwise 
concessions. However, the Soviet rulers were not able to 
install a puppet government for eight months. The 
invasion and the nonviolent resistance discredited the 
Soviet government around the world, especially among 
communist parties in the west, causing many members to 
question Soviet leadership of the communist movement 
and to form independent parties. Undoubtedly the fact that 
resistance was nonviolent helped reduce the legitimacy of 
the invasion. The Czechoslovak resistance foreshadowed 
the Polish Solidarity movement in the 1980s and the 
nonviolent movements that overthrew Eastern European 
communist governments in 1989, including in Czecho-
slovakia. 
 The 1968 Czechoslovak resistance to the Soviet 
invasion was spontaneous, yet it was remarkably success-
ful. No form of resistance had much chance of success 
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against the overwhelming Soviet military superiority; 
nonviolent resistance maximised the cost to the Soviet 
rulers. And this was without any preparation.  
 Military defence is not guaranteed to be successful. 
Military planners recognise that to increase the prospects 
of success, planning, preparation and training are essen-
tial. A spontaneous armed resistance cannot be expected to 
succeed. The same applies to nonviolent defence: it is 
more likely to be effective with comprehensive training—
and much else.  
 For example, building links with people in places 
where a threat might arise is valuable. In Australia, for 
decades some politicians and commentators drummed up a 
fear of an invasion from “the north”—variously Indonesia, 
China or Japan—used as a pretext for greater military 
expenditures. (In recent years, this has been superseded by 
alarm over terrorism.) Assuming, for the sake of 
argument, there was some actual threat from Indonesia 
(especially prior to 1998, when it was a military-based 
regime), social-defence preparation in Australia would 
involve building links with pro-democracy and anti-war 
groups in Indonesia. The idea is that if the Indonesian 
government launched an invasion, it would provide a 
stimulus for a challenge to the Indonesian government.  
 Technology is also relevant. Secure communication 
systems are essential to coordinate resistance and to 
contact allies in other parts of the world. This might 
involve making encryption standard, and designing 
systems so that no one—including the government—can 
monitor the content or pattern of communication. This 
goes right against new Australian laws that require tele-
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communications providers to save metadata so it can be 
used by security agencies in anti-terror investigations. Any 
system that enables centralised control is a vulnerability in 
the case of a foreign invasion, because it can be taken over 
and used by the invaders. 
 There is much else that could be done to build a 
social defence system: renewable, decentralised energy 
systems; factories in which workers can shut down 
production; resilient agricultural and transport systems.15 
Most of all, a society prepared and designed for non-
violent resistance needs to be united in its goal, and in this 
there is a similarity with conventional patriotism. The 
difference is that social defence involves solidarity in 
defence of community, not government, and is not tied to 
the military. 
 This brings up an essential difference between social 
and military defence. Militaries can be used to defend 
against foreign enemies but are regularly used as tools by 
governments to defend against “internal enemies,” which 
is code for any citizen threat to the government or the 
military. There are many military regimes around the 
world, and in most countries the military, or a militarised 
police, is the ultimate defender of government. 
 With social defence, citizens are empowered with the 
skills and tools to challenge repressive rulers. This means 
that preparations for social defence necessarily promote 
skills and tools that can be used to challenge the govern-
ment and other powerful groups, or at least any of its 
                                                
15 Brian Martin, Technology for Nonviolent Struggle (London: 
War Resisters’ International, 2001). 
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policies that are unwelcome. For example, if workers have 
the capacity to shut down production and resist efforts to 
force them to get it going again—a very useful capacity in 
the event of a takeover—then they can use their capacity 
against bosses and owners. In fact, the ideal organisational 
form for production in a social defence system involves 
worker-community control, in a decentralised, cooperative 
arrangement. This makes it difficult for any oppressor to 
simply come in, replace the bosses and run the operation 
for their own benefit. 
 During the Nazi occupation of Europe, in most occu-
pied countries the Nazis did not aim to exterminate 
everyone—their targets for this were Jews, Gypsies, gays 
and a few other groups—but rather to exploit the popula-
tion and resources for their own benefit. Rather than 
destroy a factory, they would rather take it over and keep 
it operating. But the Nazi occupiers did not have the 
personnel and skills to replace all the managers of 
factories, businesses and government departments across 
Europe, so they relied on collaborators: citizens in the 
occupied countries who would serve the Nazi cause. Two 
prominent collaborators were Marshal Pétain in France 
and Vidkun Quisling in Norway; officially they were 
government leaders but in practice they were puppets of 
the Nazis. But further down the pecking order, acquies-
cence was also essential to Nazi rule. Business managers 
and government officials needed to keep doing their jobs. 
 In the Netherlands, there had been limited prepara-
tion in government departments for resistance to occupa-
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tion.16 Officials were supposed to do their job if it served 
the people but to resign if forced to implement unethical 
policies. However, in practice this plan was not carried 
out. Most Dutch government employees continued to 
work as usual. However, in other countries there was not 
even any thinking about preparing to resist. 
 In a social defence system, planning, preparation and 
training for resistance would be routine, in the same way 
that fire brigades plan for emergencies and run fire drills 
in workplaces. In the 1970s and 1980s, there was a 
network of a dozen social defence groups in the Nether-
lands, addressing different issues. One of them sought to 
formulate principles and plans for resistance by govern-
ment employees, so they would be better prepared than 
they had been against the Nazis. In the 1970s and 1980s, 
the primary foreign threat was from the Soviet Union: 
there was serious concern about a Soviet invasion of 
Europe, and indeed the rationale for the military alliance 
NATO was to deter and defend against such a threat. With 
the end of the cold war in 1989 and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1991, the threat evaporated and interest in 
social defence dissipated.  
 Yet the same issues remained relevant. To develop an 
alternative to military defence based on nonviolent 
resistance requires extensive planning, preparation and 
training. Most of all, it requires people to understand and 
                                                
16 A. H. Heering, “Het openbaar bestuur onder vreemde 
besetting,” Bestuurswetenschappen, nr 4, april/mei 1983, (“Public 
administration under foreign occupation,” http://www.bmartin.cc/ 
pubs/peace/83Heering.html). 
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be committed to unarmed resistance to aggression and 
oppression. This would have implications for nearly every 
aspect of society. The general direction for a transfor-
mation towards social defence is self-reliance, self-suffi-
ciency, decentralised decision-making, and empowerment 
of citizens through skill development and training. 
 A society organised for social defence would be a 
society resistant to any form of domination—including by 
its own government. What this means is that if people 
have the understanding and skills to resist an invader, they 
can use the same understanding and skills to challenge the 
government itself, if it becomes oppressive in some way. 
This, in my view, is the primary reason why few govern-
ments are keen to promote social defence. 
 Governments are protected from internal challenges 
by their own systems of organised violence, primarily the 
military and police. In practice, most of the time these 
systems are not needed. Most people cooperate with laws, 
and support enforcement of laws. When someone steals a 
car or assaults a stranger, most citizens cooperate with 
police in tracking down the culprit. But sometimes there 
are serious challenges to the government or to other 
powerful groups, especially corporations, and so force is 
used to protect the system. When people refuse to pay 
their taxes, then the courts, and the police if necessary, are 
invoked to force compliance. If workers go on strike or 
occupy the workplace, troops are sometimes brought in to 
break the resistance.  
 Completing the picture is selective enforcement of 
the law: when governments break their own laws, there is 
seldom any penalty, and when big companies flout the 
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law, they often get away with it or suffer only a small 
symbolic penalty.17 The point is that the police and mili-
tary nearly always support those with more power. 
Governments write laws that benefit those with power and 
wealth and then enforce the laws in a selective fashion, 
with those with little power or wealth receiving most of 
the blame for law-breaking. 
 In a society with a social defence system, ordinary 
members of the public would be empowered. A govern-
ment that lost the trust of significant portions of the 
population would have a difficult time surviving. To 
reiterate: empowering the people to resist oppression is 
threatening to most governments, so social defence is 
unlikely to be supported. It might be okay to support 
people power movements in other countries, to challenge 
enemy regimes, but promoting equivalent movements at 
home is another story. 
 With this background, it is useful to look at tactics 
used by governments to oppose the option of social 
defence. This assessment offers some clues about how to 
promote this alternative. 
 
Cover-up 
Few governments give any attention to social defence. 
“Cover-up” is not quite the right word for this treatment, 
which might better be called neglect or lack of interest. 
The social defence option is not on the government 
agenda, and there are no obvious means to raise it. When 
                                                
17 See chapter 4. 
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was the last time that a government sponsored a major 
public investigation into modes of defence? 
 The mass media usually follow government cues, and 
have given little attention to social defence. Peace move-
ments often don’t promote alternatives as much as oppose 
wars and weapons systems: they are better called antiwar 
movements. 
 There has been interest in social defence in a few 
parts of the world, including Australia, Britain, Canada 
and the US, but most progress in this direction occurred in 
Europe. This makes sense. European peoples had experi-
ence in being conquered and occupied by powerful 
regimes—Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union—or, if 
spared themselves, seeing their near neighbours being 
subjugated. Military defence against a much more power-
ful opponent was pointless or worse, except as part of an 
alliance with a powerful ally (the US military, via NATO). 
But with the collapse of the Soviet Union, much of the 
incentive to explore social defence evaporated. No threat, 
hence no need for an alternative. Of course this didn’t 
mean governments dismantled their military systems. It 
meant that civil society groups became less active as the 
official rationale for military forces became less salient. 
Indeed, it might be said that governments became less 
active in raising alarms about invasion, and hoped that few 
would notice that the rationale for standing armies and 
advanced weapons systems was gone. Then, conveniently, 
terrorism apparently provided a new pretext for military 
preparedness. Social defence provides a template for a 
citizen-based alternative to conventional anti-terrorism, 
but this was undeveloped and never captured much 
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interest among peace groups. After all, anti-terrorism was 
a pretext, and terrorism a minor problem, compared to the 
real possibility of nuclear attack during the cold war. 
 
Devaluation 
Governments and their apologists, on the few occasions 
when they took notice of social defence, could easily dis-
miss it as impractical—it simply wouldn’t work against a 
determined invader. Their assumption has always been 
that a ruthless aggressor will always be victorious over 
nonviolent opposition.  
 This sort of dismissal by governments wouldn’t 
matter so much except that it has long been shared by a 
large proportion of the population. Most people have been 
convinced, somewhere along the line, that violence is 
superior. Hollywood films assist in this: the good guys 
always win against bad guys by using violence, either 
greater force or force used in a smarter way. Few 
mainstream films show the power of collective nonviolent 
action. Despite dozens of repressive regimes having been 
toppled through mass citizen resistance over the past 
century, this has not become the stuff of Hollywood 
scripts. Instead, superheroes are a popular genre. 
 The glorification of violence as the antidote to threats 
to the citizenry contains an implicit devaluation of popular 
nonviolent action, which is assumed to be ineffectual and 
hence easily dismissed. 
 
Reinterpretation 
Another response to the idea of social defence is to 
provide arguments about why it won’t work. A typical one 
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is to say, “It wouldn’t work against the Nazis.” This is less 
an argument than an assertion that operates by appealing 
to unarticulated assumptions, in particular that ruthless 
violence will always triumph over nonviolent action. The 
argument about the Nazis has been countered in several 
ways, for example by noting that nonviolent action was 
used against the Nazis in some countries, with a degree of 
success,18 and more generally that nonviolent action was 
not even tried systematically, and certainly not as a 
strategy by governments.19 
 There have been few serious critiques of social 
defence. One of them was a study by Alex Schmid, who 
analysed opposition to a potential Soviet occupation of 
Western Europe.20 Schmid, to his credit, also analysed 
armed resistance to Soviet domination, for example in 
Lithuania from 1944 to 1952, and found it too was 
ineffective. Schmid’s arguments were questionable at the 
                                                
18 Jacques Semelin, Unarmed against Hitler: Civilian Resistance 
in Europe, 1939-1943 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993). 
19 For a careful response to the argument about ruthless violence, 
see Ralph Summy, “Nonviolence and the case of the extremely 
ruthless opponent,” Pacifica Review, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1994, pp. 1–
29. 
20 Alex P. Schmid, with Ellen Berends and Luuk Zonneveld, 
Social Defence and Soviet Military Power: An Inquiry into the 
Relevance of an Alternative Defence Concept (Leiden: Center for 
the Study of Social Conflict, State University of Leiden, 1985). 
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time.21 Their weakness was shown more dramatically a 
few years later with the collapse of Eastern European 
communist regimes in 1989 and the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union in 1991, triumphs of people power against 
repressive regimes.22 
 Careful arguments against social defence have not 
played a major role in its dismissal apparently because it is 
easy to dismiss the option on the basis of simplistic 
assumptions about the superiority of violence and appeals 
to the Nazi example and other assumed refutations. 
 
Official channels 
Attempts to convince governments that social defence is a 
viable option, indeed a superior alternative to military 
defence, have made little progress. Gene Sharp, the 
world’s most prominent nonviolence researcher, wrote 
two books about civilian-based defence and spent consid-
erable effort seeking to convince the US government to 
adopt the option.23 The US-based Civilian-Based Defense 
Association, which largely followed Sharp’s approach, 
also made efforts, all to no avail. The US government 
never even initiated a major public investigation into 
civilian-based defence. Seeking change via appealing to 
elites turned out to be a dead end. 
                                                
21 Brian Martin, Review of Alex P. Schmid, Social Defence and 
Soviet Military Power, in Civilian-Based Defense: News & 
Opinion, Vol. 4, No. 4, May 1988, pp. 6–11. 
22 Michael Randle, People Power: The Building of a New 
European Home (Stroud, UK: Hawthorn, 1991). 
23 Sharp, note 13. 
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 A few governments have looked seriously at social 
defence. Sweden has a “total defence” system incorporat-
ing conventional military defence, civil defence (bomb 
shelters, underground factories and other preparations to 
survive attack), psychological defence (preparation for the 
possibility of war) and social defence. The idea is that in 
case of invasion, if military defence fails, civil defence can 
provide protection and the population will be psychologi-
cally prepared and able to use nonviolent means to resist. 
This is not the same as a social defence system, especially 
considering that mixing violent and nonviolent methods 
can undermine the effectiveness of nonviolent resistance. 
Still, the Swedish system nominally includes nonviolent 
options, though they are subordinated to conventional 
military means. It should be mentioned that Sweden has a 
well-developed arms manufacturing industry, and its arms 
exports are the largest in the world on a per capita basis: it 
is not a model for fostering nonviolent alternatives. 
 As mentioned, in the Netherlands in the 1970s and 
1980s there was considerable grassroots interest in social 
defence, as well as a number of articles and books 
exploring and promoting this option.24 Nevertheless, the 
government was not much interested, until a minor party 
was able to use its pivotal role to push for a dozen social 
defence research projects.25 But this was reduced to a 
                                                
24 J. P. Feddema, A. H. Heering and E. A. Huisman, Verdediging 
met een Menselijk Gezicht: Grondslagen en Praktijk van Sociale 
Verdediging (Amersfoort: De Horstink, 1982); Niezing, op. cit. 
25 Giliam de Valk in cooperation with Johan Niezing, Research 
on Civilian-Based Defence (Amsterdam: SISWO, 1993). 
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single study—the Schmid study discussed earlier—which 
turned out to be more critical than supportive of social 
defence. 
 In Austria, conscripts are taught about social defence 
for part of their training. In Italy, individuals who were 
conscripted could opt for alternative service, and one 
option was being involved with an organisation promoting 
social defence. 
 Slovenia was formerly part of Yugoslavia. Around 
the time of the Balkan wars, Slovenia sought independ-
ence, and obtained it without any fighting. At that time, 
there was support for social defence. It was an optimal 
time for changing, especially for a small, weak state with 
no serious prospects of being able to defend militarily 
against an aggressor. But the interest in social defence 
faded and Slovenia ended up with a conventional military 
system. 
 The Baltic states—Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia—
were independent countries when, in 1940, they were 
incorporated into the Soviet Union. The next year they 
were conquered by Nazi Germany, and then reconquered 
by the Soviet Union in 1944. After 1989, with the collapse 
of Eastern European communist regimes through mass 
citizen action, people in the Baltic states used nonviolent 
means to agitate for independence, and were successful in 
1991. It was a classic case study of a nonviolent challenge 
to an oppressive ruler. So, some leaders thought, why not 
change to a social defence system and thus institutionalise 
this form of citizen resistance? There was interest—but 
only in Lithuania did interest continue. In 2015, the 
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country’s Ministry of Defence produced a manual for 
citizens on how to nonviolently resist an invasion.26 
 Various lessons can be drawn from these examples. 
One is that more pressure is needed to get governments to 
take social defence seriously. Another is that governments 
are the least likely group to make moves towards social 
defence. After all, if the state is built on a claimed 
monopoly over the legitimate use of violence in public, 
then social defence is a direct challenge to the state. Only 
the most enlightened leaders are likely to take it seriously. 
 
Intimidation and rewards 
It’s possible to imagine that proponents of social defence 
might be subject to threats and attacks, perhaps losing 
their jobs or being arrested and assaulted. So far, there 
seems little evidence of anything like this. It would be 
ironic should this occur, because the methods of social 
defence are designed to deal with attacks. 
 The other side of the coin is rewards for those who 
support military defence, and there are plenty. Promoters 
and supporters can obtain careers in the military or 
supporting agencies, such as arms manufacturers, and bask 
in the recognition that comes with being part of a coun-
try’s defence establishment. The entire military-industrial 
complex—a complex to which can be added science, 
education and other sectors—is built around rewards for 
                                                
26 Maciej Bartkowski, Nonviolent Civilian Defense to Counter 
Russian Hybrid Warfare (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Center for Advanced Governmental Studies, 2015), 
http://www.advanced.jhu.edu/nonviolent 
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those contributing. To promote social defence instead is, 




Social defence, as an alternative to military defence, thus 
faces quite a few obstacles, classified here into the catego-
ries of cover-up (though neglect is a better description), 
devaluation, reinterpretation, official channels and lack of 
rewards (whereas there are considerable rewards for 
supporting military defence). The next question is, how 
can they be countered? 
 
Exposure 
The first and essential step in promoting social defence is 
to make more people aware of this option. This can be 
done via articles, blogs, talks, debates and media cover-
age. This seems obvious enough. Indeed, it is far easier 
today to make information available than it was in the 
1980s, before the Internet. Despite the apparent ease of 
making the concept of social defence more visible, it has 
not been happening. It is worth considering some factors. 
 One problem today is information overload. Decades 
ago, the main challenge was gaining access to information 
about social defence, which meant finding out about a 
newsletter, article or book and obtaining it. Today, much 
of the same information—in books for example—is 
readily available for those who want to pursue it, but it is 
drowned in masses of other information. This is nothing 
new, but the factor of overload is much more significant 
today.  
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 Another problem is that information needs to be 
made relevant to today’s circumstances. Warfare is differ-
ent today than in the 1980s, and likewise social defence 
needs to be updated. Reading books written in the 1950s 
or 1980s is informative, but to engage more people in the 
ideas, contemporary relevance is vital. A big component 
of social defence today is likely to be online. Tactics, 
strategies, logistics and skills need updating. 
 Then there is the question of who is going to lead a 
resurgence of interest in social defence. It is all very well 
to talk about making the concept visible, but who will do 
this? In analysing tactics to promote an alternative to the 
war-state nexus, there need to be individuals and groups 
who will pursue them. 
 There is yet another consideration. Perhaps it is 
unwise to advocate directly for social defence, as this may 
only stimulate opposition by those committed to military 
defence. Another option would be to join campaigns that 
increase the capacity for social defence, even though that 
is not their purpose. Skills and strategies for overthrowing 
dictators are highly relevant. So are skills and strategies 
for challenging online surveillance, for developing local 
energy self-reliance, for building transport systems not 
dependent on imports of fuel, and a host of other areas.  
 Any centralised system is vulnerable to takeover. 
Think of transport, for example. If most people can get 
around by walking or cycling or vehicles powered by 
locally produced energy, then the transport system is 
resilient. Hence, the population cannot easily be subju-
gated by cutting off imports of oil or by occupying 
refineries or power plants. The same applies to communi-
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cations. If a government can monitor everyone’s calls and 
Internet usage, then the population is vulnerable to oppres-
sion by the government itself or by any aggressor that 
takes over the system. The implication is that efforts to 
build resilient transport systems and secure communica-
tion systems can make a community less vulnerable to 
control. This is a contribution to the capacity for social 
defence, even if no one ever thinks about defending 
nonviolently against aggression. 
 Social defence through changes that pass unnoticed? 
Is this better or worse than making more people aware of 
the option?  
 
Valuing 
A second aspect of promoting social defence is to increase 
its credibility by association with things people value. This 
might include endorsements by high-status people or 
associations with valued symbols. 
 Stephen King-Hall, a British naval officer in World 
War I, later became a prominent social commentator and 
an advocate of social defence. His book Defence in the 
Nuclear Age, in which he recommended abandoning 
military defence and defending Britain through citizen 
nonviolent resistance, was one of the earliest full-scale 
proposals for nonviolent defence.27 For respected military 
personnel to give credence to social defence is a potent 
endorsement, because it can make people think the option 
is worth considering. So far, however, very few prominent 
                                                
27 Stephen King-Hall, Defence in the Nuclear Age (London: 
Victor Gollancz, 1958). 
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people in any sphere of life—politicians, celebrities, 
business executives, religious figures, famous scientists—
have endorsed social defence.  
 Some respected figures have endorsed nonviolence, 
especially those who have led campaigns: Martin Luther 
King, Jr, Nelson Mandela, Desmond Tutu, Aung San Suu 
Kyi. However, no such figure has paid much attention to 
social defence. 
 Endorsement can also come from respected organisa-
tions, but few have taken any notice of social defence, 
much less given it their backing. The Green Party in 
Germany, from its beginnings, endorsed social defence. 
Although green parties are often associated primarily with 
environmentalism—via the symbolic colour green—in 
principle they are built around four principles: ecological 
wisdom, social justice, grassroots democracy and nonvio-
lence. However, whatever the formal policies of green 
parties, in practice few of them have done much to 
promote social defence. Perhaps this is a good thing, 
because it can be risky for an alternative to be identified 
with a political party, because then it may be more 
strongly opposed by members of other parties. 
 So far, the principal endorsements of social defence 
have come from those who have written about it and 
advocated for it. Most of those in this category have been 
peace researchers, such as Johan Niezing, Theodor Ebert, 
Gene Sharp and Johan Galtung. They add credibility to 
social defence in part through their status within the field, 
but perhaps more on the basis of what they actually write. 
Furthermore, most of their support for social defence was 
during the cold war. Johan Galtung, the world’s leading 
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peace researcher, wrote insightful essays on social defence 
in the 1960s,28 but has not given the option much attention 
in more recent works. Gene Sharp, the world’s most 
prominent analyst of nonviolent action, wrote two 
important books about civilian-based defence in the 
decade before the end of the cold war. Since then, Sharp 
has received quite a bit of mainstream recognition for his 
work on nonviolent action, especially in the wake of the 
Arab spring, but this has not had much spin-off for 
civilian-based defence. 
 In summary, social defence has received few 
endorsements outside of small community of scholars and 
activists who study and support it. This no doubt has 
contributed to its marginalisation. 
 
Interpretation 
Social defence, when it is raised with audiences unfamiliar 
with it, receives a variety of responses. Some people 
dismiss it out of hand; a few are intrigued and want to 
know more. However, these responses are mostly at the 
gut level, based on emotions and assumptions. At the 
intellectual or cognitive level, though, there can be a calm, 
logical engagement with arguments and evidence. At this 
level, advocates of social defence can make quite a few 
points. 
 
                                                
28 Johan Galtung, Peace, War and Defense: Essays in Peace 
Research, Volume Two (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers, 1976), pp. 
305–426. 
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 • Military defence cannot easily be separated from 
military offence: systems nominally set up for defence can 
be used for aggressive or interventionist purposes. 
 • Arms manufacture and sales underlie a huge 
amount of killing and suffering throughout the world. 
 • Military forces, in many countries, are used to 
support authoritarian governments. 
 • Social defence is based on methods of nonviolent 
action that have been shown to be more effective than 
armed struggle against repressive governments. 
 • Social defence is a system in which the means 
reflect the ends: if the goal is a world in which conflict is 
carried out without violence, then it is desirable that the 
methods to achieve such a world should not involve 
violence. (In contrast, military systems use the threat of 
violence to pursue “peace.”) 
 • Social defence can build a sense of solidarity among 
people, because preparations require this. 
 • Social defence systems promote skills throughout 
the population, including skills in persuasion, communi-
cation, decision-making, protest, noncooperation, and self-
reliance in energy, transportation, agriculture and other 
arenas. 
 • People who learn the skills for social defence can 
use those same skills to pursue social justice, for example 
to challenge government repression and corporate abuses. 
 However, such arguments are unlikely to win over 
anyone who is not already sympathetic.  
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Mobilisation of support 
Gene Sharp, who wrote important books about civilian-
based defence, believed that governments could be 
convinced to switch to this alternative after they were 
shown it was more effective, but his efforts were unsuc-
cessful. Indeed, although he received some polite hear-
ings, the US government made no significant initiatives 
towards civilian-based defence—not even an official 
investigation—meanwhile spending hundreds of billions 
of dollars every year on the military. This is a telling 
example of how logic and evidence cannot make much 
headway in the face of deeply held beliefs linked to vested 
interests. It might also indicate that the real driving force 
behind US military preparedness is not defence against 
foreign enemies but rather protection of US state and 
corporate interests. 
 Trying to convince government and military leaders 
about the effectiveness of social defence is to use official 
channels to bring about change. This is unlikely to be 
successful, and indeed official channels such as govern-
ment inquiries or expert panels often serve to give the 
appearance of dealing with concerns while actually 
nothing much happens. My view is that governments are 
the least likely to take the initiative to introduce social 
defence, because they have the strongest stake in having 
military forces to protect their own interests.  
 Instead of appealing to governments, the alternative 
is to mobilise support. For promoting social defence, this 
means building popular support via a mass movement, in 
the spirit of previous movements: anti-slavery, labour, 
feminist, peace, environmental, animal rights and other 
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movements. A movement for social defence could start 
out as a subset of the peace movement, but to have any 
chance of success it needs to have a wider base. The 
labour movement is important because, in a social defence 
system, workers need to be prepared and skilled in 
withdrawing and/or using their labour to resist impositions 
by an aggressor. Social defence is also relevant to most 
other movements, via the skills needed for resistance and 
via reorganisation of society to have the solidarity to 
oppose aggression and repression. 
 In relation to patriotism, there is a complication. 
Civilian-based defence, as presented by Sharp and others, 
is seen as national defence, namely defence against 
foreign aggressors. The idea is to replace one form of 
national defence by another: military defence becomes 
nonviolent defence. Much of the advocacy for civilian-
based defence is built around this assumption. This has the 
advantage of conforming to the usual thinking about 
defence, and drawing on assumptions about nationalism 
and patriotism. It does not question conventional govern-
ment-promoted views about the military and its purposes.  
 Treating civilian-based defence as national defence is 
at the same time a disadvantage. It assumes that state and 
military leaders are the ones who will make decisions to 
switch to a different form of defence, when they are the 
least likely to want to make such a change.  
 Another way to think of social defence is as defence 
of a community by its members. The word “community” 
is vague and makes assumptions about relationships 
between individuals. The idea, though, is that the state or 
nation is not necessarily the unit being defended. A more 
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likely possibility is that people defend themselves against 
their own government, including against troops or 
militarised police. “Social defence” in this formulation is 
defence against government repression. This is actually 
the usual meaning of social defence in some European 
countries. It makes sense in relation to the dual purpose of 
military forces: to defend the state against external and 
internal enemies. The internal “enemies,” in many cases, 
are simply citizens who are challenging abuse of power by 
the government. This is another way of seeing why few 
government leaders are likely to be convinced to switch 
from military to social defence. 
 Mobilisation of support for social defence means 
getting individuals and groups to support and take action 
to strengthen people’s commitment and skills to resist 
aggression and repression and to develop plans and build 
infrastructure to enable this. Since the 1990s, only a few 
groups in a few countries have been advocating for social 
defence, so most of the progress is happening in indirect 
ways. 
 • The spreading of skills in nonviolent action against 
repressive governments. This is ideal preparation for 
social defence. In fact, people power movements are 
social defence in action. What they lack is any sustained 
way of creating a system for nonviolent resistance as an 
alternative to military defence. 
 • Network communication systems, using phones, 
texts, Facebook, Twitter and other social media. Repres-
sive governments can more easily control one-directional 
media such as television and newspapers; networked 
media are more readily used for resistance. However, 
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governments are increasingly collecting data from social 
media to monitor dissent, so methods of opposing 
surveillance, such as encryption, are important to enable 
resistance. 
 • Technological self-reliance. Movements for local 
food production, decentralised energy production, and 
transport by walking and cycling help to make local 
communities less dependent on centralised facilities that 
can be controlled by governments. 
 • Protest movements—against poverty, exploitation 
and a host of other injustices—can provide experience and 
understanding in how to oppose repression, especially 
when the movements involve mass participation using 
methods of nonviolent action. 
 These and other developments are building capacity 
that can be used against foreign aggressors and against 
home-grown repressive governments. Whether this is an 
adequate substitute for a social defence system is another 
matter. Almost certainly it is not.  
 Governments continue to develop their capacities to 
control their own populations, for example through moni-
toring of dissent through mass surveillance and targeted 
intelligence operations, sophisticated public relations op-
erations, suppression or cooption of initiatives for worker 
self-management and participatory democracy, and 
promotion of high-tech infrastructure—large power plants, 
industrial agriculture dependent on pesticides, high-rise 
buildings—that is high cost, potentially vulnerable to 
disruption and amenable to centralised control. In the 
context of defending against aggression, campaigns 
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against this type of infrastructure contribute to making 
communities less vulnerable to attack and domination. 
 
Resistance to intimidation and rewards 
Supporters of military systems, to oppose critics and 
challengers, can intimidate them and/or offer rewards to 
tempt them to change their views or actions. A typical sort 
of intimidation is the surveillance, infiltration, disruption 
and repression of peace groups. Typical rewards include 
jobs and funding for supporters of the military, including 
individuals, companies and sectors of the population. 
These methods are likely to be used against promotion of 
social defence, at least if this promotion gains traction. 
 Promoters of social defence therefore need to be 
prepared to resist intimidation. This is a perfect example 
of methods reflecting and serving goals: the goal is a 
system for citizens to nonviolently defend against aggres-
sion and repression, and to promote this goal it may be 
necessary to defend against repression. At the moment, 
advocacy for social defence scarcely exists, and the risk of 
repression is not so great. It can be expected that if a 
significant movement develops and starts making progress 
promoting and implementing social defence, elements 
within the military may take serious steps to subvert or 
crush the movement. 
 Countering rewards often can be more difficult than 
countering intimidation. There are vastly more research 
grants and career opportunities for military-related 
projects than ones involving nonviolent action. Promising 
nonviolence practitioners and researchers may be attracted 
to jobs in the system that seem worthwhile but restrain 
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activism. Resisting temptations is part of promoting 
alternatives to the military. The bigger task is to change 
the incentive structure. This is a huge challenge. Imagine 
the hundreds of billions of dollars now spent on military 
systems every year being redirected to the building and 
maintenance of social defence systems. This would indeed 
be a revolution in defence affairs. 
 
Conclusion 
There are two main ways to challenge state-centred 
thinking linked to military systems. One is to directly 
respond to the war machine, addressing the massive 
attention to war, the glorification of military sacrifice, the 
rationales for military forces, the institutional legitimation 
of “defence,” and the intimidation of critics. Antiwar 
movements have made an enormous difference in deter-
ring or helping halt particular wars and opposing particu-
lar weapons systems. Even so, the war system remains 
central to the world order, because military forces serve a 
dual role, protecting the state against both external 
enemies and internal challenges. 
 A second way to challenge military nationalism is to 
propose alternatives to military defence. I examined one 
particular alternative, social defence, that involves prepa-
rations for citizens to resist aggression and repression, 
through understanding, training and choice of appropriate 
technological systems. This option has been almost 
completely marginalised. Nevertheless, an analysis of 
tactics can be helpful in seeing ways to promote social 
defence and the barriers likely to be encountered. In order 
to be a challenge to state-based defence, social defence 
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needs to be conceptualised as community defence, in 
many cases against the state. This potential for 
undermining state power is probably a primary reason 
why few governments have made any steps towards 
converting from military to social defence, or even 





The world seems to be made up of countries, and each one 
has a government. Most people think about the world in 
terms of countries and governments—it seems natural, and 
it’s a convenient way to make sense of the news and much 
everyday discussion. In addition, many people identify 
with a particular country. 
 This way of seeing the world, while useful for some 
purposes, can be misleading. Countries and governments 
are not the same as the people in them. Furthermore, 
governments often act contrary to the interests of the 
population, instead serving the interests of those with the 
most wealth and power.  
 What I call “ruling tactics,” which might also be 
called “patriotism tactics,” are methods used to encourage 
people to think in terms of countries and to identify with a 
particular one, and not to question in any fundamental way 
how wealth and power are distributed. To illustrate these 
tactics, I’ve chosen a variety of issues such as sport and 
terrorism. I picked these particular examples because I 
know something about them and they are addressed in 
everyday conversations. However, my assessments are far 
from definitive. Much more could be done to examine 
tactics in relation to any given topic, and to tackle 
additional topics. If you want to do this, how should you 
proceed? 
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 Consider a topic such as the economy, transport or 
the arts. Concerning this topic, a useful first step is to ask 
whether there is any plausible reason for people to identify 
with a country. (See chapter 2.) Does the average person 
really have much in common with thousands or millions 
of others who will never be friends or even be introduced, 
just because they are resident in the same area of land? For 
example, it might sound beneficial that the economy has 
grown, but looking more closely it could be that nearly all 
the increased income has gone to the top 1% of earners: 
not everyone has the same stake in our economy, namely 
the country’s economy. If you’re one of the wealthy ones, 
fine, but otherwise thinking in terms of our economy is 
misleading. It’s even more misleading if you take into 
account people in Bangladesh, Malawi and Peru.  
 The next step is to look at the common types of 
tactics used by rulers and their supporters to gain support 
for the system. As listed in the introduction, five tactics 
are commonly used in relation to the system (the country, 
the nation, the government).  
 
System-support tactics 
1. Exposure (of positives); attention 
2. Valuing 




So you look for evidence of any of these tactics, for 
example in the media, government policies or everyday 
conversations. For example, what sorts of comments are 
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there are about economic growth, especially of our 
economy? If growth is mentioned, that’s exposure. If it’s 
seen as a good thing, that’s valuing—and so forth. 
 After looking at tactics to encourage support for the 
system, you can look at tactics to oppose challenges and 
alternatives. To do this, you might need to learn more 
about a particular alternative or campaign, such as the 
Occupy movement, the global justice movement or the 
steady-state economy. Then you look for evidence about 
tactics against this alternative or campaign. The five tac-
tics listed in chapter 1, regularly used against challenges to 
the dominant view, are 
 




3. Negative interpretation 
4. Discrediting endorsements 
5. Intimidation 
 
For example, you might notice that there is little or no 
discussion of steady-state economics—it is covered up—
or that when it is discussed, it is criticised or dismissed as 
irrelevant or foolish. 
 Some of these techniques are more visible than 
others, depending on the topic. Some alternatives are 
hardly ever discussed: cover-up is so effective that other 
techniques are not required. In relation to conventional 
economics, Gandhian economics is one such alternative. 
However, some economic alternatives occasionally obtain 
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visibility, for example local currencies, the Tobin tax or a 
guaranteed annual income, in which case you need to 
examine the way they are treated by various commentators 
and spokespeople. Evidence of devaluation and reinterpre-
tation can come from what people say and write. Evidence 
of intimidation can sometimes be hard to obtain: it is 
hidden. Local currencies have sometimes been shut down 
by governments, but this is not widely known. 
 If you’re involved in a campaign to challenge domi-
nant perspectives and promote alternatives, then you can 
go on to challenger tactics.  
 
Opposing system-support tactics 
1. Exposure (of negatives) 
2. Devaluing 
3. Negative interpretation 
4. Discrediting endorsements 









These tactics provide a rough framework for thinking 
through how to proceed and in particular for seeing 
whether there are actions that might be taken. For 
example, if you are involved in promoting local curren-
cies, you can oppose the tactics by rulers by exposing the 
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negative consequences of the conventional money system, 
devaluing it, explaining what is wrong with it, and so 
forth. You can promote the alternative by publicising and 
valuing it, and so on. 
 These are big topics, and no one can do everything. 
To become deeply involved in just one issue such as local 
currencies can become a life’s work and, depending on the 
individual, it can be worthwhile putting most effort into 
one or two tactics, for example explaining the alternative 
to wider audiences or trying to implement it in a particular 
area. 
 Another possibility is to look at what’s being done 
already and seeing whether there are any significant gaps, 
namely worthwhile tasks that are being neglected. This 
could be an opportunity to make a difference. 
 It is helpful to remember that countries, borders and 
states are human creations. They are all fairly new, and are 
neither inevitable nor necessary aspects of the way 
humans organise themselves. The fact that so many people 
spend so much effort encouraging everyone to think in 
terms of countries and governments indicates that this 
perspective does not come naturally. There are strong 
contrary pressures to think locally and globally. System-
support tactics are just tactics, not guaranteed to succeed. 
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